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Key factors that explain the negotiating failures of developing countries are [ ] a myopic focus on 
single issues rather than the game in aggregate. 
Peter Drahos 
 
Governments of poor countries are being asked to co-operate in a redistribution of global income 
that will cost them hundreds of millions of dollars. 
The Economist 
 
Failure does not strike like a bolt from the blue; it develops gradually according to its own logic. 
Dietrich Doerner 
 
 2 
 
The Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws and their Enforcement in Jordan 
A post-WTO Review & Analysis 
Ferris K. Nesheiwat 
 
Abstract 
This thesis examines the implementation, enforcement and evolution of IP laws and regulations in 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.  The period of interest includes the last decade of the 
twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty first century, with emphasis on the role 
played by Free Trade Agreements struck between Jordan and the United States, the European 
Union, and Jordan’s accession to the World Trade Organization. 
This thesis also examines the enforcement of the current set of IP laws in Jordan, and looks at 
their social and economic compatibility with the Jordanian societal norms and economic realities. 
This thesis argues that Jordanian IP laws lack a meaningful social and economic texture, and have 
failed to be evenly enforced in Jordan, essentially because they do not fit the Jordanian culture 
and are not compatible with Jordan’s economic stage of development.  Additionally, the thesis 
argues that IP laws have had insignificant economic impact on the Jordanian economy as the 
majority of technologies used in Jordan, and the majority of foreign direct investments attracted 
to Jordan, are not IP related.  Finally, the thesis argues that the current Jordanian enforcement 
model, which is built on coercion by donor countries, is serving the interests of foreign 
companies to the exclusion of the local citizens, and will not, in the long run, produce an 
enforcement model based on self-regulation by Jordanians, themselves.  The laws, therefore, are 
unable to produce tangible results for the Jordanian people, or help meet their economic interests. 
The last part of the thesis deals with recommendations and suggestions aimed at creating an 
integrated approach to the adoption of IP policies.  
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1. CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to Thesis 
Prior to Jordan’s amending its laws in preparation for its accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) on 11 April 2000, there was not a substantive legal body that focused on 
issues of intellectual property (IP).  IP was marginalized for the majority of the period from the 
creation of the Jordanian state in 1921 until the 1990’s, but that changed with the increased 
prominence of IP in the early 1990’s resulting from a major overhaul of laws and regulations in 
general, particularly those related to IP.  The main two catalysts for that overhaul were Jordan’s 
goal of securing membership in the WTO, and the new liberalized economic outlook, which 
focused on market liberalization, economic openness, and the attraction of foreign investments.   
Pursuing WTO membership was mainly a political rather than an economic decision, and it was 
an outlook influenced by the principles advocated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
during its support program of the Jordanian economy and currency, which began in 1989 and 
ended in 2004.1  The economic impact and value of such decisions were not evaluated beyond the 
promises made by the developing countries of more access to world markets, increased foreign 
direct investment (FDI), and the improvement of the Jordanian standard of living.2 
The adoption of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
as part of the WTO accession resulted in sweeping changes to IP laws.  A new patent law 
granting 20 years of patent protection was enacted in 1999, incorporating TRIPS-consistent 
standards into its language.3  A new copyright law was enacted in 1992,4 while the law on 
trademarks, which dates back to 1952,5 was amended several times throughout 2007.6  
Additionally, in the span of three years (2000-2003), Jordan went from having only four IP laws 
before 2000 to having twelve such legislations.  As a result, the traditional laws covering 
Copyright (Law No. 22 (1992)), Patent (Law No. 32 (1999)), Trademarks (Law No. 33 (1952)), 
and Service Marks (Law No. 19 (1953)), were joined by an additional eight legislations covering 
various aspects of IP.7 
These developments were not made without controversy. The Parliament was suspended for the 
period when the IP new laws were enacted, thus the process was deprived of a full debate by the 
                                                     
1 See, “Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF -- Evaluation Report IMF Support to Jordan, 1989-
2004”, April 14, 2010, http://www.imf.org/External/NP/ieo/2005/jor/eng/index.htm; Mohammad 
Halaiqah, “Interview”, August 9, 2011; Rula Madanat, “Interview”, August 9, 2011; Hanan Sboul, 
“Interview”, July 26, 2011; Ahmed Hammed, “Interview”, August 18, 2011.,  
2 Halaiqah, “Interview”; Sboul, “Interview”; Hammed, “Interview.” 
3 Patent Law No.32, 1999.  TRIPS stands for the “the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property” 
4 Copyright Law No.22, 1992. 
5 Trademarks Law No.33, 1952.. 
6 Ibid., art. 40. 
7 Industrial Forms and Drawings Law No. 14, 2000.  Integrated Circuits Law No. 10, 2000.  Geographical 
Indications Law No.8, 2000.  Unfair Competition and Trade Secrets Law No. 15, 2000.   New Plant 
Varieties Law No. 24, 2000. Instructions for Border Points Regarding the Protection of Intellectual 
Property No.7, 2000.  E-Transactions Law No.85, 2002.  Competition Law No.49, 2002; National 
Products Protection Law No.50, 2002. 
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legislative branch.  Additionally, civil-society organizations were not involved in their enactment, 
which limited the input of economic and social costs associated with their implementation.8   
Shortly after the WTO accession, Jordan embarked on negotiations with the United States to 
conclude the Jordan–US Free Trade Agreement (JUSFTA), and with the European Union (EU) to 
conclude the Jordan-EU Association Agreement (JEUAA).  The JUSFTA which entered into 
force on December 17, 2001,9 and the JEUAA entered into force on May 1, 2002.  Both the 
JUSFTA and the JEUAA have a strong IP component with a significant TRIPS-plus dimension. 
1.2 Hypothesis 
This thesis argues that IP laws have failed to be evenly enforced in Jordan, essentially because 
they do not fit the Jordanian culture and are not compatible with Jordan’s economic stage of 
development.  Additionally, the thesis argues that IP laws have had an insignificant economic 
impact on the Jordanian economy, as the majority of technologies used in Jordan, and the 
majority of foreign direct investments attracted to Jordan, are not related to IP.  Finally, the thesis 
argues that the current Jordanian enforcement model, which is built on coercion by donors and 
developed countries, is serving the interests of foreign companies to the exclusion of Jordanian 
citizens, and will not, in the long run, produce an enforcement model based on self-regulation by 
Jordanians themselves.  The laws, therefore, are unable to either produce tangible results for the 
Jordanian people or help meet their economic interests. 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter II provides a literature review of the evolution of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), a 
critique of the current IPRs system and regional and bilateral treaties, and the literature pertaining 
to Jordan.  Chapter III, presents the methodology used, and the results of the filed 
interviews/questionnaire conducted to gauge the attitudes to IPRs in Jordan.  Those field 
interviews and the questionnaire form the basis of the comments on the attitudes of the Jordanian 
people towards IPRs. 
Chapter IV, provides a background for understanding the contemporary Jordanian legal system.  
It touches on the historical roots of the Jordanian legal system, covering major legislations 
including the constitution, the penal code, the civil code, and the legislative process.  The judicial 
system is then examined, and the various types of regular courts are discussed.  The discussion 
then turns to the place that IPRs occupy within the Jordanian legal system.   
The process and drivers behind the existing legal framework for IPRs are addressed in Chapter V, 
which examines the factors behind the development and evolution of Jordanian IP legislations.  
The obligations and requirements of the treaties and international agreements that collectively 
impacted the development of the various laws affecting IP are examined and outlined.  The 
treatment of IPRs under TRIPS is examined by first shedding some light on the historical roots of 
TRIPS and then discussing its basic principles.  The types of IPRs discussed and covered by 
TRIPS are examined, as well as the specific requirements TRIPS has for each type.  Also 
discussed are the enforcement mechanisms and administrative and remedial procedures allowed 
under TRIPS, including the dispute resolution mechanism. 
                                                     
8 Halim Abu Rahmeh, “Interview”, August 7, 2011; Sboul, “Interview.” 
9 The Free Trade Agreement between Jordan and the United States (JUSFTA) was signed on October 24, 
2000. 
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Chapter V also discusses the Jordan-United States Free Trade Agreement and provides a detailed 
discussion of the provisions governing IPRs under it.  This includes four subsections discussing 
the most important provisions of the JUSFTA, and examining the treatment of IPRs under it.  In 
each of these four subsections, which deal with trademarks and geographical indications, 
copyright, and patents and compulsory licensing, the compatibility of the current Jordanian laws 
with the text of the JUSFTA is discussed.  The Jordanian-European Association Agreement is 
also discussed, and the IPRs and protections under it are examined.  The JUSFTA and JEUAA 
are used to discuss Jordan’s progression from a TRIPS-based IPRs standard to a TRIPS-plus 
standard.  Various features of the TRIPS-plus standard are outlined, and the additional legal 
responsibilities imposed by it are discussed in comparison to TRIPS standards. 
Chapter VI focuses on the implementation of IPRs in Jordan from the enforcement agencies’ 
point of view.  The administrative framework that governs the enforcement of the Jordanian IP 
laws is discussed, including the administrative agencies within the Ministry of Industry and Trade 
(MoIT), the National Library (NL), and other agencies.  Specific empirical data is provided and 
analysed for each enforcement agency, as well as, other general enforcement parameters, such as 
levels of overall piracy, IP caseloads, and training.  An overview of the administrative 
enforcement of IPRs in Jordan is presented using data on the overall administrative and judicial 
enforcement.  Next, the enforcement mechanism through MoIT is examined, including data on 
the patent and trademark applications as well as the patents and trademarks granted by the MoIT.  
The administration and enforcement of author’s rights is discussed, and empirical data on the 
overall software piracy levels in Jordan are examined.   
Chapter VI also discusses the role of the Customs Department as the agency in charge of 
enforcing IP laws at the Jordanian borders and examines data on the number of cases referred by 
the Customs Department to Jordanian courts.  The effect and impact of both TRIPS and the 
JUSFTA are examined and analysed, and special attention is given to the claims made by the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR) that the JUSFTA requires the amendment of the 
Customs Law.  Next, the enforcement role played by the Jordan Institute of Standards and 
Metrology (JISM) is examined, including an analysis of the whether the JISM is actually 
overstepping its mandate in the enforcement of IP laws. 
Chapter VI also examines the role played by courts in the enforcement of IPRs.  The problem 
with the execution of verdicts in terms of the extensive backup of execution orders and the 
suitability of specialized IP courts are also discussed.  The general correlation between IP 
standards and economic development in Jordan is discussed, as well as the relationship between 
those standards and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Jordan, including the impact that FDI has 
had on the Jordanian pharmaceutical sector.  The chapter concludes by presenting a list of 
impediments to the enforcement of IPRs in Jordan, including poor coordination between 
enforcement agencies, poor drafting and implementation, weak patent prosecution, poor public 
awareness and adverse economic conditions, inappropriate IP standards, and low levels of 
innovation. 
Chapter VII brings together several threads from the thesis from the perspective of Jordan as a 
developing country to address some current issues in enforcement and compliance.  This chapter 
argues that TRIPS and TRIPS-plus fail to work in Jordan because they are not consistent or 
compatible with Jordan’s economic, social, and cultural conditions.  First the economic cost of 
TRIPS and TRIPS-plus standards are put in perspective, and then historical roots of pre-TRIPS 
enforcement activities are explored, particularly the evolution of the Special 301 Report.  The 
chapter then explains how Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Regional and Bilateral 
Agreements (RBTs) represent the continuation of the Special 301 Report by different means in 
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order to achieve the same end result of propagating high IP standards globally.  Both the Special 
301 Report and FTAs have significant IP enforcement factors, which are used in Chapter VII to 
introduce the discussion of the factors influencing the levels of IP protections on a global scale, 
such as forum shifting, the expanding connectedness of IPRs with other disciplines and fields of 
study, and access to pharmaceuticals.  All three factors show a concerted effort by developed 
countries to relentlessly support increasingly stringent IP standards supported by international 
corporations and their lobbying bodies.  
However, as a developing country dependent on foreign aid from developed countries and 
international organizations, Jordan is susceptible to economic pressures by developed countries 
and international corporations to adopt high IP standards.  Such pressures are the primary 
explanation for the developing countries’ eventual agreement to adopt TRIPS and TRIPS-plus 
standards.  Developing countries use the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) when 
it suits their needs, while simultaneously undermining it by incorporating separate dispute 
settlement mechanisms in FTAs to the exclusion of the DSU.  Coupled with the enforcement of 
IP through coercion, however, Jordanian decision makers are led to believe that higher IP 
standards are essential for economic growth.  
Chapter VII concludes by outlining specific factors that are impacting the enforcement of IP 
standards in Jordan: Framing, which shapes policy by helping to designate meanings, build 
understandings, and subsequently produce specific policy actions and solutions; Monitoring and 
Capacity Building, which presents a mutually supportive approach for influencing the 
enforcement of IP standards; Donor Funding, which heavily impacts Jordan’s policy-making in 
the areas of interest to its donors, including IP; Levels of Adjustment, Technology Transfer and 
Societal Norms; and finally Policy Issues and Governmental Capacity. 
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2. CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides a survey of IP literature.  It identifies how international scholars perceived 
the effect of harmonized IP standards on access to common knowledge, and it provides a review 
of literature pertaining to Jordan.  Areas of controversy and questions are identified. 
2.1 Background 
The advent of the twenty-first century brought dramatic changes to the global governance of IP.  
The seeds of this change were sown in the 1980s and 1990s, as the US and the EU championed 
the establishment of universal rules to govern IP practices.  Their goal was and remains the 
globalization of OECD10-style IP regimes, which emphasise greater protection of IPRs at the 
expense of more public access to those rights.  The most significant milestone towards 
harmonizing national IP standards with OECD-style IP standards was the inclusion of TRIPS in 
the WTO, which, as examined by various scholars, was the direct result of intense lobbying by 
corporate executives who gained full backing from the trade negotiators of the developed 
countries.11 
Assessments of TRIPS by scholars have concluded that, notwithstanding the limitations on 
setting national IPRs policies imposed by TRIPS, countries could exhibit diminished variations in 
their IP laws in accordance with their specific economic and social conditions.12  Such early 
assessments, however, were prematurely optimistic, as they did not take into account the advent 
of multilateral and RBTs, which further pushed the pendulum towards higher IPRs protection.  
RBTs were introduced by the US and the EU because they realised that the ultimate goal of IPRs 
harmonisation was not fully achieved through TRIPS, and because they both became increasingly 
aware of the blocking power that developing countries enjoyed by virtue of the consensus 
requirement for any TRIPS amendment.  As a result, the US and the EU moved to an RBT 
approach to achieve IPRs harmonisation outside the multilateral approach of the WTO.   
RBTs were presented to developing countries as yet another piece of the contemporary landscape 
of trade agreements intended to provide them with a heightened degree of integration into the 
international economy.  Specifically, they offered developing countries the trade-off of exclusive 
entry conditions to the US and EU markets in return for amending the legal and administrative 
frameworks, governing IPRs to become similar to those in the US and the EU.  Thus, the price to 
be paid for increased market access under RBTs is the relinquishing of many of the very tools 
that historically were used by developing countries to attain the developmental benefits of 
integration in the international economy.   
                                                     
10 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
11 See for example, P. Drahos, “Global Property Rights in Information: The Story of TRIPS at the GATT,” 
Prometheus 13, no. 1 (1995): 6–19; Duncan Matthews, Globalising Intellectual Property Rights: The 
TRIPS Agreement (London: Routledge, 2002); Susan K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The 
Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2003); C. May, The World 
Intellectual Property Organization: Resurgence and the Development Agenda (Taylor & Francis, 2007). 
12 See for example, C. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options 
for Developing Countries, 2001; The Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (UK), Integrating 
Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy (London, 2002); Kenneth Shadlen, “Exchanging 
Development for Market Access? Deep Integration and Industrial Policy Under Multilateral and 
Regional-Bilateral Trade Agreements,” Review of International Political Economy 12.5 (2005): 750–
775. 
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Many scholars are critical of TRIPS and the increasing integration of IP into RBTs, but much of 
that criticism is not country-specific; rather, it is focused on general rules and legal provisions.13  
While the criticism of the increased integration of IP into RBTs was at times based on the RBTs’ 
threat to eliminate the national capacity to tailor IP management to national conditions,14  it did 
not go further into an analysis of country-specific local political and cultural frameworks.  I argue 
that without such an analysis, it is not possible to understand the tensions between technologically 
advanced countries’ push for higher rights protections and less developed countries’ resistance to 
the resulting increased cost of regulation.  At stake is the significant impact that IP policies and 
laws can have on country-specific human development and allocation of limited resources. 
Jordan, which is the focus of this thesis, is a prime example of such a situation as it has attached 
its strategies of IPRs integration to the multilateral framework of the WTO and RBTs with the US 
and the EU.   However, one must not consider such a shift towards favouring IPRs as the final 
word in the overall historical discussion of IPRs, because the tension between the desire for 
maximum exclusivity and the desire for maximum access cannot be resolved for the benefit of 
one over the other.  Such a one sided approach will result in either severely restricting access to 
knowledge or eroding the economic incentive to innovate.  The discussion inevitably concerns the 
tension between the interests of right holders, who want to maximise the control they exert over 
their works in hopes of maximising the profits gained from such works, and the interests of those 
who are not right holders, but want to have access to these works and possibly use them to create 
other innovations.  Instead, there must be a fair and balanced system of IP laws that provides 
limited exclusivity and sufficient access consistent with the public interest.15   
A balanced system should be dynamic and adaptive to new technologies, as well as to economic 
shifts and global developments.  An adaptive system is an open system that is able to alter its 
behaviour according to changes in its environment because it is closely linked to that 
environment.  For IP systems, such a system necessitates that governments and legislators have 
closer reflection on and a better understanding of the local needs of the societies to which those 
IP systems are applied.  This chapter presents a literature review, which concludes that the current 
literature is too focused on general rules and legal provisions at the expense of country-specific 
analysis, failing to provide an intimate comprehensive review of IP laws at the country-specific 
level.   
2.2 Evolution of IPRs 
The evolution of IP laws and standards that culminated in TRIPS is viewed by the literature as a 
shift in the direction of maximising private rights over public interests.  Sell and May view 
                                                     
13 See for example, Peter Drahos, “Information Feudalism in the Information Society,” The Information 
Society 11, no. 3 (July 1995): 209–222; Christopher May and Susan K. Sell, Intellectual Property 
Rights: A Critical History (Lynne Rienner Pub, 2005); Sell, Private Power, Public Law; Keith Eugene 
Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy (Peterson Institute, 2000); C. M Correa, 
Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO, and Developing Countries: The TRIPS Agreement and Policy 
Options (Zed books, 2000); Matthews, Globalising Intellectual Property Rights: The TRIPS Agreement; 
Shadlen, “Exchanging Development for Market Access? Deep Integration and Industrial Policy Under 
Multilateral and Regional-Bilateral Trade Agreements.” 
14 For example, Kenneth C Shadlen, “Intellectual Property, Trade, and Development: Can Foes Be 
Friends,” Global Governance 13 (2007): 171. (Concluding that making the IP and trade regimes work 
for development is a challenging task and is not a direct result of either.) 
15 Tzen Wong and Graham Dutfield, Intellectual Property and Human Development: Current Trends and 
Future Scenarios (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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TRIPS as the latest episode in a long process of expansion of IP protection.16  They argue that 
TRIPS has resulted in the shifting of IPRs towards monopolies of the right holders at the expense 
of the public interest.17 
May takes this argument one step further by arguing that developed countries and multinational 
companies (MNCs) are pushing for the reification of IPRs in order to depoliticise the IP 
discourse, and to emphasis a technocratic policy-making approach to IPRs.18  In this context, May 
uses reification to refer to the process of transforming a an abstract idea or concept (in this case 
IP standards) into a concrete concept that is not subject to debate in terms of the reduction of its 
scope or limits. 19  In other words reification will cause a discussion of decreasing the limits of 
protection of IPRs to be considered by society as unorthodox because it contradicts the 
reified/concrete concept of increased and not decreased protection of IPRs.20  He argues that 
reification should be resisted if we are to establish a meaningful global politics of information and 
knowledge.21  He submits that IPRs are not natural, but the result of a historical process of 
political-legal developments, whereas their reification aims to place the harmonisation of IPRs in 
an ahistorical context.22 
The shift towards higher protection of IPRs is explained by Machlup and Penrose in the historical 
context of a decline in support for the idea of free trade.23  While Shadlen attempts to explain that 
shift using political diffusion, which depicts policy-making as an interdependent and interactive 
process that results in developing countries’ rush to harmonise IP standards similar to those 
adopted by the US and the EU.24  Other important factors include framing, socialisation, and 
selective use of capacity development and trade dependency, all of which were shown by 
Shadlen, Schrank, and Kurtz to have statistically significant effects on shaping the level of 
protection provided through IPRs.25  In addition to ideas from the US and EU, those factors were 
used by entities holding opposing views to the US and EU’s official stand on IPRs, such as 
Oxfam and academic scholars.26  
                                                     
16 Susan Sell and Christopher May, “Moments in Law: Contestation and Settlement in the History of 
Intellectual Property,” Review of International Political Economy 8, no. 3 (September 2001): 467–500. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Christopher May, “The Denial of History: Reification, Intellectual Property Rights and the Lessons of the 
Past,” Capital & Class 30, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 33 –56. (Another consequence of reification is the 
cementing of the ‘natural’ status quo, such that criticism of the ‘natural state’ becomes unnatural, which 
can be portrayed by MNC’s and developed countries as destabilizing and even dangerous) 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid.; Christopher May, “The Hypocrisy of Forgetfulness: The Contemporary Significance of Early 
Innovations in Intellectual Property,” Review of International Political Economy 14, no. 1 (2007): 1–25. 
23 Fritz Machlup and Edith Penrose, “The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century,” The Journal of 
Economic History 10, no. 01 (1950): 1–29. 
24 Kenneth Shadlen, “The Politics of Patents and Drugs in Brazil and Mexico: The Industrial Bases of 
Health Policies,” Comparative Politics 42.1 (2009): 41–58. 
25 Kenneth C Shadlen, Andrew Schrank, and Marcus J Kurtz, “The Political Economy of Intellectual 
Property Protection: The Case of Software,” International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 1 (2005): 45–71. 
26  See for example, Hamed El Said and Mohammed El Said, “TRIPS‐Plus Implications for Access to 
Medicines in Developing Countries: Lessons from Jordan–United States Free Trade Agreement,” The 
Journal of World Intellectual Property 10, no. 6 (November 1, 2007): 438–475; A. H Khoury, 
“‘Measuring the Immeasurable’-The Effects of Trademark Regimes: A Case Study of Arab Countries,” 
Journal of Law and Commerce 26, no. 1/2 (2006): 11; Mohammed EL-SAID, “From TRIPS-minus to 
TRIPS to TRIPS-plus: Implications of IPRs for the Arab World,” The Journal of World Intellectual 
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The literature shows that such harmonisation of IP standards through TRIPS has the effect of 
restricting the space for national IP policy setting.27  This is a significant departure from the 
traditional role of having national IP laws reflect levels of economic development.  Developing 
countries, including Jordan, have traditionally made private ownership of knowledge difficult to 
obtain and had weaker IPRs than developed countries.28  This has been evident in shorter patent 
terms, and Jordan’s, refusal to patent pharmaceuticals and setting concurrent requirements for 
national registration for copyright and trademark protections.  This variation in protection and 
enforcement standards was not uncommon in the pre-TRIPS era; for example, the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (the principal international convention on IP 
for most of the 20th century) allowed countries a significant degree of flexibility in designing 
their patent regimes.29  Under TRIPS, such variation and flexibility are no longer available, as all 
but the poorest countries are subjected to the same standards for IP management under a one-size-
fits-all approach.30   
Harmonisation also is criticised for resulting in increased commodification of intellectual 
products and for emphasising proprietary usage at the expense of non-proprietary areas, such as 
fair use for copyright and compulsory licensing for patents.31  Halbert uses that criticism as the 
philosophical basis for opposing the harmonisation model, which she views as making the public 
good residual to the exercise of private rights with commodification given primary importance.32  
Within the broad political economy debate, the commodification argument is specifically based 
on the assumptions that within the commodity culture, no one creates for free, and the assumption 
that culture is only created by professionals who, because they make a living from their work, 
always demand compensation.33  Halbert rejects both assumptions and draws parallels between 
the unfair treatment of women in developed countries and the unfair treatment of developing 
countries by developed countries under the commodification model of IPRs.   
Halbert argues that the commodification model has historically benefited developed countries and 
men.  She believes the ultimate threat posed by the current commodification of IPRs is the further 
erosion of the value that can still be found in the types of creative endeavours that developing 
countries and women produce.34  For example, Halbert views the introduction of copyright law 
into areas of creative activity for females (e.g., quilting) as commodification at the expense of the 
gift/sharing aspect of creative endeavours.35  Halbert’s articles while clearly preferential of IPRs 
model that allows for more sharing of the creative endeavour than currently allowed under the 
harmonisation model, never seems to define the borders of such an IPRs model. 
                                                                                                                                                              
Property 8, no. 1 (2005): 53–65; Oxfam, All Costs, No Benefits: How TRIPS-plus Intellectual Property 
Rules in the US-Jordan FTA Affect Access to Medicines, Briefing Paper (Oxfam, March 2007); F. K 
Nesheiwat, “The Adoption of Intellectual Property Standards Beyond TRIPS–Is It a Misguided Legal & 
Economic Obsession by Developing Countries?,” Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative 
Law Review 32 (2010). 
27 Kenneth C Shadlen, “Policy Space for Intellectual Property Management: Contrasting Multilateral and 
Regional-bilateral Arrangements,” Econômica 10, no. 2 (2008): 55–81. 
28 Christopher May, A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2000). 
29 Shadlen, “Policy Space for Intellectual Property Management.” 
30 Ibid. 
31 May, “The Denial of History”; Debora Halbert, “Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses: A 
Manifesto for User-Generated Rights,” Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 11 
(2009 2008): 921. 
32 May, “The Denial of History.” 
33 Halbert, “Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses.” 
34 Debora Halbert, “Feminist Interpretations of Intellectual Property,” American University Journal of 
Gender, Social Policy & the Law 14 (2006): 431. 
35 Ibid. 
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Scholars like Halbert and Gill see the resistance of such forms of commodification as part of the 
global fight against IPRs, which has become part of the resistance to the neo-liberal form of 
globalisation.36  In resisting this form of globalisation, Drahos and Braithwaite argue that 
developing countries’ bargaining and negotiation position will be improved if they adopt a 
networked governance approach rather than rely on traditional coalition building.37  Through 
networking, they argue that weak parties become connected to other pools of capacity and power 
pools that can then flow through the network to achieve the goals of the members of the 
network.38  However, they do not explain how a country like Jordan, which is heavily dependent 
on foreign aid from developed countries, can create or participate in such a network without 
jeopardising its socio-economic stability. 
 May sees the commodification of IPRs as self-defeating, because increased commodification will 
cause rational people to reject the role of IPRs.  He argues that such a rejection will occur because 
IPRs construct a scarcity model that is neither natural nor self-evidently beneficial to all, thus 
creating a non-efficient model of supply and demand focus on the protection of rights for the 
express purpose of raising prices.39  This is a point that I build upon in this thesis, especially as I 
explore the levels of compliance in the methodology chapter. 
2.3 Critique of the Current IPRs System 
As a result of the increased harmonisation of IPRs, the theoretical criticism of harmonisation has 
escalated, and various critiques of the current IP system have emerged, including calls for new IP 
models.  Halbert calls for the deconstruction of the current power/domination relationship that 
does not recognise reciprocity and treats IP standard setting as the domain of developed countries; 
in place of the current system, Halbert calls for IPRs to be based on mutual understanding and a 
social construction of knowledge, but she does not describe the limits for the scope of protection 
of IPRs, if any, under this scenario.40   
Drahos, on the other hand, has been especially active in elaborating a proposal for a new 
framework of IPRs grounded in a human rights framework, which does not circumscribe the 
freedom of developing countries to set efficient standards of IP protection.41  Drahos argues that 
the current IP regimes’ monopoly rights actually fail to avoid the ‘tragedy of the commons’ for 
IPRs (i.e., that property held in common and not otherwise rationed through proprietary use is 
subject to over- and abusive use and subsequent ruin, because information cannot be depleted 
through use).42  However, he makes that leap without explaining what harm would result from 
monopoly rights even if they fail to avoid the tragedy of commons for intangible information.  I 
                                                     
36 Stephen Gill, Power and Resistance in the New World Order (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Francis Gurry 
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Medicines,” Liverpool Law Review 28, no. 1 (May 2007): 11–39; John Braithwaite, “Responsive 
Regulation and Developing Economies,” World Development 34 (2006): 884. 
38 Drahos, “Four Lessons for Developing Countries from the Trade Negotiations Over Access to 
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39 Christopher May, “Between Commodification and ‘Openness’:The Information Society and the 
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have found both Halbert’s and Drahos’ arguments against the harmonisation model of IPRs to be 
morally appealing, but they have not provided me with tools to suggest what limits should be 
applied.  In other words, should countries completely forsake IPRs, and, if not, what are the 
boundaries of a new system, and I think that such a query can only be answered through country- 
specific research similar to that undertaken by this thesis.   
May, is more helpful in that regard, as he argues for jettisoning the globally harmonised IP 
standard model to allow social costs at the national level to play a larger role in determining 
global IPRs protections.43  He argues for that approach because until there is a more equal global 
society, a global regime that attempts to treat access to knowledge in all countries and regions 
similarly cannot be justified.44  I find the argument for using country-specific social costs to 
determine the limits of each country’s IPRs system to be a sound basis for an alternative to the 
globally harmonised IP standard, and I have argued for it in the case of Jordan. 
The globally harmonised IP regime has also been criticised for presupposing that  third-world 
countries are more developed than they are in reality and, therefore, capable of generating and 
absorbing inventions at a rapid pace.45  Shadlen finds that the IP regimes in general, and  the 
patent systems advocated by TRIPS in particular, do not fit with developing countries’ scientific 
and technological capacities.46  The challenges of such a mismatch translate into less funds 
allocated to enforcement, because increased protection, and therefore benefit, accrues 
disproportionately to foreign right holders.  Developing countries are learning that enforcement 
entails significant fiscal costs, and. Since the majority of IP is imported by developing countries 
and not developed by them, they are realising that IPRs protection is effectively the use of local 
resources to protect foreign right holders.47  
Specific to that disproportionate benefit Haunss and Shadlen fault the patent system because the 
majority of its benefits accrue to a tiny minority of foreign actors; they challenge the notion that 
patents serve the industry as a whole.48  In addition to that fault, they argue that the US and EU 
patent systems are functionally unfit for developing countries because both systems are built 
around allowing litigation to correct for errors in patent examination and granting, whereas 
developing countries generally do not have a robust patent prosecution or litigation practice.49    
This thesis validates that point for Jordan, as field interviews done in the course of this thesis 
have concluded that, ten years after TRIPS, Jordan has no local patent law practice.   
2.4 Critique of RBTs 
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Drahos accuses RBTs of weakening the multilateral trading system,50 and further criticises RBT 
drafting because it has differences in interpretation structured into the agreement, thus planting 
the seeds for future differences in expectations and obligations.51  This point is addressed in this 
thesis by examining the debate between the US and Jordan regarding the Jordanian Customs Law 
amendment under the Jordan-US Free Trade Agreement (JUSFTA).   
Another problem with RBTs is that their dispute resolution mechanisms provide a forum-shifting 
opportunity, which weakens the multilateral WTO dispute resolution system.  Because they are 
less legally sophisticated, developing countries are disadvantaged by RBT’s’ forum shifting 
because it takes them away from the legal precedents under the WTO’s dispute resolution 
mechanism.52  Choice of forum provisions in RBTs does not strengthen the multilateral trading 
system under the WTO. 
RBTs also restrict the flexibilities available under TRIPS.  Shadlen notes that few countries take 
advantage of their rights under TRIPS and that, in combination with the proliferation of RBTs, 
the de facto opportunities for policy innovation in IP are significantly less than suggested by 
TRIPS.53  Shadlen also argues that the proliferation of RBTs is a de facto (if not explicit) effort to 
create a TRIPS-plus system (i.e., an IPRs system that is even more protective of IP than TRIPS 
is).54   
Matthews supports the point that developing countries are slow to take full advantage of the full 
scope of TRIPS flexibilities, including those aimed at ensuring access to medicines, such as 
compulsory licensing, exceptions to exclusive patent rights, and parallel importation.55  Reasons 
suggested for developing countries not taking advantage of the full TRIPS flexibilities include: 
(1) absence of institutional capacity and local technical expertise to put the TRIPS flexibilities 
into practice; (2) bilateral pressures, especially through RBTs that have IP provisions that go far 
beyond those under TRIPS; and (3) the prevailing form of technical assistance and capacity 
building in the area of IP.56  This thesis validates the points made by Shadlen and Matthews as it 
concludes that Jordan effectively moved into a TRIPS-plus IP model, which greatly hindered 
Jordan’s ability to benefit from flexibilities under TRIPS.  
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RBTs also usually call for an increased level of technical assistance to the developed countries as 
an additional tool to support the commodification and harmonisation of IPRs.  Drahos challenges 
the way technical assistance provided by the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO), and the European Patent Office (EPO) has been used.  He argues that instead of 
building local capacity, such assistance has focused on creating integration with developing 
countries’ patent offices, which ultimately leads to reliance on the USPTO’s and EPO’s searches 
and granting decisions.57   
May criticises the WIPO for being a politicized organization that uses its capacity development 
and technical assistance programmes to engender, through socialisation, IPRs views similar to 
those under RBTs.58  WIPO socialisation of policy makers through training and education is 
thought to produce advocates for enhanced IPRs protections among domestic policy decision 
makers.59  Such local advocates are used to overcome local opposition for increased IPRs 
protections and to formulate public policy that increases the security of property owners while 
minimising the uncertainty of investors.60   
The UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, and Matthews and Tellez conclude that the 
design and delivery of IP-related technical assistance to developing countries is not integrated 
with the overall national development strategy of each individual developing country.61  
Matthews finds that instead of being used to help remedy issues related to institutional capacity, 
technical assistance is used by developed countries to highlight the need to safeguard the interests 
of right holders and to achieve improved IPRs enforcement standards by emphasising the best 
practices to protect IPRs.62  For example, the 2002 WIPO-drafted patent law for Cambodia did 
not even take into account any TRIPS flexibilities in its mandate for the issuing of pharmaceutical 
patents, even though, as a least developed country, Cambodia was not expected to meet that 
requirement until 2016.  This thesis validates the point that technical assistance provided to the 
Jordanian patent office was geared towards best enforcement practices and not towards the use of 
any flexibilities available under TRIPS . 
2.5 Literature Pertaining to Jordan 
Developing countries like Jordan would want to open US and EU markets to their products, but in 
return, are asked by the US and the EU to enter into RBTs and accept the regulatory norms that 
come attached to the RBTs.63  As Shadlen points out, in the case of RBTs, in exchange for even 
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greater access to the developed countries’ markets, developing countries relinquish yet more 
regulatory instruments.64   
Analysis of the effect of RBTs on the Arab world in general was previously presented by M. El 
Said,65 but no detailed analysis has yet been performed for Jordan specifically.  Malkawai 
provided an analysis of the JUSFTA, but only in the context of deciding if its terms can serve as a 
template for a proposed US-Middle East free trade agreement, not to examine the local context of 
those terms.66    
Similarly, El Said and El Said’s examination of the terms of the JUSFTA and cautioning against 
the negative effects of TRIPS only related to access to medicines.67    They challenged the claim 
that the RBTs bring general and specific benefits to developing countries and suggested that 
benefits from the JUSFTA have been largely exaggerated while the costs have been 
underestimated.68  I agree with their analysis and build on it in this thesis, as they have only 
presented it within the context of access to medicines.  Also, Malkawi and Haloush’s review of 
Jordan’s protection of plant variety law is limited to plants and not intended to address IPRs in 
Jordan from a broader perspective.69  A contextualisation of the JUSFTA and the JEUAA within 
Jordan is therefore missing from the literature.   
Nawafleh’s approach to IPRs enforcement in Jordan, on the other hand, sees the need for even 
stronger IPRs.70  He argues that stronger IPRs will increase foreign direct investment (FDI) into 
Jordan as well as investment in the information technology (IT) sector.71  He basis his demands 
on foreign reports and reviews by agencies like the US Agency for International Aid (USAID); he 
does not provide any local analysis to support his conclusions.  I disagree with his findings and 
provide the missing local analysis of FDI inflows to show that there has been little impact of IP 
laws on FDI inflows.  Al-Dajani also makes the unsubstantiated link between increased FDI 
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inflows into Jordan for a period of time with Jordan’s upgrading of its IP laws to TRIPS 
standards.72 
In two separate works, Sirhan and Al Sharari follow Nawafleh’s trend by recommending stronger 
IPRs enforcement in Jordan and the allocation of more human resources to such enforcement.73  
They both see weaker IPRs leading to fewer jobs, less research and development, and increased 
costs in all sectors.74  Their work, however, does not provide any basis for such a conclusion 
other than citing foreign scholars who have written generally about the benefits of IPRs; because 
they fail to provide a local context for their conclusion, the reader is left wondering if a one-size-
fits-all IPRs model is applicable. 
This thesis addresses two weaknesses of the current literature.  First, overgeneralisations have 
been made regarding the pros and cons of TRIPS and RBTs with too much attention paid to rules 
and legal provisions at the expense of country-specific analysis.  Specifically there is no detailed 
examination of the effect of TRIPS, the JUSFTA, and the JEUAA on Jordan’s IP policies and 
economic development.  There is an abundance of literature on the origins of TRIPS and the 
integration of IP into RBTs;75 however, there is a gap in the literature on country-specific analysis 
of IP policy-making.  A second problematic weakness in the literature that arguably results from 
the first one is insufficient contextualisation of local political and cultural frameworks and how 
they do or do not influence IP policies.  In this thesis, I argue that there are good reasons to 
assume that specific local knowledge and information is likely to lead to different set of policies 
within different countries. 
Addressing the two mentioned shortcomings is important because it is not sufficient to discuss 
IPRs from a global perspective; rather, there must be a localised approach to resolving the tension 
between the competing social objectives of encouraging innovation by recognising private rights 
and encouraging diffusion of knowledge to a broad range of people.   The next logical step is 
localised contextualisation, which will strongly complement all the work surveyed throughout 
this chapter.  Localised analysis provides the required validation or refutation of the theory that a 
one-size-fits-all harmonised approach to IPRs can address the tension between the social 
objectives discussed.  Competing interpretations of IP policies and the tensions and human 
consequences that arise from them can only be resolved locally and at the domestic level.  Such 
local understanding can then, in turn, be used to influence the more general discussion of 
international IP and trade agendas. 
This thesis also lends critical support from a country-specific perspective to the notions that true 
and proper enforcement should not be necessarily associated with changes in laws and policies, 
and that direct pressure to adopt IP laws from developing countries may lead to little change in 
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behaviour.76  This thesis confirms that in the case of Jordan’s approach to IP enforcement, there is 
a strong element of acquiescence on paper, including amending existing laws and enacting new 
ones, to do just enough to free itself of US pressure—but not more.77   
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3. CHAPTER III: GAUGING ATTITUDES TO IPRS IN JORDAN – 
BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Cultural Factors 
Jordan and the Arab world can be described, according to the cultural indicators developed by 
Hofstede,78 as conservative, masculine, power distant, and collective. Masculine cultures are 
more assertive than Feminine cultures and value achievement and materialism.79  In power distant 
cultures, the authority of superiors is accepted, inequalities among people are both expected and 
desired, less powerful people are dependent on the more powerful, and the hierarchy in 
organizations reflects the inequality between higher-ups and lower-downs.80  Collective countries 
have little personal freedom, because the groups and organizations to which one belongs invade 
one’s private life.81   
Hofstede’s power distance index measures the extent to which the less powerful members of 
organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed 
unequally, resulting in inequality (those who have more versus those who have less).  Hofstede 
suggests that the followers endorse a society’s level of inequality as much as the leaders do.  For 
example, Germany is positioned at 35 on Hofstede’s scale.82 Compared to Arab countries where 
the power distance is very high (80) and Austria where it is very low (11), Germany falls 
somewhat in the middle.  German society does not have a large gap between the wealthy and the 
poor, and German citizens have a strong belief in equality.  German citizens have the opportunity 
to rise in society.  By contrast, the Arab world has a large gap between the wealthy and the poor, 
and its residents do not have a strong belief in equality.   
The strong collectivist culture of the Arab world, of which Jordan is part, results in little personal 
freedom, which leads to a weak individual assumption of responsibility. This collectivist 
orientation is expressed in ideals that scholars associate with Arab culture, such as solidarity, 
cooperation, commitment, mutual trust, support, and a sense of belonging.83   The literature 
suggests that collectivist cultures place strong cultural restrictions on the self, resulting in a low 
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need for uniqueness and a strong motivation not to break away from the aforementioned values.84  
In such a collective society, where individuals sacrifice their personal ambitions for the good of 
the collective, the spread of IP piracy is more likely, as individuals motivated by solidarity, 
cooperation, trust, and support are likely to share property with others and expect them to do the 
same, without much regard for the notion of IPRs.85   
IP piracy is also related to power distance, which is high in Arab countries.86  The greater a 
culture’s power distance (i.e., the further individuals feel from their superiors, such as law 
enforcement officials), the greater the propensity to pirate IP products87  The Arab culture, 
therefore, scores high on collectivism and power distance, both of which have been correlated in 
the literature with increased piracy rates and low enforcement of IPRs.  Overall, the literature 
does point to an effect of the cultural effects on perceptions of IP.88  Specific nations have 
specific cultural traits that are difficult to change in their essentials, although they can often be 
superficially modified.89 
3.2 Religious Factors 
In this section, religion is examined as a potential factor in shaping Jordanian attitudes to IPRs.  
Religion is an important moral and cultural force in Arab societies like Jordan, where 95% of the 
population is Muslim.90  In Islamic countries, religion directs the citizens’ behaviour91; however, 
due to contemporary Islamic views on IP, it is difficult to ascertain a clear position in Islamic 
jurisprudence towards IPconcepts.92  On the one hand, those who adhere to the position of 
classical scholars reject the concept of IP, arguing that knowledge should be available for all 
humans to use and share with each other and that no one should be deprived access to 
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knowledge.93  On the other hand, some Islamic scholars have accepted the premise that ideas 
and/or methods can be owned under the rubric of IP but have premised their prohibition of 
copying on the need to have a ‘legitimate ruler’ approve such a prohibition.94  The issue of who is 
a legitimate ruler under Islamic law is not a clear one; Sharia, which is considered God’s law and 
supersedes the laws of the State, is expected to be the sole criterion of behaviour, and the 
authority of the temporal ruler as the representative of Allah is derived from and designed by that 
law.95  The fact that all Arab countries, including Jordan, have adopted a hybrid legal system that 
takes Sharia law into account in certain areas but forsakes it in other areas, can be a key factor in 
leading observant Muslims to believe that laws pertaining to IPRs should not be observed from a 
religious point of view, because the ruler who approved them is not technically a ‘legitimate 
ruler’ according to Sharia law.   
Thus, because there is not a single unified Islamic position on IP, any claims that Islam supports 
the enforcement of TRIPS-style IP are questionable.  The problem of establishing a unified 
religious position on IP is further complicated by the fact that Islam does not acknowledge the 
role of a universal legal authority with the power and right to make laws applicable to all 
Muslims; rather, the authority of even a legitimate ruler is no greater than that of any other 
qualified mujtahid96 (one who possess the power of ijtihad, the interpretation of problems not 
precisely covered by the Qurān, Ḥadīth (traditions concerning the Prophet’s life and utterances), 
and ijmā (scholarly consensus)).97  Therefore, since the default position under Islamic 
jurisprudence is to allow an activity unless it is specifically prohibited, the position of one legal 
scholar opposed to piracy is considered only that scholar’s personal opinion and cannot be given 
any more weight than another scholar’s opinion which might contradict it.  IPRs is addressed 
under the Quran, Ḥadīth, or ijmā; thus, it is an area that will likely never be treated uniformly by 
legal scholars, resulting in inconsistent approaches that allow for individual interpretation on how 
a Muslim should observe or not observe IPRs laws.  One can also conclude that studies 
suggesting that Muslims will abide by IPRs laws if piracy is prohibited by Islam98 should be 
interpreted within the context of (i) the lack of treatment of IPRs under Islamic law, and (ii) the 
fact that any Islamic legal opinion on piracy holds little or no universal jurisprudential weight. 
Another potential rationalization for disregarding IPRs is that counterfeiting data provided by 
multinational companies is accused of being grossly overestimated; thus, some research 
concludes that piracy is an externality to MNCs, meaning that piracy has little to no negative 
monetary impact on MNC’s.99  MNCs have been accused of making false claims of massive 
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economic losses in order to divert attention from the real harms of counterfeiting, such as the use 
of IP piracy to fund organized crime, and the MNCs role in perpetuating these harms by 
aggressively marketing their expensive brands as status symbols.100  The literature points out that 
people look for ways to rationalize their behaviour when considering decisions such as whether to 
pirate a copy of software.101  A monetary rationalization posits that most IP companies are large 
corporations that make large profits and can therefore afford the loss of a few pirated copies.  A 
religious one might be based on any of the religious positions under Islamic law that oppose the 
enforcement of IPRs.   
3.3 A Note on Empirical Data 
This thesis is concerned with the implementation and enforcement of IP laws.  Laws do not exist 
in a vacuum; rather, they derive their value and significance from the impact they have on their 
environment and surroundings.  One of the guiding themes of this thesis is the idea that a law that 
does not have such an impact is destined to be no more than a passive text. 
Thus, the researcher has endeavoured to use empirical data as part of the analysis to gauge the 
impact of IP laws.  Obtaining data in Jordan is difficult for the following reasons: 
1. There is no unified repository of information on most issues, including legal 
topics.  In addition, statistics have not been made publicly available in all areas 
(including important economic information like FDI, as noted by the U.S. 
Government accountability office),102 and available information is usually overly 
general and lacking in detail.  Even though Jordan has a General Statistics 
Department (GSD), statistics and data on several areas are compiled by other 
agencies and sources (e.g., Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and FDI numbers are 
compiled by the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ)).  Similarly, data on court 
activities are compiled and published by the Ministry of Justice and the Judicial 
Council, and data on specific enforcement agencies like the Customs Department 
and the MoIT are available almost exclusively through those agencies.  This 
problem is not unique to the economic or legal sector and even extends to social 
sectors.  For example, there are three different figures for the percentage of 
handicapped individuals in Jordan,103 and unemployment numbers are similarly 
disputed.  The end result is that in order to secure data or statistics on almost any 
social, legal, or economic area, one must perform a great deal of research to 
determine the source of those figures and to reconcile their disparate values, often 
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by examining their differing definitions, areas of measurement, and measurement 
mechanisms. 
2. The quality of the available data is not uniform.  For example, the imports and 
exports numbers compiled and published by the CBJ are usually presented in the 
form of a press release that states the relative breakdown of a few major 
categories of imports and exports but stops well short of a detailed analysis or 
even a complete listing.  FDI numbers as presented by the CBJ represent another 
major problem because they are not broken down by category, which meant that 
this researcher could not find a specific number for the IP component of FDI 
figures and instead had to deduce that component from other numbers pertaining 
to the sources of the FDI and the areas to which the FDI was targeted.  In some 
instances, as with the numbers pertaining to investments benefiting from 
incentives by the investment promotion laws, which are compiled by the Jordan 
Investment Board (JIB), it was found that projects were counted more than once 
in order to artificially increase the value of projects benefiting from those 
incentives.104  This researcher therefore relied on CBJ data rather than JIB data 
when examining the impact of IP laws on economic development and investment.  
This lack of uniformity, which continues to be perpetuated by the many 
competing sources of data and the absence of full statistical analysis is 
particularly dangerous because the public tends to be easily manipulated by 
statistics.  An old adage describing the persuasive power of numbers rings true in 
the case of obtaining data in Jordan: “There are three types of lies – lies, damned 
lies, and statistics.” 
3. The various agencies and departments are largely reluctant to offer any numbers 
on their work, especially if those numbers pertain to areas that are considered 
problematic or in which the official data could be used in potentially unflattering 
ways, such as IP laws.105  Jordan does have an Access to Information Law,106  
which stipulates that citizens have the right to access written, recorded and 
photographed governmental information and basic government records. Actual 
access, however, is restricted by agencies’ obfuscation and by other laws like the 
Press and Publication Law and the Government Secrets Law, in addition to ten 
exceptions within the Access to Information law itself that place certain data 
outside its purview.  It is worth noting that agencies’ reluctance seems to 
disappear when communicating with foreign governmental officials or local staff 
of foreign embassies.  For this reason, the author corresponded with several 
ministries seeking information but did not receive written responses from the 
majority of them; this prompted him to seek field interviews instead, which are 
discussed in greater detail below.  Correspondence between the GoJ and foreign 
agencies (an example of which is presented in Annex 5) and information released 
through Wikileaks demonstrate that Jordanian officials are very willing to share 
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information with foreign agencies.107  Additionally, the Access to Information 
Law Request Form demands that the seeker explain why the information is 
needed, thus allowing the request to be refused if the reviewer does not approve 
the intended use.  There are no mechanisms to force the government to explain its 
denial of the request; while the law states that each denied request must be 
justified, the refusal to provide an answer to a request is considered an implied 
denial under the law which does not require justification.108  It is not clear how 
would one exercise a judicial review option under such a de facto denial, as the 
requester is not provided with any reasons to include in its claim before a court of 
law.  On the other hand, Jordan’s willingness to provide information to 
international agencies was clearly indicated by considerable data often found by 
this researcher in filings by the Jordanian government to the WTO or the USTR 
and the US Congress, when attempts to obtain similar data from the local sources 
were futile. 
As a result of the above issues, the researcher had to rely on information obtained first hand 
through interviews (explained in further detail below), data published in the news media, and data 
provided by the government to foreign agencies (often found on those agencies’ websites). 
3.4 Field Interviews 
The political, economic and social attitudes of IPRs by the Jordanian governmental and private 
sectors presented in this thesis were based on field work carried out by the author throughout the 
period from the registration for the degree with Durham University, specifically from 26 July to 
28 August 2011.  A concise transcript of the interviews is provided in Annex 7 of this thesis.  
Because the governmental agencies were not responsive to written requests for information, the 
author sought personal interviews instead.  Securing such interviews was difficult, as the 
interviewees were initially reluctant to meet with the author, who had to rely on personal contacts 
to secure approval from the interviewees.  Once the interview process started, however, the 
author was able to obtain further recommendations that led to additional interviews.  Individuals 
in the governmental and private sectors were interviewed, including key members of the 
Jordanian team to the WTO and the JUSFTA negotiations, which provided good insight.  
Interviews with the governmental officials proved to be more difficult to conduct than those in 
the private sector, as they were more cautious and reluctant to share personal impressions or 
information beyond the official information usually available on the internet.  The author assured 
them that they would be provided with a transcript of the interview in order to indicate any 
information they preferred to be cited anonymously.  This approach facilitated the interview 
process, eased the atmosphere with the governmental employees, and helped in obtaining a more 
candid picture of the IP situation in their respective departments.  Interviews in the private sector 
were easier to conduct; initial inhibitions were surmounted quickly as the interviewees engaged in 
a candid and open discussion of the implications of Jordan’s adoption of TRIPS on their 
respective economic sectors.   
Extensive interviews were conducted with Jordanian officials and Jordanian industry trade groups 
in the following organizations, offices, and departments: 
• Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT),  
• Jordanian Patent Office at the Department of Industrial Property within MoIT, 
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• Jordan Food and Drug Administration (JFDA) 
• Jordan Customs 
• Jordan Institute for Standards and Metrology (JISM) 
• Former governmental officials including the head of the Jordanian delegation to 
the WTO and the JUSFTA negotiations 
• Jordanian Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (JAPM) 
• Jordan Exporters Association 
A complete list of the interviewees and their respective institutions is included, along with notes 
from the interviews, in Annex 7. 
The interviewees who were government officials were cautious and reserved in their comments, 
with the exception of the officials from the JISM, who were asked by the JISM director to fully 
cooperate with the author.  Officials from the MoIT were aggressive in editing their answers and 
comments and asked that the edited segments not be attributed to them, while they did not dispute 
the truthfulness of those parts. 
(a) Questionnaire:109 
A questionnaire was created and used to gather the attitudes of students at Jordan 
University toward counterfeit products.  A copy of the questionnaire can be found 
in Annex 8 of this thesis.  The survey questions were formulated based on the 
literature.110  The questionnaire consisted of four sections.  The first section 
contained questions on perception of the current prevalence of counterfeit 
products among university students. . The second section contained questions on 
the respondents’ attitudes towards counterfeit products based on their religious 
beliefs; these questions were intended to examine whether students’ ethical 
orientation affected their behaviour towards counterfeit products.  The third 
section, consisting of six items measured on a two point (yes or no) scale, 
contained questions on the respondents’ ethical attitudes towards counterfeit 
products.  The fourth section contained questions on the following demographic 
categories: 
• Respondent’s age 
• Marital status: 
• Monthly income of the respondent’s family 
• Respondent’s College 
                                                     
109 The questionnaire was designed, prepared, collected, tabulated and analyzed with the help of the staff of 
Jordan University’s Center for Strategic Studies (CSS), under the supervision of Dr. Waleed Alkhateb 
the head statistician of the CSS. 
110 Ramnath K. Chellappa and Shivendu Shivendu, “Managing Piracy: Pricing and Sampling Strategies for 
Digital Experience Goods in Vertically Segmented Markets,” Information Systems Research 16, no. 4 
(December 1, 2005): 400 –417; T.C.H. Kwong and M.K.O. Lee, “Understanding the Behavioral 
Intention to Digital Piracy in Virtual Communities - a Propose Model,” in IEEE International 
Conference on e-Technology, e-Commerce and e-Service, 2004. EEE  ’04. 2004 (presented at the IEEE 
International Conference on e-Technology, e-Commerce and e-Service, 2004. EEE  ’04. 2004, Taipei, 
Taiwan, 2004), 223–226; Jih-Hsin Tang and Cheng-Kiang Farn, “The Effect of Interpersonal Influence 
on Softlifting Intention and Behaviour,” Journal of Business Ethics 56, no. 2 (January 1, 2005): 149–
161; Al-Fadhli, “The Ethical Dilemma of Software Piracy in Islamic Societies.” 
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• Respondent’s country of birth 
• Respondent’s place of residence (province) 
• Source of respondent’s tuition 
Given the earlier discussion on the power distance and collectiveness of 
Jordanian society, the lack of a unified religious position on the issue of IPRs in 
Islamic jurisprudence and the monetary rationalization against MNCs, the results 
of the questionnaire were expected to indicate a high percentage of piracy, the 
non-conclusive role of religion in combating piracy and a general disregard for 
the alleged damages suffered by MNCs as a result of piracy among university 
students. 
(b) Sample 
Jordan University students from several colleges outlined in Table 3.1, below, 
were chosen as the sample for the questionnaire because college students 
represent a large segment of copyright violators.111  Jordan University is the 
oldest and largest campus in Jordan, and its location in Amman attracts students 
from various parts of the country, unlike provincial universities where the student 
composition tends to be more localized.   
The total sample was 381 students.  Of the 362 valid responses, 177 (46.5%) of 
respondents were male, and 199 (52.2%) were female, with 5 (1.3%) not 
reporting their gender.  The respondents represented a cross section of majors 
taught at the university.   
The sample was representative of the various colleges at the University of Jordan 
and was distributed as follows: 
                                                     
111 Steven Lysonski and Srinivas Durvasula, “Digital Piracy of MP3s: Consumer and Ethical 
Predispositions,” Journal of Consumer Marketing 25, no. 3 (2008): 167–178. 
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Table (3.1) Sample Distribution: 
 
Faculty Frequency Per cent 
Engineering 109 28.6 
Education 35 9.2 
Science 43 11.3 
Islamic Law 
(Sharia) 
17 4.5 
Agriculture 4 1.0 
Information 
Technology 
33 8.7 
Business 
Administration 
71 18.6 
Arts 50 13.1 
Total 362 100 
 
(c) Analysis and Findings  
In the following section, the responses are explained according to the three 
groups of questions.  A full listing of the frequency tables for the results obtained 
from the sample can be found in Annex 9 of this thesis. 
The first group of questions explored the current state of digital piracy among 
Jordan University students. A total of 89.9% of the respondents had knowingly 
engaged in buying counterfeit products or using cracked software on at least one 
occasion.  This finding confirms the high level of use of counterfeit goods among 
young people in Jordan.    
 
Table (3.2) Have you engaged at least one time in knowingly buying 
counterfeit products? 
 Frequency Per cent Valid Per cent 
Cumulative Per 
cent 
Valid 1 Yes 342 89.8 89.8 89.8 
2 No 39 10.2 10.2 100.0 
Total 381 100.0 100.0  
 
When respondents were asked if they had any original software installed on their 
computers, the responses were: none (26.5 %), one to two software products 
(59.6%), three or more software products (13.1%); none of respondents claimed 
that all of their software was original.  When asked if they were likely to continue 
buying counterfeit products or using cracked software, 53% said they would, 
indicating that the buying of counterfeit products is an acceptable social norm for 
the majority of the respondents.  The economic factor was a major incentive to 
buy counterfeit products, as 64.3% of the respondents said that they would not 
buy counterfeit goods if they could afford to buy the original versions. It is a 
measure of the inappropriate pricing levels of original products that even in rich 
countries like Kuwait, with a GDP nine times that of Jordan,112 the economic 
                                                     
112 Kuwait’s GDP in 2010 was $48,900 compared to Jordan’s $5,400.  
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factor played an essential role in the purchase of counterfeit products for 51.9% 
of respondents to a similar question.113  
Dedicated shops were the source for buying counterfeit products for 24.7% of the 
respondents, while 55.9% of the respondents said they bought the counterfeit 
products from dedicated shops as well as other places, and 19.2% of the 
respondents indicated that friends and relatives were their source of counterfeit 
products.  
The second group of questions explored the respondents’ attitudes towards 
counterfeiting based on their religious beliefs. This question examines whether 
students’ ethical orientation affects their choice to buy counterfeit products. 
In the questionnaire, the ethical orientation was tested using responses to the 
scales measuring ethical cases. A majority of the respondents (65.9%) believed 
that counterfeit products are not prohibited by religion, while only 28.6% of the 
respondents thought that religion prohibited counterfeit products, and 4.7% did 
not know whether such a religious prohibition existed.  A majority of the 
respondents (81.1%) indicated that they would not continue to buy counterfeit 
products if prohibited by religion the majority of the respondents answered in the 
negative, while a smaller majority of the respondents (64.8%) indicated that they 
would stop buying counterfeit products if prohibited by state law.  Tables 3.3 and 
3.4 show the results.  
                                                     
113 Al-Fadhli, “The Ethical Dilemma of Software Piracy in Islamic Societies.” 
 39 
 
Table (3.3): If you knew that counterfeit products were prohibited by 
religion, would you continue to buy and use such products? 
 
Frequency Per cent Valid Per cent 
Cumulative Per 
cent 
Valid 1 Yes 66 17.3 17.3 17.3 
2 No 309 81.1 81.1 98.4 
6 I don’t know 4 1.0 1.0 99.5 
9 Missing 2 .5 .5 100.0 
Total 381 100.0 100.0  
 
Table (3.4): If you knew that state law prohibited counterfeit products, 
would you continue to buy and use such products? 
 
Frequency Per cent Valid Per cent 
Cumulative Per 
cent 
Valid 1 Yes 132 34.6 34.6 34.6 
2 No 247 64.8 64.8 99.5 
6 I don’t know 1 .3 .3 99.7 
9 Missing 1 .3 .3 100.0 
Total 381 100.0 100.0  
 
Results from Table 3.3 show that the majority of the respondents (81.1%) would 
stop buying counterfeit products if they knew that Islam prohibits it, while 64.8% 
of them said that they would stop buying counterfeit products if prohibited by 
state law.  But given that IP is not a matter dealt with directly by religion, and 
given the decentralised and non-hierarchical nature of the Islamic faith practiced 
by the vast majority of Jordanians,114 it is misleading to take answers based on 
religious belief without further scrutiny.  In the interest of further scrutiny, two 
questions were posed.  First, respondents were asked to identify what they 
considered their source of religious authority, and then they were asked to 
identify the degree to which they were inclined to follow the opinion of that 
religious authority on matters related to counterfeit goods.  Tables 3.5 and 3.6 
show the results for both questions, respectively.   
The Mufti (a Muslim legal expert and adviser on the law of the Quran115) was 
considered the source of religious authority by (41.2%) of the respondents; 
however, interestingly enough, only 52.8% said they would always follow the 
guidance of the main religious authority on the prohibition of counterfeit 
products, while 46.7% said they would either never or only sometimes follow 
such guidance, indicating that the effect of religion on the respondents’ choice to 
                                                     
114 “Guide: Christians in the Middle East,” BBC, December 15, 2005, sec. Middle East, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4499668.stm. (Estimating that only 3-4% of Jordanians are 
Christian). 
115 “The Definition of Mufti,” Dictionary.com, n.d., http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/mufti. 
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use counterfeit products may not be as strong as it first appeared.  This validates 
the earlier conclusion that the suggestion that Muslims will abide by IPRs laws if 
piracy is prohibited by Islam should be interpreted within the context of (i) the 
lack of treatment of IPRs under Islamic law, and (ii) the fact that any Islamic 
legal opinion on piracy holds little or no universal jurisprudential weight.  
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Table (3.5): What is the main source of your Islamic actions and decisions? 
 
Frequency Per cent Valid Per cent 
Cumulative Per 
cent 
Valid 1 The Mufti 157 41.2 41.2 41.2 
2 The Cleric in my 
neighbourhood 
60 15.7 15.7 57.0 
3 Parents 65 17.1 17.1 74.0 
4 Other 96 25.2 25.2 99.2 
6 I don’t know 2 .5 .5 99.7 
9 Missing 1 .3 .3 100.0 
Total 381 100.0 100.0  
 
Table (3.6): If the source of your religious guidance deemed counterfeiting 
to be prohibited by religion, to what extent would you abide by such an 
edict? 
 
Frequency Per cent Valid Per cent 
Cumulative Per 
cent 
Valid 1 Always  201 52.8 52.8 52.8 
2 Sometimes 148 38.8 38.8 91.6 
3 Never 30 7.9 7.9 99.5 
6 I don’t know 1 .3 .3 99.7 
9 Missing 1 .3 .3 100.0 
Total 381 100.0 100.0  
 
The third group of questions focused on the respondents’ ethical attitudes towards 
counterfeit products.  The results showed that 71.9% of the respondents believed 
that buying counterfeit products is an ethical act, because counterfeit products 
provide people with limited income access to goods, software and books, while 
only 27.3% of respondents believed that buying counterfeit products is an 
unethical act.  Oddly, 75.1% of the respondents believe that counterfeit products 
infringe on the rights of companies, while 63.5% indicated that they personally 
did not care about the companies’ losses because of counterfeiting, which shows 
that a majority of the respondents do not see the intrusion on the rights of 
companies because of counterfeit products as a personal issue for them to care 
about.  To the probable satisfaction of the IP scholar and IP reification opponent 
Christopher May, the reification of IPRs in Jordan has a long way to go.   
Although 27% of the respondents indicated that they would continue to buy 
counterfeit products even if they could afford to buy the original, 49.3% indicated 
that they felt uncomfortable when buying counterfeit products.  It is worth noting 
that 45.5% of the respondents did not believe that buying counterfeit products 
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causes any harm to Muslim people, likely because the companies that produce the 
original goods are located in the West.  
3.5 Conclusion  
Results indicate that piracy percentages are high and that religious beliefs, while not decisive 
deterrents against IPRs infringement, are stronger deterrents than legal measures.  Price is also 
very important in consumers’ decision of whether to pirate or legally purchase IP-protected 
products.  Monetary rationalization was significant, and the results indicate a general indifference 
to damages incurred by MNCs as a result of piracy, which can be interpreted as an indication of 
the disregard of MNCs’ allegations that piracy is harmful to the local economy or that it is a form 
of theft.  Cultural and social backgrounds are found to be influential factors in consumers’ 
decision to buy counterfeit products, as a significant percentage do not view counterfeit products 
as harmful to Muslim people.   
While a majority of the respondents are aware of the economic cost of piracy to companies, a 
strong majority is not sympathetic to those losses.  Moral relativism is clearly involved in 
respondents’ claim that they considered counterfeit products infringement yet did not care 
personally about the issue.  This is a strong indication that a majority of Jordanian youth do not 
concern themselves much with counterfeiting notions, which the Jordanian IP laws have 
embraced.  This is clear from the fact that the majority of the respondents indicated that they 
would continue to buy counterfeit products even if prohibited by state law. 
The ethical attitude of consumers is important in addressing the purchase of counterfeit products 
because it may complement legal actions against piracy.  Legal actions alone are therefore 
insufficient in confronting this problem, especially in developing countries like Jordan.  
This questionnaire’s finding that most respondents would not follow their religious leader or 
guide if that leader prohibited counterfeit products does not support the call made by some 
scholars to concentrate efforts on the media to spread Muslim fatwas forbidden buying 
counterfeit products.116  Further, the finding that the majority of the respondents would continue 
to buy counterfeit products even if prohibited by state law, in addition to the apathy shown 
toward the infringement of MNCs’ rights, indicates that more public awareness of IPRs will not 
serve to stem the tide of consumers buying counterfeit products.  Instead, following the finding 
that a substantial percentage of software users would buy original software if they could afford to 
do so, an alternate pricing model should be adopted by MNCs. 
3.6 Limitations 
Some limitations of this study are as follows: 
1. First, statistical analysis can be used to provide evidence to support causal 
relationships between constructs, but it cannot be used alone to infer causality.117   
2. Second, full statistical analysis was not employed. The data could be further 
mined for statistical inferences with a chi-square test, which tests a null 
hypothesis stating that the frequency distribution of certain events observed in a 
sample is consistent with a particular theoretical distribution.  Therefore, one 
                                                     
116 Al-Fadhli, “The Ethical Dilemma of Software Piracy in Islamic Societies.” 
117 Joseph F. Hair et al., Multivariate Data Analysis, 6th ed. (Prentice Hall, 2005). 
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venue for future research could be to employ such designs to test various null 
hypotheses based on causal models of piracy.   
3. Third, the statistical analysis was performed on data collected from 
undergraduate students at eight colleges at one university.  The sample was 
statistically representative of the university’s populations, as it was a random 
sample intended to ensure that each member of that population had an equal 
probability of being selected.  The sample, however, did not include members of 
the society outside of the university, which may restrict the generalization of the 
findings to larger populations. 
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4. CHAPTER IV: AN OVERVIEW OF THE JORDANIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
The Jordanian legal system is based on a civil law approach.  Stare Decisis – the legal principle 
under which precedent plays a significant role in the creation of legal facts – is not well-defined 
or a forceful element in the formulation of legal code or in the code’s interpretation by the courts, 
as it is in the common law tradition.118.  Consequently, courts of the same level are generally not 
bound by one another’s rulings, and the rulings of the highest (Cassation) court  are binding only 
if issued en banc.119   
Under the colonial effects of Great Britain, elements of the common law were introduced to the 
various legal areas, most notably the first Jordanian Commercial Code.120  In the midst of all 
those legal traditions that affected or influenced the Jordanian legal system, Islamic law’s most 
notable impact was in the area of personal status, such as family affairs and inheritance.  Islamic 
law does not have any impact on IP laws in Jordan. 
This chapter will highlight the foundations of the Jordanian legal system, and the judicial system 
and its components.  The laws governing IPRs and their various elements will then be discussed.  
4.1 Foundations of the Jordanian Legal System  
(a) Historic Roots of the Jordanian State 
From the fourteenth century until the end of the First World War, greater Syria, 
which consists of present-day Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and Israel, was 
under the rule of the Ottoman Empire.121  After the end of the First World War, 
the Ottoman Empire lost its political control over the region, partly because of a 
                                                     
118 In the United States, which uses a common law system in its federal courts and most of its state courts, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: 
 “Stare Decisis is the policy of the court to stand by precedent; the term is but an abbreviation of stare 
decisis et quieta non movere — "to stand by and adhere to decisions and not disturb what is settled." 
Consider the word "decisis." The word means, literally and legally, the decision. Nor is the doctrine stare 
dictis; it is not "to stand by or keep to what was said." Nor is the doctrine stare rationibus decidendi — 
"to keep to the rationes decidendi of past cases." Rather, under the doctrine of stare decisis a case is 
important only for what it decides — for the "what," not for the "why," and not for the "how." Insofar as 
precedent is concerned, stare decisis is important only for the decision, for the detailed legal 
consequence following a detailed set of facts.”  United States Internal Revenue Serv. V. Osborne (In Re 
Osborne) 76 F.3d 306 (9th Cir. 1996).  
119 The issues of disseminating the holdings of the Cassation Court, and the introduction of modern 
technology, including the posting of past and present holdings on a dedicated website for the court, are 
among the most urgent, yet easily achievable, modernization requirements of the Jordanian legal system. 
120 The first Companies Law in Jordan was enacted with British experts’ assistance in 1964 and reflected 
many Common law ideas. More recently there is a clear effect of the Common law on procedural laws 
and those dedicated to create alternative dispute settlement mechanisms.   
121.See William L Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 2nd ed. (Westview Press, 1999).  “For 
the Arab people who have lived within the [Ottoman’s] domains, the dismemberment of the Ottoman 
Empire marked more than just the end of a particular state; it also marked the end of a political, social, 
and religious order that had shaped their patterns of public behavior for 400 years.  Ottoman rule had 
applied with differing degrees of intensity in various regions of the Arab provinces.  That kind of 
adaptability was the very essence of the Ottoman system: It governed directly the areas that could be 
efficiently controlled and allowed a certain degree of latitude to chieftains and feudal amirs in more 
remote locations.” Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, at 157-158.. 
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revolution led by Hussein bin Ali, the Sharif of Mecca.122  The revolution was 
supported by Britain to undermine the Ottoman Empire’s rule in Hejaz, the 
western part of modern-day Saudi Arabia.123  In return, the Sharif asked the 
British for a pledge of financial and political support for his movement, with the 
ultimate goal of establishing an independent Arab government in the Arabian 
Peninsula and most parts of greater Syria.124 
The revolt never fulfilled its ultimate goal of a pan-Arab state headed by the 
Sharif.  While Great Britain was promising the Sharif independence should he 
continue to press his revolt against the Turks, Great Britain and France entered 
into the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, dividing the region into political bodies 
representing their respective spheres of influence.125  Hence, Great Britain and 
France assumed the Ottoman Empire’s control of the region.  The current 
geopolitical map of the Middle East was drawn as a result of this process and has 
remained practically unchanged ever since. 
One of the Sharif’s sons, Abdullah, headed the newly created political entity, 
called Trans-Jordan.126  Trans-Jordan proclaimed its independence from the 
British Crown on May 25, 1948, and was re-named the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan.127 
A modernization movement was created in the nineteenth century due in greater 
degree to the contact between the Islamic world and the West.128  Such movement 
was initiated by two factors; the Ottoman government’s adoption of the French 
Commercial and Penal Code and the establishment of a system of secular 
courts.129  The Majalla, a publication issued between 1869 and 1876, 
encompassed the newly created Ottoman civil law, which was an amalgam of 
French law and the Hanafi School of Islamic law.130  
(b) Classification and Branches of Law 
                                                     
122See Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, at 148..  The Sharif of Mecca, was an honorary 
title granted by the Ottoman Caliph to his representative in Arabia.  Usually it was awarded to the head 
of a family that claims to be a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. 
123See Arthur Goldschmidt and Lawrence Davidson, A Concise History of the Middle East, 9th ed. 
(Westview Press, 2009).. 
124See Ibid., at 187.  The roots for these conditions are in the controversial McMahon-Hussein letters, 
exchanged between Hussein and the British high commissioner of Egypt and Sudan in 1915-1916.  
Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, at 149. 
125. See Sykes-Picot Agreement, Avalon Project, available at “The Avalon Project : The Sykes-Picot 
Agreement : 1916”, April 20, 2010, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/sykes.asp. 
126.See Goldschmidt and Davidson, A Concise History of the Middle East, at 193-194., see also Cleveland, 
A History of the Modern Middle East, at 157. 
127.“No one expected this Emirate of Trans- Jordan to last long, but it did.  While the rest of [greater Syria] 
was seething with Jewish-Arab strife, Trans-Jordan became an oasis of tranquil politics and economic 
development.”  Goldschmidt and Davidson, A Concise History of the Middle East. 
128.See Matthew Lippman, Sean McConville, and Mordechai Yerushalmi, Islamic Criminal Law and 
Procedure: An Introduction (Praeger Publishers, 1988), at 100. “The first sectors affected by the 
modernization movement were criminal and civil justice, the economy, and the military.  In these fields 
the deficiencies of traditional Islam were most apparent to modernists.  The gap between new conditions 
and traditional law was unbridgeable, and thus the rulers opted for the Western approach.” 
129.Ibid. 
130.Noel J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh University Press, 1995), at 151-152. 
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Below is a review of the major governing laws in Jordan.  
(i) The Constitution  
Enacted in 1952, the Jordanian constitution was a novelty in the Middle 
East in its time because it explicitly granted rights to the citizens 
(citizenship, property, assembly, travel, etc.) and instituted a 
parliamentary monarchy.131  It has a clear delineation between the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches, and a minimal role for the 
monarch as the head of state, guardian of the constitution and enforcer of 
the separation of powers.132  As mentioned earlier, and in line with the 
accepted practice for Arab and Islamic nations, the constitution declares 
Islam as the state religion and Arabic as its official language.133   
(ii) Criminal Code  
The Criminal Code enacted in, and continuously amended since, 1960 
addresses the basic concepts of criminal liability, crimes and sanctions.  
The law outlines various elements for any crime and for criminal liability.  
There can be neither a crime nor punishment unless specifically stated in 
the code – Nulla crimen sine lege.134  For criminal liability, the code 
requires an act – actus reus, which can be a commission or an omission, 
and a guilty mind or intention – mens rea. 
The code provides for three classes of crimes: felonies, misdemeanours 
and offences.  This classification rests on the type of punishment 
associated with each crime.  A felony is any crime punishable by more 
than three years; a misdemeanour is punishable by one week to three 
years in prison; and an offence is punishable by less than one week of 
imprisonment or a fine.  The procedural arm of the Criminal Code is the 
Criminal Procedure Law, which organizes all issues related to procedures 
before police, public prosecutors and courts. 
(iii) The Civil Code 
The Jordanian Civil Code was 22 years in the making, from February 4, 
1952, when the initial draft was submitted to parliament, until the 1964 
royal letter requesting the drafting of a “Civil Code based on Islamic law 
                                                     
131Jordanian Constitution, 1952, art. 1.  
132 Parliamentary monarchy is a constitutional monarchy or limited monarchy is a form of government 
established under a constitutional system, which acknowledges an elected or hereditary monarch as head 
of state, as opposed to an absolute monarchy, where the monarch is not bound by a constitution and is 
the sole source of political power.  Most constitutional monarchies take on a parliamentary form, like the 
United Kingdom, Canada, Japan and Malaysia where the monarch may be regarded as the head of state 
but the prime minister, whose power derives directly or indirectly from elections, is head of government. 
133 Jordanian Constitution, art.2.  
134 Jordanian Penal Code, 1960, art.3. stated that courts should not impose any sanction unless the law 
stated that sanction.  
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and broad enough to govern the various areas of daily life”, culminating 
in the Code’s actual enactment in 1976.135   
The Civil Code contains rules, which mainly organize private financial 
relations, and types of rights – personal rights that include, inter alia, 
contracts and injurious acts, and real rights like property rights. It also 
organizes contracts.136  The Civil Code is the primary source for all 
private laws in Jordan, and its clauses are binding when a private law 
does not address a specific point that is addressed by the Code. 
(iv) Commercial Laws   
Commercial laws in Jordan encompass several laws and legislations all 
revolving around the same concept of organizing the commercial sector.  
The most important commercial laws in Jordan are the Trade Law, 
Companies Law, Banking Law, Securities Law, and Trading in Foreign 
Exchanges Law.  The Civil Code has rules to be applied in commercial 
cases, particularly in the interpretation of contracts; however, as stated 
earlier, such rules are of a general nature and are pre-empted by any 
specific laws where applicable.137  Trade Law, being the oldest of the 
group, reflects a more traditional perspective of commerce.  The other 
legislations are more modern, as they were either promulgated or updated 
after Jordan’s accession to the WTO in 2000.138  They also reflect the 
constant evolution of the legal framework of doing business in Jordan, 
and in that sense share the features of evolution and development with IP 
laws in Jordan. 
4.2 The Legislative Process 
Jordan’s legislative branch is represented by the Parliament, to which legislative authority is 
vested by the Constitution.139  The Parliament consists of two chambers, often referred to as the 
upper and lower houses.  The lower house of Parliament, also referred to as the House of 
Representatives, consists of elected members whose term is for four years.  The upper house of 
Parliament, also known as the Senate.  There are twice as many seats in the House of 
Representatives as in the Senate, and the Senate seats are appointed by the King for two year 
terms..140   
                                                     
135 Royal letter to then Prime Minister of Jordan Hussein Bin Naser, dated April 1964.  The committee that 
delivered the law in January 5, 1976 stated that is based its work on four resources 1) Islamic 
jurisprudence in all its schools, 2) effective Jordanian legal code, 3) draft Civil Code law presented by 
the upper house of parliament, 4) all modern legislations, which are based on Islamic law. 
136 The Jordanian Civil Code recognized the freedom of contractors in establishing any legitimate contracts. 
137  The general rule is that all the articles of the Civil Law can be applied on commercial cases provided 
they are consistent with the basic principles of the Law of Commerce.  
138 The most recent of the commercial laws is the Trading in Foreign Exchanges Law No.50, 2008., which 
came into effect as a result of the increased sophistication of dealers and middlemen attempting to 
market and promote investments in foreign exchanges.  As it became clear that a substantive portion of 
those investment opportunities were nothing more than Ponzi schemes, the law was enacted in late 2008 
in an attempt to regulate an area that was as of that time unregulated. 
139 Jordanian Constitution, art.24.  
140 Ibid., arts.62 and 63. 
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In addition to laws, which can be passed only through the Parliament, Jordan also has other types 
of regulative documents, including Systems, which are promulgated by the council of ministers, 
and Regulations, which are promulgated by a minister and impact only that specific ministry.  
This hierarchy is further illustrated in Table 4.1, below.  Any legislation proposed to the 
Parliament must be approved by both houses and then ratified by the King.  
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Table (4.1) The Hierarchy of the Jordanian Regulative Documents   
 
The Constitution 
The law of the land and the foundation upon which all other legislations must be based and 
with which they must conform. 
Laws 
Enacted exclusively by the Parliament based on drafts from the government, members of the 
House of Representatives, or the Senate.  Provisional laws can be passed by the government 
but must be confirmed by Parliament once reconvened.  Must be in compliance with the 
Constitution. 
Systems 
Enacted by the Council of Ministers to clarify, augment, or execute a law or portions thereof.  
Can be mandated sometimes by the law itself, which can request that one or several clauses 
be further detailed by a system to be issued by the government.  Must comply with the text of 
the law they are meant to clarify, augment, or execute, as well as with the Constitution. 
Regulations 
Are issued by the Minister or by a senior official of the ministry who is empowered by the 
Minister.  Enforceable only on the executive agency for which they were issued and must 
comply with relevant systems and laws, as well as with the Constitution. 
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4.3 The Judicial System 
Civil and criminal conflicts in Jordan can be legally resolved through the court system or through 
arbitration.  Courts consist of several tiers with laws outlining the duties and responsibilities of 
each tier, as well as the limits of their jurisdiction.141 This multi-tier system applies to the three 
types of courts in Jordan, namely regular, religious, and special courts.142  Table (4.2) illustrates 
the three types of courts and their different tiers, along with a brief description of each.  Of 
special importance to IP conflicts and disputes is Jordan’s Supreme Administrative Court.143 
(a) Regular Courts   
These courts handle commercial, civil, and criminal cases.  Regular Courts are 
classified into three different types: courts of first review, the Court of Appeals 
and the Court of Cassation.  
(i) Courts of First Review 
There are two types of courts within this category: the Small Claims 
Court and courts of First Instance.  Small Claims Courts have jurisdiction 
over in which the claim is for less than 7000 Jordanian Dinars (JD)144 and 
criminal cases in which the penalty does not exceed two years the 
imprisonment.145  Verdicts from Small Claim Courts can be appealed to 
courts of First Instance if their value is less than JD 1000 or if the penalty 
is less than three months’ imprisonment.  Original jurisdiction is vested in 
the courts of First Instance over all cases, but jurisdiction for Small 
Claims Courts is carved out and specifically provided for in the law 
creating First Instance Courts.146   
(ii) Courts of Appeal  
                                                     
141 Article 27 of the constitution vests the judicial authority in the courts and authorizes them to issue 
verdicts in the name of the King.  Article 100 of the constitution states that the way and manner that all 
types of courts are to set up will be outlined in a special law, which must include the formation of a 
Supreme Court.  It is not clear if the term ‘supreme court” as used in the constitution is meant to be the 
Supreme Administrative Court in the format currently exists as a review of administrative law, or the 
creation of the Cassation   court. 
142 Article 99 of the constitution authorizes the creation of three types of courts: 1) regular, 2) religious, and 
3) special.  Article 110 of the constitution stated that special courts would be organized based on laws to 
be passed for that purpose.  
143 The Supreme Administrative Court’s jurisdiction over final copyright, trademark, and patent 
administrative decisions is based on article 9(9) of the Supreme Administrative Court Law No.12, 1992., 
giving the court jurisdiction over the appeal of final administrative decisions issued by governmental 
agencies.  The origins of the Supreme Administrative Court are in Article 100 of the constitution, which 
calls for the creation of the courts and specifically mentions a “Supreme Court” by name.  Pursuant to 
that constitutional mandate, the first law organizing courts was issued in 1952 – Courts Formation Law 
No. 26, 1952.  It, however, did not include a designation for a Supreme Court.  This constitutional 
oversight was rectified when the Cassation Court exercised its role as a final arbiter for judicial opinions 
in its capacity as a Cassation Court, and for administrative opinions in its capacity as a Supreme 
Administrative Court.  This dual-hat anomaly continued till the enactment of the Supreme 
Administrative Court Law No.12., which created a separate court named the Supreme Administrative 
Court to be formed. 
144 $1.3 = 1 JD. 
145 Small Claims Courts Law No.15, 1952, arts 3 and 5, as amended in 2008.  
146 Courts Formation Law No.17, 2001, art. 3 as amended in 2008. 
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There are three Courts of Appeal in Jordan, located in the cities of 
Amman, Irbid, and Ma’an.  They have appellate jurisdiction over certain 
decisions by Small Claims Courts, all decisions by the courts of First 
Instance.147  An appellate panel usually consists of three judges, whereas 
First Instance and Small Claims Courts consist of one judge (or two in 
some criminal cases).148  Evidence Law governs the type of evidence that 
may be used before the courts as well as the method by which it can be 
used.149  
(iii) Cassation Court  
This is the highest non-administrative court in Jordan. It usually sits in 
panels of five judges, but it can sit in panels of eight judges to review 
novel legal points, to review decisions that represent a split between the 
courts of appeal.150  Monetary thresholds also govern the appellate 
process; cases not exceeding JD 10,000 in value require written 
permission from the Cassation Court to file an appeal.  If this written 
permission is denied, cases are deemed settled and decided by the 
Appellate Court that last reviewed them.  This makes Appellate Courts 
the final arbiter in IP cases if valued at less than JD 10,000 and denied 
written permission by the Cassation Court.   
                                                     
147 Ibid., art. 8. 
148 Ibid.  art. 7. 
149 Evidence Law No. 30, 1952. 
150 Small Claims Courts Law No.15, art. 9 as amended in 2008. 
 52 
 
Table (4.2): Courts in Jordan 
 
Specialized Courts 
Have jurisdiction over issues 
specifically outlined in the laws 
creating them.  Have the narrowest 
jurisdiction of all types of courts. 
Regular Courts 
Have general jurisdiction over all 
civil, commercial and criminal 
cases. 
Religious Courts 
Have jurisdiction over issues related 
to personal status such as marriage, 
divorce and inheritance. 
Supreme Administrative Court 
Primarily reviews final procedural 
and administrative rules issued by 
the various governmental agencies.  
Is the final arbiter for administrative 
law.  
Court of Cassation 
The country’s highest court for all 
non-administrative law issues.  
Reviews appeals from all lower 
courts as the jurisdictional rules 
allow.  Automatically reviews 
certain criminal rulings, regardless 
of whether an appeal is filed, if the 
penalty is more than ten years 
imprisonment or capital 
punishment.   
 
Various Appellate Courts 
- Court of Appeals for the Customs 
Department: Receives appeals from 
the Customs Court of First Instance. 
Its decisions may be appealed to the 
Court of Cassation.    
- Court Appeals for the Tax 
Department Receives appeals by 
and against the department of 
income tax in income tax issues. Its 
decisions may be appealed to the 
Court of Cassation  
 - State Security Court: Deals with 
issues related to terrorism, threats to 
security and narcotics trafficking. 
Its decisions may be appealed to the 
Court of Cassation.  
 
Courts of First Review 
Include the courts of First Instance 
as well as the Small Claims Courts.  
Have jurisdiction over commercial, 
civil and criminal cases. Municipal 
Courts: Deal mainly with traffic 
violations. 
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(b)  Arbitration and other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution  
The first Arbitration law was enacted in 1952 and amended in 2001.151 To further 
facilitate the proceedings of trials and to maximize settlement possibility, the 
Civil Procedure Law was amended to create a Case Management position to be 
held by a judge within the lower courts.  The Case Management judge is charged 
with ensuring speedy legal notice to the parties, completeness of the docket, and 
(failing settlement) transferring the complete docket to the assigned trial judge.152   
4.4 IPRs under Jordanian Laws 
The notion of what constitutes a “right” under Jordanian law is delineated by the Civil Code, 
which allows for three types of rights: personal, material and incorporeal.153  The Code defines a 
personal right as a legal bond between a debtor and a creditor.154  That bond must relate to 
transferring a material right, executing an act or abstaining from one.  The reference to abstinence 
from certain acts as one of the components of personal rights refers to injurious acts, or torts.155   
A material right, which can be original or subsidiary, is the direct authority given by the law to an 
individual.156  An original material right arises out of legal, direct, physical control over personal 
or real property. A subsidiary material right is one that is derived from an original right157 (e.g., a 
building owner’s secondary material right to collect  rent arises out of the original material right 
of ownership). 
The Civil Code defines incorporeal rights as those rights exercised over intangible or non-
material things.158  IPRs including copyrights, patents, and trademarks, are explicitly mentioned 
as examples of incorporeal rights.159 
Overall, there are twelve laws regulating aspects of IP under Jordanian law.160  The Civil Code 
laid the theoretical foundation for IPRs by incorporating them within incorporeal rights.161  
(a) Patents 
The first Jordanian Patent law was enacted in 1953.162 A new Patent law 
extending the protection period to 20 years was enacted in 1999, incorporating 
                                                     
151 Arbitration Law No. 31, 2001. 
152 Civil Procedure Law No. 24, 1998, as amended by law No. 16 (2006). 
153 Civil Code No. 43, 1976, art. 67. 
154 Ibid., art. 68. 
155 Anis Al-Qasem, “The Injurious Acts under the Jordanian Civil Code,” Arab Law Quarterly 4, no. 3 
(August 1989): 183-198. 
156 Civil Code No. 43, art. 69. 
157 Ibid., arts. 69 and 70.  
158 Ibid., art. 71(1).  
159 Ibid., art. 71(2).  
160 Copyright Law No.22; Patent Law No.32; Trademarks Law No.33. Servicemarks Law No. 19, 
1953.Industrial Forms and Drawings Law No. 14.  Integrated Circuits Law No. 10.  Geographical 
Indications Law No.8. Unfair Competition and Trade Secrets Law No. 15.  New Plant Varieties Law No. 
24; Instructions for Border Points Regarding the Protection of Intellectual Property No.7; E-
Transactions Law No.85; Competition Law No.49; National Products Protection Law No.50. 
161  It also laid down the rules governing civil liability and contracts.  
162 Patent Law No. 22, 1953.  
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TRIPS-consistent standards into its language.163  The 1999 law clarified the 
criteria for awarding a patent, areas outside patentability domain, and the rights 
and obligations of a patent holder.  It also outlined some specific sanctions that 
can be requested by a patent holder in case of a patent infringement.  The law was 
amended in 2001 and 2007 to reflect ever-evolving concepts and to synchronize it 
with Jordan’s obligations and international best practices.  It puts forth 
patentability conditions that include novelty, non-disclosure to the public, non-
obviousness, and industrial utility.164   
The first patentability requirement, novelty, is set forth in article 3(a).  It 
represents a codification of the doctrine of anticipation (i.e., whether a claim is 
anticipated if each and every element in it was shown, described, organized, and 
functioned in substantially the same way as in prior art).165  Essentially, article 
3(a) requires the applicant for the patent to demonstrate that the invention is new 
and is different from prior art in the sense that they are not identical.  It has yet to 
be tested in a court of law, as there have not yet been any cases addressing it.166 
Claim analysis and determination of obviousness, which are key aspects of patent 
prosecution and litigation, are non-existent because Jordan lacks a developed 
patent prosecution mechanism/apparatus.167  A clear sign of the embryonic stage 
of development of patent prosecution in Jordan is that legally it is the patentee’s 
responsibility to assure patentability,168 whereas this would be the responsibility 
of the governmental agent in charge of issuing the patent (i.e. the Patent 
Registrar) in a developed patent prosecution system. 
Non-obviousness, set forth in article 3(b) of the Patent Law, requires the 
applicant to show that the invention is not trivial.  In order to determine whether 
an invention is trivial it is necessary to investigate whether any prior art contains 
the exact same elements, or whether a number of sources would combine to 
produce the claimed invention.169  A patentable invention is required to have non-
obvious differences from prior art; in other words, it is necessary that a person 
with ordinary skill would not have thought the subject matter of the invention to 
be obvious at the time the invention was made.170  This makes this area of 
examination highly factual and technical.  There is also a very strong element of 
subjectivness in this test, and combining fact-based examination with a deep 
technical knowledge of the subject area is key for its fair and balanced 
application.171   
                                                     
163 Patent Law No.32. 
164 Ibid., art.3. 
165 Ibid., sec. 3(a). 
166 Patent Law No.32. 
167 Lina Haddad, “Interview”, July 31, 2011; Zain Alawamleh, “Interview”, August 2, 2011. 
168 Patent Law No.32, art. 16. 
169 Ibid. art. 3(b). 
170 Ibid. art. 3(b). 
171 T.J. Chiang, “Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent Obviousness, A,” . John’s L. Rev. 82 (2008): 39; M. 
Astorino, “Obviously Troublesome: How High Should the Standard Be for Obtaining a Patent,” J. Pat. 
& Trademark Off. Soc’y 89 (2007): 239; G.N. Mandel, “Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical 
Demonstration That the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational,” Ohio St. LJ 67 (2006): 
1391. 
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Technical knowledge in the invention’s subject area is key because it allows the 
examiner to differentiate between the prior art and the proposed claims, to assess 
what level is considered ordinary skill in the field, and to determine what would 
be considered obvious based on that level of ordinary skill.172  A combination of 
all of the above is the only guarantee that the examiner will be able to produce 
reasonable and objective evidence of obviousness or non-obviousness.  It is the 
level of technical expertise in the patent’s subject area that allows a seemingly 
purely subjective test to be made objectively.173  
The third patentability requirement, industrial utility, is set forth in article 3(c).  It 
requires the patentee to demonstrate that the claimed invention is “useful” for 
some purpose.174  It is not clear whether this statement of utility has to be made 
explicitly or implicitly.  Typically, for a claimed invention to violate the utility 
requirement it must be incapable of achieving a useful result, which could occur 
if the inventor fails to disclose enough information to convince an examiner of 
the claimed invention’s utility or makes a demonstrably non-credible utility 
claim.175  
Nondisclosure is not a strict requirement.  Disclosure occurring up to 12 months 
prior to the filing date is tolerated, as long as it is either made by the inventor or 
erroneously or maliciously made by others.176  Although the law grants the right 
to a patent to the inventor or his or her successor(s) and allows joint ownership in 
the case of joint efforts, it is clearly a first-to-file system, and priority can be 
established either by directly filing with the Jordanian patent office or by proving 
that a patent was filed with a foreign patent office within the past 12 months.177   
The patent protections provided under the law are twofold.  If the subject of the 
patent is a product, the holder is granted the right to exclude others from making 
that product.178  If the subject of the patent is a method, the holder is granted the 
right to exclude others from utilizing that method.179  This exclusionary power is 
in line with the classical protections granted to patent holders under Western 
laws, especially the United States patent code.  The Jordanian law also grants the 
right to use a patent without a license for purposes of research and development; 
however, the law does not specify whether such a purpose is insufficient if there 
is a commercial objective in mind, nor is any case law available to illuminate that 
point.180  The law also gives the Minister of Industry and Trade the right to issue 
a compulsory license in the following four situations:181 
                                                     
172 Astorino, “Obviously Troublesome.” 
173 Ibid.; Chiang, “Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent Obviousness, A.” 
174 Patent Law No.32 art. 3(c). 
175 N. Machin, “Prospective Utility: A New Interpretation of the Utility Requirement of Section 101 of the 
Patent Act,” Cal L. Rev. 87 (1999): 421.  A perpetual motion machine is a classic and often cited 
example. 
176 Patent Law No.32, art. 3(a)(2). 
177 Ibid., art. 10(a)(1). 
178 Ibid. art. 21. 
179 Ibid., art. 21. 
180 Ibid. art. 22. 
181 Ibid., art. 22. According to the TRIPS Agreement, foreign patentees are not obliged to provide their 
patents locally, thus, compulsory licenses could have a limited application.  Article 31 of the TRIPS 
Agreement permits compulsory license if the patentee refuses to authorize the use of the invention on 
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1. For national security purposes,  
2. If the patent is not exercised or is not sufficiently exercised by the patent 
holder within three years of the patent issuance or four years from the 
date of filing,  
3. If a court of law decides the patent is being used in a way that restricts 
competition, or  
4. if the compulsory license will be used to export the subject of the patent 
to disease-plagued regions to fulfil Jordan’s obligations under the World 
Trade Organization. 
The language is broad enough to create a compulsory license when the state 
deems it necessary, yet narrow enough to protect the patent holder from 
haphazard governmental decision making.  To add a layer of judicial supervision, 
the minister’s decision is not absolute and is subject to review by the Supreme 
Administrative Court.182  
A summary of the main elements of the protections provided under the Jordanian 
Patent law is illustrated in Table (4.3) below. 
                                                                                                                                                              
reasonable commercial terms.  In other words, a compulsory license shall be allowed only when 
negotiating a license on fair commercial terms has failed. 
182 Ibid., art. 26. 
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Table (4.3): Patent Protections  
Element When Element is Effective Components of the Element 
Pre-award 
Protection 
Prior to issuance of a patent  Temporary protection can be granted to an 
item that can be patentable in Jordan, for 
the purpose of protecting the item during 
an exhibition. Temporary protection 
license is granted, officially registered, and 
is valid for 6 months from the start date of 
the exhibition.183 
Criminal 
Penalties  
After granting the patent  Jail terms and/or monetary fines are 
imposed for:  
1. Replicating a patented invention for 
commercial or industrial purposes. 
2. Selling, offering for sale or importing 
products patented in Jordan.  
3. Labelling or documentation for a 
product that leads the public to believe that 
a patent was issued for the product. 
Injunctive Relief In case of an infringement 
civil or criminal action  
If the patent holder provides a bank 
guarantee, he or she can ask a court for: 
1. An injunctive order to stop the allegedly 
infringing activity.  
2. Precautionary seizure of the allegedly 
infringing products.  
3. Preservation of all evidence related to 
the alleged infringement.  
Foreign Patents 
Registration 
Upon approval by the patent 
Registrar at the MoIT 
The holder(s) of the foreign patent can file 
for a Jordanian patent.  If the Jordanian 
patent is granted, the holder has all the 
rights and responsibilities of a Jordanian 
patent.  
 
                                                     
183 Patent Law Regulations No. 97, 2001. 
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To summarize the discussion on Jordanian patent law, the table below provides a brief 
characterization of other laws related to patentable subject matter, including the Industrial Forms 
and Drawings Law No. 14 (2000), the Integrated Circuits Law No. 10 (2000), the Geographical 
Indications Law No. 8 (2000), the Unfair Competition and Trade Secrets Law No. 15 (2000), and 
New Plant Varieties Law No. 24 (2000). 
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Table (4.4) Other Patentable Subject Matter Laws 
Law Elements 
Industrial Forms & 
Drawings Law No. 
14 (2000) 
• Provides protection for designs and models related to the aesthetic 
appearance of a product, which are registered at the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade. 
• Requires novelty, non-disclosure, and a purely aesthetic function 
for registration. 
• Period of protection is 15 years from the date the application is 
filed. 
• Provided the registration holder provides a bank guarantee, he or 
she can ask a court for: 
• - An injunctive order to stop the allegedly infringing activity.  
•  -Precautionary seizure of the allegedly infringing products.  
• - Preservation of all evidence related to the alleged infringement.  
Integrated Circuits 
Law No 10 (2000) 
• Provides protection for three-dimensional designs of integrated 
circuits registered in the Integrated Circuits Register at the Ministry 
of Industry and Trade. 
• Requires novelty and non-obviousness for registration. 
• Provides for an R&D use exception. 
• Grants protection from the date a request for registration is filed.  
The duration of protection after registration is 10 years from the 
date of first use anywhere in the world, but the total period of 
protection cannot exceed 15 years. 
• Provides for compulsory licensing for national security reasons, 
pubic non-commercial use, or to counter an emergency.  The 
registration holder is entitled to fair compensation, and can 
challenge the compulsory license before the Supreme 
Administrative Court. 
• Right holder can ask a court for: 
• -An injunctive order to stop the allegedly infringing activity.  
• -Precautionary seizure of the allegedly infringing products.  
• - Preservation of all evidence related to the alleged infringement. 
New Plant 
Varieties Law No. 
24 (2000) 
• Provides protection for plant varieties registered in the New Plant 
Varieties Register at the Ministry of Agriculture. 
• Requires the plant variety to be novel, non-disclosed, distinguished, 
homogenous, and stable.  
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(b) Copyright 
Prior to the copyright law enacted in 1992,184 Jordan used the Ottoman-era 
copyright law, and the Supreme Administrative Court confirmed such usage in 
opinions.185  In cooperation with the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), Jordan amended the law twice, in 1998 and 1999, to bring it in line with 
the requirements of accession to the World Trade Organization.186  One of the 
most significant changes made in these amendments was the automatic grant of 
copyright protection to any published work, whether or not it was registered with 
the Jordanian National Library.187 
Currently the Copyright Law provides protection to the following works:188 
1. Any written documents 
2. Any verbally delivered words like sermons, lectures, and speeches 
3. Any theatrical productions, including musicals and mime acts 
4. Any musical productions, whether accompanied by words or not 
5. Any cinematic, audio-visual, or broadcasted productions 
6. Paintings, photography, carvings, sculptures, and architectural and 
ornamental works 
7. Maps, designs, blueprints, and 3-D models, including those related to 
geography 
8. Computer programs in any programming language 
9. Titles, except those which have other common usages 
10. Compilations of any sort 
Moral rights granted exclusively to the author include the right to:189 
1. Be identified as the author on all produced copies. 
2. Modify the work in any form. 
3. Prevent any change to the work. 
4. Remove the work from circulation altogether, provided equitable 
restitution is made to the entities that would otherwise have financial 
rights to the work. 
                                                     
184 Copyright Law No.22. 
185 Opinion No. 76/81 (n.d.). 
186 Amending Laws No. 14 (1998) and No. 29 (1999). 
187 Copyright Law No.22, art. 45. The National Library (NL) is the governmental agency in charge of 
registering copyrightable material. 
188 Ibid., art. 3..  
189 Ibid., art. 8..  
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The financial rights granted to the author under the law clearly identify areas of 
exploitation that are exclusively within the author’s purview, which include the 
right to:190 
1. Duplicate and reproduce the work in any form, including photographic, 
cinematic, or digital reproduction. 
2. Translate the work to any other language, quote it, or produce it 
musically. 
3. Lease or rent copies of the work to the public. 
4. Distribute the work, give permission for copying it, or any other form of 
action that would otherwise create ownership rights in copies of the work. 
5. Import the work. 
6. Offer the work in a public form such as reading, projection, acting, audio-
visual broadcasting, or any other form. 
The law also grants licenses for the unauthorized use of the work (e.g., translation 
of the work with official approval from the Minister of Culture), provides for 
financial compensation to the copyright holder, and limits the use of the 
translated work to educational or research-related activities.191   
The duration of protection granted under the law varies with the type of work 
protected, as illustrated by table 4.5 below. 
 
                                                     
190 Ibid., art. 9..  
191 Ibid., art. 45..  
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Table (4.5): Copyright Protection Periods192 
Type of Work Duration of Protection 
Audio Performance 50 years 
Audio Producers 50 years 
Audio Broadcasters 20 years 
Author’s Financial Rights Duration of author’s life plus 50 years after 
death of all authors 
Cinematic and TV works, works authored 
under a pseudonym, and works not authored by 
individuals 
50 years from the year of publication 
Applied Arts (paintings, manuscripts, sculptors, 
photos, architectural, topographical, or 
geographical maps, computer programs) 
25 years from the year of completion 
Author’s Moral Rights Not specifically mentioned in the law, but a 
Cassation Court decision stated these rights 
continue with the heirs after the author’s death, 
presumably for the duration of the financial 
rights193 
 
                                                     
192 Ibid. 
193 Opinion No. 2003/2648 (n.d.). 
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While the law is notable for providing universal protection without a requirement 
for registering the work with the National Library, it does mandate such 
registration for works published in Jordan and/or by a Jordanian author,194  with 
failure to register resulting in a monetary fine.195  Jordanian publishers are also 
required to file a bi-annual report with the National Library of all titles published 
during that six-month period.196   
The mandatory registration requirement before distribution gives the National 
Library implicit authority to exercise a pocket veto over any work should the 
author decline to register it.  Article 38 extends that authority to any work 
published or distributed in Jordan even if the author is not Jordanian.197  The 
overall effect is the limitation of the right to legally distribute foreign works in 
Jordan without a National Library registration number. 
(c) Trademarks  
Trademarks occupy a significant place in the Jordanian IP jurisprudence because 
the trademark law was created in 1952.  it has since been amended several 
times198   
Along with the 1952 trademark legislation, regulations were enacted that outlined 
in considerable detail the mechanism and process by which a trademark can be 
registered as well as how a registration can be renewed, disputed, amended, or 
revoked.199  The law and the regulations give the office of the Trademark 
Registrar the responsibility to perform those tasks.200  Disputes with the 
Registrar’s decision can be appealed to the Jordanian Supreme Administrative 
Court.201  A more recent addition to the panoply of trademark-related laws is the 
Trade Names Law of 2006, which covers the actual names used with goods and 
services.202  Similar to trademarks, the law for Trade Names creates a Registrar at 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade and gives that office the duty of approving and 
officially recording Trade Names.  Decisions by the Trade Names Registrar can 
be appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court.203   
In the interpretation of the trademark law, the courts established certain tests for 
examining whether a common, non-distinguishing mark can be registered.  The 
trademark law explains that a mark can be registered if it has a distinguishing 
feature (e.g., a name, letter, number, shape, colour, etc.) such that the feature can 
distinguish the goods or services from those provided by others.204  The Supreme 
                                                     
194 Copyright Law No.22, arts. 38-41. 
195 Ibid., arts. 38-41.. 
196 Ibid., arts. 38-41. 
197 Ibid. art. 38. 
198 Trademarks Law No.33. 
199 Trademarks Regulations No. 1, 1952. 
200 Trademarks Law No.33. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Tradenames Law No. 9, 2006. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Trademarks Law No.33.  Article 8 of the law also lists several features that would render a mark non-
registrable, including: 
Marks similar to monarchy, governmental, official, religious, foreign and international symbols, slogans 
and flags.  
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Administrative Court held that if a suggested mark was common and used by 
many people, then it lacked distinct associative value and could not be 
registered.205   
Another area where the courts helped clarify the legislative text was in the area of 
defining “similarity” as a condition for registration.  The court asked the 
Registrar of Trademarks to consider the:206  
1. General idea of the mark  
2. General features of the mark as more important that its detailed parts 
3. Kind of goods for which the mark is intended  
4. Possibility that the consumer will not carefully examine the mark and 
compare it to other similar marks to establish their distinctiveness 
5. Possibility of visual or auditory confusion between the mark being 
examined and other similar marks. 
The courts’ have upheld the Registrar’s refusal to register marks which 
contravened public order,207 promoted unfair competition and confused the 
public,208 or were similar or identical to registered marks.209210 
The law only protects marks registered in Jordan, but it does provide for some 
protection to non-registered foreign trademarks by denying registration in Jordan 
for the same type of goods or services by someone other than the holder of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Marks containing any word or number which may cause the public that the goods enjoy a privileged 
position with an entity, which it does not have actually, or because these words and numbers are used in 
trade to distinguish that kind of goods from other similar kinds.  
Marks containing a person or entity’s name or image without the consent of that person or entity.  
Marks that contravene public order and public morals and confuse the public or encourage unfair 
competition.  
Marks which are identical or very similar to other registered marks such that it might confuse the public.  
205 Opinion No. 6/53 (n.d.).  
206 Opinion No. 108/65 (n.d.).  
207 Opinion No. 87/72 (n.d.).Opinion No. 6/53.  
208 Opinion No. 163/84 (n.d.). 
209 Opinion No, 128/88 (n.d.).  
210 But the court’s refusal to link a trademark to the distinctiveness of the good or service for the sake of 
avoiding confusion in the mind of the public, led it sometimes to issue opinions that came across as 
parochial, and lack the broad economic understanding of the value of the mark as property, albeit an 
intangible one.  This was clear in the courts’ decision to waive the criteria for similarity (listed above) 
for pharmaceutical products.  The court’s rational was that the dispensing of pharmaceuticals is the 
purview of physicians and pharmacists who are not likely to confuse pharmaceutical products even if 
they have similar trademarks or trade names. It is important to note, though, that this opinion of the court 
predates the accession of Jordan to the World Trade Organization, and the subsequent IP rights 
obligations that were part of that accession, including the protection of foreign trademarks.  It also 
predates the amendment of the trademark law, which prohibited the registration of a foreign-registered 
trademark in Jordan for a similar product, by other than the owner of the foreign trademark. It is 
expected, therefore, that should the court revisits this issue again that the distinctiveness and non-
similarity criteria will be applied. 
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foreign mark.211  In the case of famous foreign trademarks, the law denies 
registration for all goods or services, even if not of the same type as the famous 
mark.212   Famous marks do not need to prove that their foreign registration 
predates the registration requirement in Jordan by someone other than the famous 
mark owner, and can, therefore, obtain registration in Jordan even if their 
application is contested by a similar non-registered mark in Jordan.213  The law 
considers the letter of registration of a trademark to be prima facie proof that the 
holder of the letter is the owner of the mark, unless evidence to the contrary can 
be presented, thus shifting the burden of proof to the person challenging the 
registration.214  The table below outlines the main steps for trademark 
registration. 
                                                     
211 Trademarks Law No.33. 
212 Ibid., art. 8. 
213 Ibid. 
214 Ibid., art. 28. 
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Table (4.6): Trademark Prosecution and Appeal 
Step Procedure Appeal 
Application215 • File a written request with the 
Registrar of trademarks at the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade. 
• Acceptance of the filed application 
does not mean the trademark 
registration is approved. 
 
Application 
Prosecution216 
• Registrar can accept the application, 
accept the application with 
modifications, or deny registration. 
• Acceptance of the trademark must 
include the clear delineation of any 
restrictions or conditions of use 
associated with the acceptance. 
Applicant can appeal Registrar’s final 
decision to the Supreme Court, but the 
law does not set a time for filing the 
appeal. 
Opposition217 • Opposition to the registration of a 
trademark can be filed within 90 days 
of the registration’s announcement.218 
• The Registrar resolves the opposition 
after soliciting responses from the 
holder of the registration and 
allowing the entity opposing the 
registration to respond accordingly. 
• The Registrar’s resolution of 
the opposition can be 
appealed to the Supreme 
Administrative Court within 
20 days. 
• Points other than those 
presented to the Registrar 
cannot be presented to the 
court without the court’s 
permission. 
Post-registration • Trademark is registered for 10-year 
intervals, which can be renewed 
indefinitely. 
• If the owner of the trademark does 
not request its renewal then it expires 
within 1 year of the end of the ten 
years for which it was originally 
registered.  Others can register an 
expired trademark. 
• Requests can be filed to remove the 
registration of trademarks not used 
for 3 consecutive years.  
• Owner can amend a registered 
trademark if the Registrar approves. 
Registrar’s decision to remove a 
trademark can be appealed to the 
Supreme Administrative Court. 
Rights of 
Trademark 
• Exclude others from using the  
                                                     
215 Ibid., art. 11. 
216 Ibid., art. 13. 
217 Ibid., art. 14. 
218 The Supreme Administrative Court had a role in expounding on who has standing to file a trademark 
opposition claim by decreeing that such a claim can be filed by any person, even if that person does not 
have a direct economic interest in the trademark.  The court’s rational was based on the indirect 
economic interest all citizens have to prevent confusion between brands, and to promote the 
distinctiveness of high-quality trademarks. 
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Holder registered trademark. 
• Exclude others from using an un-
registered famous trademark for the 
same products. 
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Jordanian trademark law also recognizes collective registration, which allows the 
Registrar to grant a registration for a single trademark to one or more entities or 
individuals at the same time if they were using the trademark for the same 
services or products; the Registrar can impose any conditions it sees fit to 
guarantee equitable use of the trademark by all.219  The Registrar’s decision on 
this issue can be appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court within 30 days.220 
The law provides for civil and criminal remedies and outlines several punishable 
violations, including counterfeiting a registered trademark, illegal use of a 
registered trademark, and knowingly selling goods with a counterfeit registered 
trademark.221   
The owner of a registered trademark can file a civil or a criminal case against the 
alleged infringer(s), and, subject to the provision of a financial bond, can ask the 
court for injunctive relief, including a cease and desist order against the infringer, 
the placing of all goods under protective custody, and/or the safeguarding of any 
related evidence.222  If the injunctive relief is granted, the moving party must file 
a lawsuit against the alleged infringer within eight days from the date of its 
approval.223  Failure to file a lawsuit within the eight-day window results in the 
automatic termination of the injunctive relief measures instituted by the court, 
thus allowing the accused party to claim equitable compensation for damages 
caused by the terminated injunctive relief.224  
The trademark law allows for a trademark to be transferred or sold in conjunction 
with or separately from the entity that holds it.225  Alternatively, the Registrar 
can, without affecting the corporate registration of the trademark holder, cancel a 
registration if it is not used or if the registration process was found to contain 
violations of the necessary requirements.226   
(d) The Protection of New Plant Varieties Law   
This law is the result of the accession to the World Trade Organization, which 
required a specific law that gives clear and comprehensive protections to this area 
of technology.227  The Ministry of Agriculture is the entity charged with 
maintaining a public register of the protected plant varieties, which can only 
include “varieties” of plants, which occupy the lowest ring in plant taxonomy.228  
The law, therefore, does not protect any element of plant taxonomy other than a 
variety, which the law defines as a plant group with specific and reproductively 
                                                     
219 Trademarks Law No.33, art. 18. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid., art. 37. 
222 Ibid. 
223 Ibid. 
224 The Court of Cassation in Opinion No. 72/56 (n.d.). opined that for a criminal prosecution against a 
trademark infringer to move forward, the trademark should be registered and it should be used on the 
same type of goods associated with the registered trademark.  The court effectively added an extra 
dimension to the requirements of the trademark criminal or civil claim. 
225 Trademarks Law No.33, art. 19. 
226 Ibid. art. 19. 
227 New Plant Varieties Law No. 24. 
228 The law follows the accepted plant taxonomy of group, rank, family, genus, species, and variety. 
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stable genetic characteristics distinguishing it from other plant groups.229  The 
main features of the law are outlined in the table below. 
                                                     
229 New Plant Varieties Law No. 24. 
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Table (4.7): Elements of the Protection of New Plant Varieties Law 
Action Requirement Notes 
Registration230 • A new variety not sold for more 
than one year inside Jordan or 
four years outside Jordan prior to 
the date of filing. 
• An uncommon variety that clearly 
differs from any other known 
variety.  (Any filing for any 
variety, inside or outside Jordan, 
makes it a common variety as of 
the date of filing, if a registration 
is eventually given.) 
• A variety whose main 
characteristics are homogenous. 
• A variety whose main 
characteristics are stable 
throughout repeated reproduction 
and breeding. 
• The right to register belongs 
to the breeder(s) or to the 
employer if the work was 
done as part of an 
employment or contractual 
duty. 
• All Registrars’ final decisions 
can be appealed to the 
Supreme Court. 
Priority231 • The date of filing with the 
Jordanian Ministry of Agriculture 
is the priority date in Jordan. 
• The foreign filing date is accepted 
as a priority date in Jordan, if the 
foreign country and Jordan are 
part of a treaty that stipulates such 
action and the filing in Jordan is 
done within 12 months of the 
foreign date. 
The applicant has up to two years if 
filed based on a foreign priority date, 
and six months if filed based on a 
Jordanian priority date, to meet all the 
technical examining requirements set 
forth in article 10 of the law. 
Opposition232 Any person can oppose the registration of a new 
plant variety within 90 days of the grant of the 
preliminary registration. 
If no opposition is filed after the 
preliminary registration is announced 
in the official gazette, or if an 
opposition is rejected, a final 
registration is issued. 
 
Duration of 
Protection233 
• Period of protection for registered 
varieties is 20 years from date of 
filing. 
• Period of protection is 25 years 
for trees and grapevines. 
 
Cancellation of 
Registration234 
• If variety is common, not new, 
not homogenous, or not stable at 
the time of filing for registration. 
• If filing for registration is made 
All Registrar’s decisions on 
cancellation of registration can be 
appealed to the Supreme 
Administrative Court. 
                                                     
230 Ibid., , arts. 4–8. 
231 Ibid., sec. 8–9. 
232 Ibid., sec. 12–14. 
233 Ibid., sec. art. 18. 
234 Ibid., sec. 22-25. 
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by someone other than the true 
breeder. 
• If variety is initially stable but 
later becomes unstable. 
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The variety’s stability is regarded as the salient feature for continued registration, 
and any evidence that would call into question the variety’s stability is cause for 
cancellation of the registration, even if the variety was stable at the time of 
filing.235 
The breeder has the power to sell, transfer, or place a lien on the registration; all 
such actions must be recorded with the official Registrar at the Ministry of 
Agriculture.236  Furthermore, the registration grants the holder the power to 
exclude all others from using or cultivating the registered variety for commercial 
purposes.237  However, the law does provide for a fair-use exception for research 
and development and other non-commercial purposes.238  In the same vein, 
compulsory licensing is allowed for the public good, and the Minister of 
Agriculture can make such a determination based on a recommendation from the 
Registrar.239  Compulsory licensing does not negate the registration holder’s right 
to equitable compensation for the duration of the compulsory licensing.240  The 
law contains an interesting omission in that it does not subject the Minister’s 
decision to grant compulsory licensing to judicial review, though it does subject 
the Registrar’s recommendation to judicial review by the Supreme 
Administrative Court.  
This law does not provide for any criminal penalties for the unauthorized use of a 
registered variety.  It does, however, provide for procedural protections, which 
allow the holder of the registration, subject to the provision of a bank guarantee, 
to ask the court for one or all of the following measures241: 
1. Injunctive order to stop the allegedly infringing activity, 
2. Precautionary seizure of the allegedly infringing products, or 
3. Preservation of all evidence related to the alleged infringement. 
The owner of a registered variety can obtain injunctive relief without serving 
notice to on the potential infringer if the owner proves to the court that there is a 
high probability of immediate and significant damage.242  The court’s approval of 
injunctive relief must be followed within eight days by case filing; otherwise, the 
injunctive relief measure will automatically terminate, thus allowing the accused 
party to claim equitable compensation for any damages caused.243 
(e) Trade Secrets and Unfair Competition  
Prior to the enactment of the Unfair Competition & Trade Secrets Law No. 15 
(2000), Jordanian laws did not address unfair competition and trade secrets in a 
                                                     
235 New Plant Varieties Law No. 24. 
236 Ibid. 
237 Ibid. 
238 Ibid. 
239 Ibid. art. 21. 
240 Ibid., sec. 21. 
241 Ibid. 
242 Ibid. 
243 Ibid. art. 29. 
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specific legislation.  Table 4.8 below outlines the main elements of the relevant 
components of the law. 
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Table (4.8): Elements of the Trade Secrets & Unfair Competition Law244 
Unfair Competition Trade Secrets 
Definition: 
Any act that contravenes fair 
commercial and industrial practice, 
including acts leading to: 
• confusion as to the origin of 
goods 
• false accusations against 
another facility or product 
• false labelling as to nature, 
method of manufacturing, 
properties, quantities, or 
expiration dates of products 
 
Protections: 
A court can, upon the request of an 
allegedly injured party and the 
provision of a bank bond:245 
• stop that allegedly illegal 
practice 
• order the precautionary 
seizure of related products 
• preserve all related evidence  
If the allegedly injured party does 
not file a lawsuit within 8 days, the 
court orders automatically expire 
and the accused party is entitled to 
file for equitable restitution for any 
incurred damages. 
Definition: 
Any information: 
• whose final form or detailed components are not 
known to the public, or are not readily available to 
those who usually handle such information 
• that has commercial value by virtue of not being 
publicly known 
• that has had reasonable precautions taken by its 
owner to prevent its disclosure 
Acts that result in violating this law: 
• divulging contractual information 
• divulging information one under a fiduciary duty 
to keep secret 
• obtaining information from a third party that one 
knows, or could have known, was obtained against 
fair commercial and industrial practice 
Acts that are not in violation of this law: 
• independently arriving at the information 
• reverse engineering 
 
Protections: 
A court can, upon the request of an allegedly injured party 
and the provision of a bank bond”246 
• stop that allegedly illegal practice 
• order the precautionary seizure of related products 
• preserve all related evidence  
If the allegedly injured party does not file a lawsuit within 
8 days, the court orders automatically expire and the 
accused party is entitled to file for equitable restitution for 
any incurred damages. 
If an official entity requests, for the purpose of approving 
pharmaceutical or agricultural products, information 
pertaining to a trade secret, that entity must: 
• agree to protect the trade secret from use by others 
for up to 5 years from the date the approval is 
granted 
• Not divulge the information unless necessary to 
protect the public 
                                                     
244 Unfair Competition and Trade Secrets Law No. 15. 
245 The law does not restrict the ability to file a complaint with the court to an economically injured party; 
rather the language refers to any “interested” party injured by the unfair competition.  This implies that 
any concerned citizen can file such a request. 
246 The law does not restrict the ability to file a complaint with the court to an economically injured party; 
rather the language refers to any “interested” party injured by the unfair competition.  This implies that 
any concerned citizen can file such a request. 
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• If divulged, prevent others from commercially 
exploiting the trade secret. 
While the law provides protections to the holders of trade secrets, it also seems to 
penalize them for not filing a patent.  The period of protection for a trade secret 
for a pharmaceutical or agricultural product, once shared with a governmental 
agency, is five years, compared to the 20-year protection period provided under 
the patent law.247  The law declares as null and void any clause in an IP licensing 
agreement that might negatively impact commerce or impede the spread of 
technology.248  Three situations are mentioned and specifically prohibited:249 
1. Preventing the licensee from sharing improvements on licensed 
technology except with the licensing party, 
2. Contractually prohibiting the licensee from litigating or administratively 
disputing the right to the licensed IP, and 
3. Forcing the licensee to accept, through an adhesion licensing agreement, 
a package of licensed products, instead of individually selected ones. 
(f) Geographical Indications Law 
The law creates a central registry for the approved geographical indications, 
located at the Ministry of Industry and Trade.250   
The main criterion for gaining entry into the registry is whether the product 
exhibits a trademark that correctly indicates the geographical origin of the 
product and is not misleading to the public.251  The law, therefore, requires the 
geographical reference used to be technically correct and not misleading as to 
what the geographical region actually is known for internationally.  The law 
emphasizes that the geographical reference for wines and spirits must be 
technically correct regardless of whether confusing the public is a concern, 
effectively reducing the test, in the case of wines and spirits, to only its first 
element.252   
The law adds another dimension to the analysis by listing two actions that are not 
considered to be violations of its provisions; namely:253 
1. The filing of an application, in good faith, for a trademark that matches a 
geographical indication or  
2. The use, in good faith and prior to the geographical indication’s 
registration in its home country, of a trademark that matches the 
geographical indication.   
                                                     
247 Unfair Competition and Trade Secrets Law No. 15. 
248 Ibid. art. 9. 
249 Intellectual property covered by these prohibitions in article 9, include copyright, trademarks, 
geographical indications, industrial forms and designs, patents, integrated circuits, trade secrets, and new 
plant varieties. 
250 Geographical Indications Law No.8. 
251 Ibid. art. 4. 
252 Ibid. art. 4(c). 
253 Ibid. art. 7.  
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A Registrar’s final decision can be appealed within 60 days to the Supreme 
Administrative Court, and a registration’s revocation does not impart any 
criminal liability to the violators.254  Instead, the law provides for a range of 
administrative and procedural protections under which a court can, upon the 
request of an allegedly injured party and the provision of a bank-bond, stop the 
allegedly infringing practice, seize related products, and preserve all related 
evidence.255  If the allegedly injured party does not file a lawsuit within 8 days, 
the court’s order automatically expires and the accused party is entitled to file an 
action for equitable restitution.256 
(g) Protection of Integrated Circuits Designs Law 
An integrated circuit design to be registered in the designated central registry at 
the MoIT must be novel and non-obvious to practitioners of the art, and an 
application must be filed within two years of its first commercial exploitation 
anywhere in the world.257   
Once all formalities are presented to the Registrar at the MoIT, a decision can be 
made as to the eligibility to a license, and then other rules are applied to sort out 
situations like joint ownership of a design and the effect of employer-employee 
relationship.258   Final decisions by the Registrar can be appealed to the Supreme 
Administrative Court within sixty days.259 
Protection for the design begins from the application’s filing with the Registry; 
the protection duration is 10 years from the date of the design’s first commercial 
use anywhere in the world, not to exceed 15 years from the date of its 
invention.260  The law emphasizes that all legal dispositions over the protected 
design should be registered at the Registry at the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade.261  
The law also provides for compulsory licensing if required by national security, 
emergency, or public non-commercial use, which can be based on a judicial or 
administrative order after a showing that the right holder’s rights are being 
exercised in a way that stifles lawful competition.262  Such compulsory licenses 
are, non-exclusive, non-assignable and must afford the owner of the original 
license equitable compensation, and each application must be dealt with 
separately.263   
There are no criminal penalties to violations of the integrated circuits law, but the 
law allows for injunctive relief measures.  It gives a range of administrative and 
procedural protections under which a court can, upon the request of an allegedly 
                                                     
254 Ibid. 
255 Ibid., sec. 8. 
256 Geographical Indications Law No.8.  
257 Integrated Circuits Law No. 10 art. 4. 
258 Ibid. art. 5. 
259 Ibid., sec. 7. 
260 Ibid., sec. 12, art 12.  
261 Ibid., sec. 14–15. 
262 Ibid., sec. 17. 
263 Ibid. 
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injured party and the provision of a bank bond, stop the allegedly infringing 
practice, seize related products, and preserve all related evidence.264  If the 
allegedly injured party does not file a lawsuit within 8 days, the injunctive relief 
expires automatically, allowing for claims of compensatory damages by the 
accused party.265 
4.5 Conclusion  
The Jordanian legal system evolved throughout the 20th century from the Ottoman and Civil Law 
legal traditions.  The IP system has been tangential to the Jordanian legislative landscape; and 
while patents, trademarks, and copyright were acknowledged as distinct areas of jurisprudence in 
the Civil Code, the small role they played in practice reflected their generally minor economic 
roles.  Nonetheless, Jordan had the necessary legal infrastructure in place, with various levels of 
courts, including a Supreme Administrative Court dedicated to challenges of the governmental 
administrative decisions, and legislations that covered the basic areas of IP. Intellectual property 
areas not covered in specific legislations were dealt with, if needed, under the general principles 
of civil liability in various other codes such as the Civil and Commerce Codes.    
Trademarks were the most legally defined IP area as the courts produced a sizable body of 
jurisprudence.  On the other hand, the lack of research and development within the Jordanian 
commercial and industrial environment gave patent law little practical relevance.  Copyright 
protection was linked to actual registration at the National Library, automatically placing any 
foreign-registered material outside the scope of protection in Jordan. 
This situation, however, changed with the WTO accession talks and Jordan’s growing openness 
to the global economy.  In the span of a half a decade, Jordan transformed its IP legal framework 
into one that is in compliance with the requirements of accession to the WTO.  Areas of 
protection that had previously existed were augmented and modernized, and areas like integrated 
circuits, plant breeding, and geographical indications were provided with their own specific 
legislations with explicit protections.   
                                                     
264 Ibid., sec. 22. 
265 Integrated Circuits Law No. 10. 
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5. CHAPTER V: DEVELOPMENT OF THE JORDANIAN IPRS SYSTEM – A 
TREATY-BASED PERSPECTIVE 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the main elements of the Jordanian legal system and the current 
Jordanian laws governing IP. Now we turn our attention to an examination of the factors that 
have caused the evolution of those legislations.  In particular, we will examine and outline the 
obligations and requirements of the treaties and international agreements that, collectively, have 
impacted the development of the various laws affecting IP.  Those agreements and treaties form 
the framework of the current Jordanian IP protection system.   
This chapter starts by examining the treatment of IPRs under the TRIPS agreement.  This is 
followed by discussion on the historical roots of the TRIPS agreement,  its basic principles, the 
main criteria it requires to assure equitable and uniform application for its provisions, the types of 
IPRs it covers and its requirements for each type, and the enforcement of IP under it.  The chapter 
also examines the agreement’s administrative and remedial procedures, including the dispute 
resolution mechanism proposed. 
Part of the chapter is dedicated to a general discussion of the JUSFTA, followed by a detailed 
discussion of its provisions governing IPRs.  Throughout, the compatibility of the current 
Jordanian IP laws with the text of the JUSFTA is discussed.   
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the evolution of IPRs beyond those outlined by 
TRIPS into what is known as the TRIPS-plus standards.  The main features of a TRIPS-plus 
standard are outlined along with several examples. 
5.2 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
The TRIPS Agreement, which is annex 1C of the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, was signed in Marrakech, Morocco on 15 April 1994.266  the initial concerns 
about TRIPS focused on its potential effect on access to medicine in developing countries, 
especially given the direct involvement of pharmaceutical multinationals in the drafting of 
TRIPS.267  The different repercussions of the globalization of patent protection, the associated 
extension of monopolization, and the subsequent developments are global issues that continue to 
colour any discussion of the economic role of the WTO and TRIPS.268   
5.3 Basic Principles of the TRIPS Agreement 
                                                     
266 TRIPS is one of 28 agreements that make up the Final Act of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, the negotiations that had begun in Punta del Este in 1986 and culminated in 1994 with the 
signing of the Final Act and the creation of the WTO. 
267 See Peter Drahos, “Expanding Intellectual Property’s Empire: The Role of FTAs”, April 22, 2010, 
http://ictsd.org/i/ip/24737/. 
268 See Matthews, Globalising Intellectual Property Rights: The TRIPS Agreement..  See also, Drahos, 
“Expanding Intellectual Property’s Empire: The Role of FTAs.” 
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The historical roots of the TRIPS Agreement can be traced back to the Paris Convention of 
1883,269 which dealt with the protection of industrial property, and the Berne Convention of 
1886,270 which dealt with copyright protection.  Several countries did not ratify the Berne 
Convention until much later, with the US in 1989 being one example.271  In the area of 
trademarks, the framework that governed their international treatment was the Madrid System for 
the International Registration of Marks.272 
Article 72 of the TRIPS agreement effectively mandates those principles to be treated as one 
bundle that must be taken as a whole.273  The main elements of those principles are discussed 
below. 
(a) National Treatment 
Article 3 of the TRIPS agreement requires member states to “accord to the 
nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its 
own nationals with regard to the protection of IP.”274  The drafters of the TRIPS 
agreement alluded to this principle with slightly different wording in article 1, 
stating, “Members shall accord the treatment provided for in this Agreement to 
the nationals of other Members.”275   
Article 3 is intended to mitigate the possibility that the legislations of a member 
state are not yet in full compliance with the TRIPS standards, which would make 
the requirements of article 1 inapplicable.  Such inapplicability continues pending 
the state’s compliance with article 3’s assurances of a “minimum” standard of 
                                                     
269 “Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property”, April 23, 2010, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html, March 20, 1883.  Last amended September 
28, 1979. 
270 “Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works”, April 23, 2010, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html. September 9, 1886.  Last amended 
September 28, 1979. 
271 Orrin G Hatch, “Better Late Than Never: Implementation of the 1886 Berne Convention,” Cornell 
International Law Journal 22 (1989): 171. 
272 Established in 1891 functions under the Madrid Agreement (1891), and the Madrid Protocol (1989). The 
International Bureau of WIPO located in Geneva, Switzerland administers it. 
273 “Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights”, 1994, art. 72. “Reservations may 
not be entered in respect of any of the provisions of this Agreement without the consent of the other 
Members.”  
274 See Ibid., art. 3. 
1. Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favorable than that it 
accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of IP, subject to the exceptions already 
provided in, respectively, the Paris Convention (1967), the Berne Convention (1971), the Rome 
Convention or the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits. In respect of 
performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations, this obligation only applies in 
respect of the rights provided under this Agreement. Any Member availing itself of the possibilities 
provided in Article 6 of the Berne Convention (1971) or paragraph 1(b) of Article 16 of the Rome 
Convention shall make a notification as foreseen in those provisions to the Council for TRIPS. 
2. Members may avail themselves of the exceptions permitted under paragraph 1 in relation to judicial and 
administrative procedures, including the designation of an address for service or the appointment of an 
agent within the jurisdiction of a Member, only where such exceptions are necessary to secure 
compliance with laws and regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement 
and where such practices are not applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on 
trade. 
275 See Ibid., art. 1. 
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equal treatment based on whatever levels of IPRs protections exist at the time.  
The principle ensures that equal treatment is in place from the date of accession 
without the customary one-year amnesty period granted to the applicability of 
other provisions.276   
Nevertheless, the application of this principle is restricted by some exceptions 
applied through treaties approved by the TRIPS agreement; namely, the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Treaty on Intellectual 
Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, and the Treaty of Rome.277 
(b) Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment 
Article 4 of the TRIPS agreement mandates that a member state must 
immediately and unconditionally confer on citizens of other member states any 
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted to any other member state.278    
The goal is to assure that varying levels of IPRs protection would not exist within 
and between individual member states. 
Certain exceptions, derived or accorded under certain international agreements, 
are applicable to this principle as well, affecting advantages, favours, privileges, 
or immunities accorded by a member state.279 
(c) Minimum and Maximum Levels of Protection 
Article 1 of the TRIPS agreement mandates a minimum level of intellectual rights 
protection equal to that provided by its provisions, thus creating a “floor” for 
acceptable levels of protection for any of its members.280  The requirement to 
                                                     
276 See Ibid., art. 65. 
1. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, no Member shall be obliged to apply the provisions of 
this Agreement before the expiry of a general period of one year following the date of entry into force of 
the WTO Agreement. 
2. A developing country Member is entitled to delay for a further period of four years the date of 
application, as defined in paragraph 1, of the provisions of this Agreement other than Articles 3, 4 and 5. 
277 See Ibid., arts. 1 and 3. 
278 See Ibid., art. 4. 
279 Ibid. Exempted from this obligation are any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity accorded by a 
Member: 
(a) deriving from international agreements on judicial assistance or law enforcement of a general nature and 
not particularly confined to the protection of IP; 
(b) granted in accordance with the provisions of the Berne Convention (1971) or the Rome Convention 
authorizing that the treatment accorded be a function not of national treatment but of the treatment 
accorded in another country; 
(c) in respect of the rights of performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations not 
provided under this Agreement; 
(d) deriving from international agreements related to the protection of intellectual property which entered 
into force prior to the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, provided that such agreements are 
notified to the Council for TRIPS and do not constitute an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
against nationals of other Members. 
280 Ibid., art. 1.  
Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. Members may, but shall not be obliged to, 
implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such 
protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement. Members shall be free to determine the 
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meet those minimum standards is the main driver behind the modification of 
national IPRs legislations.  At the same time, while the language of article 1 
suggests preference for even stricter and higher levels of IPRs than the required 
minimums, it is clear that members are not obligated to seek or implement such 
levels.   
Therefore, from a compliance point of view, the obligatory minimum and 
maximum levels of protection under the TRIPS agreement are one and the same.  
Unlike the one-size-fits-all approach applied under the circumstances of the WTO 
accession talks, this allows the member states, primarily those with developing 
economies, the benefit of tailored approaches based on an actual cost-benefit 
analysis when considering any extra IPRs protection.281 
(d) Effective Dates 
Article 65 of the TRIPS agreement discusses effective dates and outlines the 
transitional arrangements for the application of the TRIPS provisions.  Member 
states must apply the provisions “before the expiry of a general period of one year 
following the date of entry into force of the WTO agreement”.282  Thus, the 
agreement grouped the countries into three areas, with each group having a legal 
standard commensurate with its economic status and its level of development 
(i.e., developed, developing, or least developed).  The TRIPS agreement provided 
further consideration for countries moving from centralized to free market 
economies.283 
Those transitional arrangements, which were the biggest concessions accorded by 
the developed countries to the developing and least developed ones, represent one 
of the major negotiating successes for both parties.  They allowed the developing 
countries more time to meet the IPRs standards under the agreement.  
Accordingly, “grace periods” were created, throughout which the terms of the 
agreement are suspended, except for the national treatment and the most favoured 
nation principles.284  
Under the first grace period (outlined in article 65(1) of the TRIPS agreement), 
member states, in general, have up to one year from the date of entry into the 
WTO agreement to apply its provisions.285  The WTO agreement came into force 
on January 1, 1995, at which time member states were expected to be in full 
compliance with TRIPS provisions no later than January 1, 1996.286  Developing 
countries, on the other hand, were permitted to delay the application of TRIPS 
provisions for a period of five years, also commencing from January 1, 1995, and 
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281 See Ibid., art. 72. 
282 Ibid., art. 65(1). 
283 Ibid., art. 65(3). 
284 See L. Peter Farakas, “Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property,” in The World Trade 
Organization: Multilateral Trade Framework for the 21st Century and U.S. Implementing Legislation 
(American Bar Association, 1996).  
285 “TRIPS” art. 65(1). 
286 El-Said and El-Said, “TRIPS-Plus Implications for Access to Medicines in Developing Countries.” 
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set to expire on January 1, 2000.287  The same grace period was granted to 
countries transitioning from a centrally-planned economy to a market-based 
economy, undertaking structural reform of their IP system, and facing special 
problems in the preparation and implementation of IP laws.288   
Under article 65(4) of the TRIPS agreement, developing countries are provided 
with the option of delaying the application of the provisions on product patents of 
section 5, part II, of the TRIPS agreement for an additional period of five years, if 
product patents were not protected in their territory on the general date of 
application of the agreement for the member state.289  The most common 
candidates for this exception were patents covering pharmaceuticals and 
chemicals, and developing countries had to fulfil certain administrative 
requirements for patent filing and were subject to certain marketing concessions 
in their territory.290   
Article 65(5) provides that any country availing itself of a transitional period 
under paragraphs 1, 2, 3 or 4 has an obligation to ensure that any changes in its 
laws and regulations during that period do not result in a lesser degree of 
consistency with the provisions of the TRIPS agreement, than the degree of 
consistency when they first entered the agreement.  This can be described as “a 
standstill clause” because it requires that IP protection may not deteriorate 
beyond the levels present.291  
Since Jordan was not a member of the WTO prior to January 1, 1995, it did not 
benefit from the grace provisions under the TRIPS agreement; accordingly, it had 
to adjust its legal and legislative framework governing IPRs prior to joining the 
WTO.  Therefore, all current Jordanian IP laws, which were covered in chapter 2, 
had to be a priori compliant with the requirements of the TRIPS agreement. 
5.4 Intellectual Property Coverage Under the TRIPS Agreement 
The TRIPS agreement provided protection for eight types of IP in addition to emphasizing the 
continued validity of several previous international treaties.  Below is a brief description of the 
eight types.  This summary is not meant to exhaustive, but simply to provide a road map to the 
various areas of protection under the agreement. 
(a) Copyright and Author’s Rights 
This area of IP is discussed in articles 4 through 19 of section II of the TRIPS 
agreement, which also emphasizes the need for member states to abide by articles 
1 through 21 of the 1971 Berne Convention.292  This seems to be the TRIPS 
agreement’s attempt to create a common denominator and a starting point for its 
                                                     
287 “TRIPS”, art. 65(2). 
288 Ibid., art. 65(3). 
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treatment of the subject.293  The protection period for copyright and author’s 
rights is set to no less than 50 years from the end of the calendar year of 
authorized publication.294  The term of protection granted for broadcasts was set 
to at least 20 years from the end of the calendar year in which the broadcast took 
place.   
An important distinction between the TRIPS agreement and the Berne 
Convention is the introduction of copyright protection for computer programs and 
databases, two types of work that emerged after the 1971 update of the Berne 
Convention.295  Under the TRIPS agreement, both types were granted 
international protection, which they had not previously enjoyed.  The 
consideration of computer programs and the associated code as literary works did 
not create an obvious implementation problem.  As for databases, which are 
selections or arrangements of existing works, more specificity was needed to 
clarify that the protection granted to the database does not affect the copyright 
protections, or lack thereof, of the works arranged or selected in the database.  To 
be accorded protection, therefore, a database should provide added value by 
bringing the selection or the arrangement together in a way that “constitutes [an] 
intellectual creation”,296 (i.e., the originality of the structure and 
comprehensiveness of the selection or arrangement were accorded protection but 
not the data or material itself). 
Additionally, the TRIPS agreement creates rental rights for at least two types of 
works: computer programs and cinematographic works.297  For the latter, such an 
obligation arises only if there is widespread copying of the cinematographic 
works that is “materially impairing the exclusive right of reproduction” of the 
right holder.298  The rental right for computer programs, on the other hand, does 
not apply if the programs are not the subjects of the rental.  From the perspective 
of developed countries, the language of article 11 is a minimum standard that 
most of them have surpassed in their national legislations by creating broader 
rental rights (e.g., the European Union’s Council Directive 92/100/EEC).299 
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296 Ibid., art. 10(2). reads: 
Compilations of data or other material, whether in machine readable or other form, which by reason of the 
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(b) Trademarks 
The TRIPS agreement’s treatment of trademarks also encompasses service marks, 
and it uses the terms ‘well-known trademarks’ and ‘collective trademarks’, which 
are also used in the current Jordanian trademark law.  The protection period for 
such marks was set to a minimum of seven years,300 and the TRIPS agreement 
embraced the notion of the trademark as a contractual object.301  While copyright 
protections under the TRIPS agreement built on the Berne Convention, the 
sections related to trademarks relied on the Paris Convention of 1967 as their 
foundation.   
Unlike the Paris Convention, the TRIPS agreement did define what makes a mark 
a protectable subject matter;302 in article 15(1), it lists two requirements for a 
trademark to meet the standard for registration: a sign or combination of signs 
(names, letters, numerals, figurative elements and/or combination of colours) and 
distinctiveness that can be acquired through use of the goods or services. 
Article 16 of the TRIPS agreement outlines the rights conferred through the 
registration of a trademark.303  Under those rights, the right holder is given 
exclusive right to exclude others from using the mark if that usage involves 1) the 
use of similar or identical signs, 2) in the course of trade, 3) for goods identical or 
similar to those used with the registered sign, and 4) that will likely result in 
confusion in the mind of the consumer.304  This very broad definition raises more 
questions than it answers; for example, what is meant by “similar,” and under 
what standard is such a concept of similarity to be judged, with the understanding 
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Any sign, or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking 
from those of other undertakings, shall be capable of constituting a trademark. Such signs, in particular 
words including personal names, letters, numerals, figurative elements and combinations of colors as 
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303 Ibid., art. 16., reads: 
1. The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive right to prevent all third parties not having 
the owner’s consent from using in the course of trade identical or similar signs for goods or services 
which are identical or similar to those in respect of which the trademark is registered where such use 
would result in a likelihood of confusion. In case of the use of an identical sign for identical goods or 
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of use.  
2. “Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property”, art. 6bis. shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to 
services. In determining whether a trademark is well-known, Members shall take account of the 
knowledge of the trademark in the relevant sector of the public, including knowledge in the Member 
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3. Article 6bis of the Paris Convention shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to goods or services which are not 
similar to those in respect of which a trademark is registered, provided that use of that trademark in 
relation to those goods or services would indicate a connection between those goods or services and the 
owner of the registered trademark and provided that the interests of the owner of the registered 
trademark are likely to be damaged by such use. 
304 “TRIPS” art. 16. 
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that the boundaries of such a definition will determine if the right holder’s 
exclusionary rights can be exercised?  Further, there is considerable confusion as 
to the meaning of “likelihood of confusion” and whether it should be defined 
from the perspective of the government employee, the consumer, or some other 
criterion. 
It is also not clear whether the concept of confusion, as intended by that language, 
also encompasses the notion of dilution of the mark or whether it is simply 
restricted to confusion as to the mark’s origin.  Since joining the WTO, the 
Jordanian trademark jurisprudence has yet to settle these issues, and it remains to 
be seen how it will interpret the language discussed above.  
Two issues that arise in the international use of trademarks, involving mark 
termination and cross-border exploitation of foreign marks, were also covered 
under the TRIPS agreement.  Article 19 mandates a minimum term of three years 
before a registered trademark can be cancelled for non-use, and even such 
cancellation can be challenged if the right holder shows a good reason for the 
non-use.305   
The unhindered exploitation of foreign trademarks in the global market was 
ensured by article 20 of the TRIPS agreement, which abolished statutory 
requirements to associate the foreign trademark with local trademarks or limit its 
use to a special form or manner before it can be marketed locally.306  However, 
the TRIPS agreement still allowed for such restrictions if they were made in a 
contractual form when licensing or assigning the trademark.307  That unhindered 
exploitation was further complemented with article 21, which restricted 
compulsory licensing of trademarks.  Marks, therefore, were considered a 
transferable commodity that can be contractually arranged independent of the 
business with which they are associated. 
(c) Geographical Indications 
Articles 22 through 24 of the TRIPS agreement covered the rights arising from 
the association of a product with a certain geographical area in one of the member 
states.308  The protections and exceptions provided under the TRIPS agreement 
are reflected in the Jordanian law protecting geographical indications (which did 
not exist prior to WTO membership).309  
The TRIPS agreement provides a minimum standard for the protection of 
geographic indications, which it defines as “indications which identify a good as 
originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, 
where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially 
attributable to its geographical origin.”310  The basic standard of protection is 
presented in a negative form, requesting that member states prevent “the use of 
any means in the designation or presentation of a good that indicates or suggests 
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that the good in question originates in a geographical area other than the true 
place of origin in a manner which misleads the public as to the geographical 
origin of the good”, as well as “any use which constitutes an act of unfair 
competition within the meaning of the Paris Convention (1967).”311  The 
reference to unfair competition under the Paris Convention effectively extends 
the notions of confusion, false allegations and the misleading of the public to 
goods whose use of a geographical indicator that, while “literally true as to a 
territory, region or locality in which goods originate, falsely represents to the 
public that the goods originate in another territory.”312 
Article 23 is devoted exclusively to geographical indications for wines and 
spirits, indicating the significance of IP for that industry.313  The article grants 
protection to each indication in the case of homonymous geographical indications 
for wines and establishes a multilateral system of notification and registration of 
geographical indications for wines eligible for protection in participating member 
states.314  Member states are requested to enter into negotiations aimed at 
increasing the protection of individual geographic indications under article 23, 
while they are prohibited from diminishing their protection of geographical 
indications that existed immediately prior to joining the WTO.315  In other words, 
if a member state’s standard of protection is less than that required by the TRIPS 
agreement provisions, it must be raised to meet the TRIPS standards, but if its 
standard already exceeded the TRIPS agreement protections before joining the 
WTO, that standard must not regress to a lower one. 
There is still, however, some question as to the value of providing protection for 
geographical indications.  Economic benefits for geographical indications have 
been suggested, such as the enhancement of geographical reputation, increased 
publicity for the localities, and more effective competition through enhanced 
capability to sell directly to final demand.316  Other evidence, however, suggests 
geographical indications have adverse effects on competition and market entry 
and that their overall economic benefits are suspect at best.317  Several 
competition law cases from the European Union, for example, found that 
geographical indications were used to create barriers to market entry, control total 
supply through the imposition of production quotas, and impose price controls 
through various anti-competitive measures.318 
(d) Industrial Designs 
The terms and provisions of the Jordanian law protecting industrial designs 
reflect the provisions of articles 25 and 26 of the TRIPS agreement, which cover 
this specific type of IP.319  Thus, the Jordanian law also reflects the TRIPS 
agreement’s approach to industrial designs as having a dual IP right nature.  First, 
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there is the utilitarian aspect of the industrial design, which is protected under the 
notions of industrial design law, and second, there is the aesthetic aspect, which 
the TRIPS agreement explicitly places under copyright protection.320   
Protection is provided for “independently created industrial designs that are new 
or original”; thus, the patent concept of novelty is used. Such novelty is 
determined if the new designs “significantly differ from known designs or 
combinations of known designs”, thus introducing the patent concept of non-
obviousness.321  The concepts of copyright law demanding “independent 
creation” and “originality” are also part of the analysis to determine the eligibility 
for protection.322  As to the duration of protection, the length granted to industrial 
designs seems more in line with the shorter periods granted to patents than the 
much longer durations granted to copyrighted material.323 
(e) Patentable Subject Matter  
The Paris Convention, which is the pre-TRIPS international convention on 
patents, suffered from a problem similar to the Berne Convention’s regarding 
trademarks: it did not provide patentability requirements or a definition of what 
constitutes a patentable invention. The lack of a specific definition beyond simply 
meeting the granting criteria allows for flexibility but at the same time results in a 
very broad range of potential subject matter for inventions. The TRIPS agreement 
addressed this issue in article 27, which provides both patentability requirements 
(newness/novelty, an inventive step, and industrial applicability)324 and a 
description of those inventions that can be excluded from patentability by 
member states.325  
                                                     
320 “TRIPS”, art. 25(2)., states: 
Each Member shall ensure that requirements for securing protection for textile designs, in particular in 
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The newness/novelty requirement is intended to ensure that the information 
pertaining to the invention is not already in the public domain.326  The 
requirement of inventiveness or non-obviousness is aimed at assuring that the 
invention makes a contribution to the field of knowledge, which is to be judged 
by someone trained in the art.327  The industrial applicability, or usefulness, 
requirement should eliminate one-hit wonders, (i.e., inventions that cannot be 
duplicated or replicated at an industrial scale).328  Of equal importance is the 
requirement that patent rights should be available for any invention, which 
effectively expanded the field of patentability and removed patentability barriers 
that existed primarily in developing countries (e.g., the distinction between 
process and product patents, which led to the exclusion from patentability of 
inventions in fields like pharmaceuticals).329 
The TRIPS agreement acknowledges exclusions to patentability for inventions 
that disturb the ordre public and morality.330  However, the fact that this optional 
exception comes after the demand that “patents shall be available for any 
inventions”331 indicates that it is not automatic and that a case-by-case review of 
each is warranted. 
The rights conferred upon a patent holder can vary based on whether the type of 
patent granted is a product or a process patent.332 The right holder’s full 
disclosure of the patent to the public is the requirement for complete disclosure of 
the invention in a manner “sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be 
carried out by a person skilled in the art, and may require the applicant to indicate 
the best mode for carrying out the invention known to the inventor”, in return for 
the patent right.333  For a product patent, the right holder can prevent others from 
making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that 
product.334  For a process patent, the right holder can prevent unauthorized parties 
from using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes the product 
obtained directly by that process.  Those conferred rights also have some 
exceptions that can be applied by member states, provided that “such exceptions 
do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking 
account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”335   
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The Jordanian law allows for a research and development exception, which falls 
under compulsory licensing (defined by TRIPS as the “use without authorization 
of the right holder”), an area that developed countries must have been keen to 
place under tight regulation.336  The main elements used by TRIPS to regulate 
compulsory licensing are as follows: 
1. Case-by-case consideration 
2. “Prior efforts” requirement to obtain authorization from the right holder 
3. Limited scope and duration 
4. Non-exclusiveness and non-assignability of the issued license 
5. “Domestic market” requirement 
6. Automatic termination upon the change of circumstances causing the 
licensing 
7. Fair and equitable compensation to right holder 
8. Judicial review of the licensing decision, as well as the amount of 
compensation offered in return, is permitted 
Exceptions to some of the requirements were allowed in the case of a domestic 
emergency, public non-commercial use, and the need to correct anti-competitive 
practices. 
The TRIPS agreement guarantees the right holder a judicial review if the patent 
was revoked or forfeited337 and set a minimum patent term of 20 years from the 
date of filing.338  In the case of infringements of process patents, the TRIPS 
agreement shifts the burden of proof to the alleged infringer by requiring the 
infringer to prove, if the two products are identical, that the process used was 
different from the patented one.  Thus, TRIPS makes the initial assumption that 
the identical product was produced using the patented process, unless the alleged 
infringer proves otherwise.339 
(f) Topographies and Integrated Circuits 
The TRIPS agreement references the protections presented in the Treaty on 
Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits (IPIC).340  However, the 
IPIC’s incorporation by reference into the TRIPS was subject to some 
modifications, which included the following changes:  
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1. The term of protection was set for at least 10 years (rather than eight 
years under IPIC) from the date of filing an application, or of the first 
commercial exploitation, but Members may provide a term of protection 
of 15 years from the creation of the layout design;341  
2. The right-holder’s exclusive rights are extended to articles incorporating 
integrated circuits in which a protected layout-design is incorporated, 
insofar as it continues to contain an unlawfully reproduced layout-design 
without the prior authorization of the right holder;342  
3. The circumstances in which layout-designs may be used without the 
consent of right-holders is more restricted subject to the same conditions 
set forth earlier for patents.  That restriction was also reflected in the 
Jordanian Integrated Circuits Law No. 10 (2000)343;  
4. Certain acts, when committed unknowingly, would not constitute 
infringement.344 
(g) Protection of Undisclosed Information  
TRIPS characterized trade secrets as information considered valuable as a result 
of its non-disclosure.345  The context for providing such protection was within the 
provision of trade secrets to governmental agencies during the course of product 
licensing.     
TRIPS incorporated the Paris Convention’s treatment of unfair competition346 
and added criteria to determine whether information would qualify for protection, 
including:347 
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342 Ibid. art. 36 outlines the scope of protection and states: 
“Subject to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 37, Members shall consider unlawful the following acts 
if performed without the authorization of the right holder: importing, selling, or otherwise distributing 
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referred to in that Article in respect of an integrated circuit incorporating an unlawfully reproduced 
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346 Ibid. art. 39(1) states: 
“In the course of ensuring effective protection against unfair competition as provided in Article 10bis of the 
Paris Convention (1967), Members shall protect undisclosed information in accordance with paragraph 2 
and data submitted to governments or governmental agencies in accordance with paragraph 3.”  
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1. The information is a secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the 
precise configuration and assembly of its components, generally known 
among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally 
deal with the kind of information in question;  
2. The information has commercial value because it is secret; and  
3. The information has been subject to reasonable measures under the 
circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the information, to 
keep it secret. 
Article 39(3) focuses on the non-disclosure requirement for protected information 
exclusively from the perspective of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical 
products.348  The drafting of article 39(3) is a direct result of the lobbying by the 
major pharmaceutical and agricultural corporations to secure more precise 
language for the protection of their trade secrets,349 which they must share with 
governmental agencies in the course of regulatory or other government-related 
dealings.350 The Jordanian statute of Unfair Competition and Trade Secrets Law 
No. 15 (2000) picked up on those issues and mandated that governmental 
agencies requesting confidential information for the purpose of approving 
pharmaceutical or agricultural products must:351 
1. Agree to protect the trade secret from use by others for up to 5 years from 
the date the approval of the pharmaceutical or agricultural product is 
granted, and 
2. Not divulge the information unless necessary for protecting the public 
and, if necessary, prevent others from commercially exploiting the trade 
secret. 
Thus, member states are mandated to protect undisclosed information provided to 
them in the course of regular governmental work. 
(h) Control of Anti-Competitive Practices in Contractual Licenses  
The TRIPS agreement outlines an approach to the control of anti-competitive 
practices in IP licenses.352 This is supported in article 7, which states that the 
“protection and enforcement of IPRs should contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology.”353  
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351 Unfair Competition and Trade Secrets Law No. 15., art. 8 
352 “TRIPS”, art. 40 
353 Ibid. art. 7. 
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Similarly, article 8(1) authorizes member states to “adopt measures necessary…to 
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic 
and technological development.”  Article 8(1)’s broad language is tempered by 
the requirement that such measures be “consistent with the provisions” of the 
TRIPS agreement.354   
While TRIPS recognizes the general right to “conclude licensing agreements” as 
part of the patent grant,355 it nonetheless moves to limit certain uncompetitive 
practices that might arise under licensing and would “have adverse effects on 
trade and may impede the transfer and dissemination of technology”.356  The 
explicit right of member states to legislate against such practices is explicitly 
mentioned, and each country is further allowed to explicitly legislate certain 
practices that constitute “in particular cases an abuse of IPRs having an adverse 
effect on competition in the relevant market.”357   
Article 40(2) lists three examples of licensing practices that member states may 
move to limit:358 
1. Exclusive grant-back conditions,  
2. Conditions preventing challenge to validity, and   
3. Coercive package licensing. 
The Jordanian Unfair Competition and Trade Secrets Law No. 15 (2000) 
explicitly prohibits all three.359  Those examples seem to have been the result of a 
compromise, as the drafting history had a much longer and more detailed list of 
practices that might be subject to regulation.360  The collective language on this 
issue seems to be more of a policy statement without actual substantive impact, 
leaving the trans-national dispute resolution mechanisms of the WTO to settle 
any ambiguous points and practices.  The remaining provisions of article 40 deal 
with such a mechanism. 
The Doha Declaration of 2001 presented a significant development regarding the 
clarification of the ambiguities surrounding the implications of the TRIPS 
agreement on developing countries, particularly the concerns about possible 
restrictions on access to affordable medicines in developing countries.361  The 
Declaration affirmed that “the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent 
                                                     
354 Ibid. art. 8(2) 
355 Ibid. art. 28(2). 
356 Ibid. art. 40(1). 
357 The “relevant market” in the realm of intellectual property could mean a physically defined market, or 
one that is marked by non-physical boundaries.  Examples of the later include the Technology Markets, 
where saleable goods are the ownership and/or licensing of intellectual property, and Innovation 
Markets, where nothing is sold or bought, but preparations are made to sell innovation at a later time.  
The TRIPS agreement’s lack of a specific definition has spawned controversy. 
358 “TRIPS”, art. 40(2) 
359 Unfair Competition and Trade Secrets Law No. 15., art. 9 
360 See Herbert Hovenkamp et al., IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to 
Intellectual Property Law (Aspen Publishers, 2001). 
361 “Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health”, 2001. 
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Members from taking measures to protect public health.”362  It emphasized, with 
certain conditions, the right of member states to grant compulsory licenses.  The 
declaration also granted the member states the freedom to determine the grounds 
upon which these licenses can be granted.363   
Article 31 of TRIPS sets forth a number of conditions for granting a compulsory 
license, including a case-by-case review of applications and the payment of 
equitable remuneration to the patent holder.364  The Declaration allowed, 
however, in the case of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
emergency, the waiver of certain requirements, such as the need for prior 
negotiations to obtain a voluntary license from the patent holder, a need that was 
already provided for under article 31 of TRIPS.365  Parallel importing and the 
principle of exhaustion can be important tools enabling access to affordable 
medicines that are sold at different prices in different markets, because there can 
be substantial differences in cost for a pharmaceutical product in different 
markets.366  Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement explicitly states that practices 
related to parallel importation cannot be challenged under the WTO dispute 
settlement system.  The Doha Declaration reaffirmed that member states are free 
to establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge.  The Doha 
Declaration also adopted decisions clarifying the obligations of developing 
member governments with respect to issues including agriculture, subsidies, 
textiles and clothing; technical barriers to trade; trade-related investment 
measures; and rules of origin.367 
These were important developments for Jordan, because by the time the Doha 
declaration was announced, Jordan was already a member state of the WTO.  Its 
pharmaceutical sector, which is the most developed and vibrant in the Middle 
East and North Africa, particularly stood to gain from the easement of restrictions 
on the exhaustion principle.368  However, around the same time, Jordan was about 
to conclude a separate Free Trade Agreement with the United States, which 
imposed further restrictions on compulsory licensing.  The Jordan–European 
Union Free Trade Agreement had similar restrictions as well.   
                                                     
362 Ibid. 
363 “Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,” 2001., para. 5/b and 5/c.  
364 “TRIPS” art. 31. 
365 “Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.” 
366 The principle of exhaustion states that once patent holders, or any party authorized by them, have sold a 
patented product, they cannot prohibit the subsequent resale of that product since their rights in respect 
of that market have been exhausted by the act of selling the product. 
367The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health further extended the transition period 
for least developed countries until January 1, 2016 with respect to the TRIPS obligations concerning 
pharmaceutical product patent protection and the protection of undisclosed pharmaceutical test data 
against unfair commercial use (Sections 5 and 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement).  In 2002, the 
WTO's Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Council) agreed to 
grant a waiver to least-developing countries concerning the obligation to provide exclusive marketing 
rights for pharmaceutical products (TRIPS article 70(9)) until January 1, 2016.  This waiver is subject to 
approval by the WTO's General Council.  There is no waiver of the obligation to adopt "mail box" 
provisions (TRIPS article 70(8)) for pharmaceutical product patent applications. 
368 Abdel-Aziz Ahmad Sharabati, Shawqi Naji Jawad, and Nick Bontis, “Intellectual Capital and Business 
Performance in the Pharmaceutical Sector of Jordan,” Management Decision 48, no. 1 (September 2, 
2010): 105–131. 
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5.5 Enforcement of IPRs Under the TRIPS Agreement 
TRIPS provided for a framework for IP, and an implementation mechanism for that framework.   
The following sections will address the various general commitments, as well as the civil and 
administrative procedures and remedies, set forth in the TRIPS agreement. 
5.6 General Obligations under TRIPS 
The TRIPS agreement outlines the general commitments that must be provided for to assure that 
all the procedures within the agreement’s framework are equitable and fair and provide for a 
deterring effect against the infringement of IPRs.369  The member states should ensure that 
enforcement procedures are available under their laws, so as to permit effective action against 
infringement of IPRs, and that such procedures are designed so as “to avoid the creation of 
barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.”370  
How invasive such affirmative requirements can be to national sovereignty is not yet clear.371  
Meeting the affirmative requirements presents a challenge for many developing countries, which 
are hoping to reduce their technological gap.372  Some of the approaches proposed include 
integrating IP laws into the national development goals, the using competition law to curb 
monopolistic abuse, designing of an IP regime aimed at supporting local innovation, resisting the 
drive towards stronger international IPRs, and strengthening the national infrastructure for 
knowledge dissemination and acquisition.373   
Jordan has not been effective in using the right, guaranteed under article 8 of the TRIPS 
agreement, to adopt certain measures consistent with the TRIPS agreement in order to protect 
public health and nutrition and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to 
their socio-economic and technological development.374  Developed countries have benefited 
from Jordan’s non-affirmative approach to IP laws by placing their own favourable interpretation 
on the terms of the TRIPS agreement, allowing them to focus their assistance quite narrowly.375  
Such assistance is requested by TRIPS to provide technical and financial cooperation in favour of 
developing countries in implementing the provisions of the agreement.376 
Jordan would do well to give closer attention to the Dispute Settlement mechanism under TRIPS 
in order to understand its rights and obligations and tools offered to it under the WTO 
agreement.377  But perhaps one should not be harsh on Jordan on this issue, as current evidence 
suggests that is a problem common to most developing countries as the majority of cases before 
the WTO dispute panels come from a handful of developed countries who are therefore 
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presumably controlling the interpretation of the terms of the WTO agreement.378  Another 
dimension to the interpretation of the WTO agreement comes from some members granting their 
national courts the right to interpret WTO law, as is the case with the United States, which might 
create “an international law with an American accent.”379   
A better understanding of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is a key factor in 
helping developing countries impact the implementation of the TRIPS agreement.380  The DSU 
offers developing countries a new venue for solving some of their difficulties in trade issues, 
including IPRs.381.  Furthermore, because the DSU brings disputes under a multilateral 
mechanism, thus assuring that developing countries will not be threatened by unilateral actions by 
developed countries, it should provide a valuable venue for disputing unfavourable conditions or 
even for testing ambiguous legal positions, especially since precedents set through the DSU can 
be as binding as the TRIPS agreement itself. 382 
RBTs provide for alternative dispute mechanisms other than the DSU, thus impacting its global 
effectiveness.383  They also introduce higher levels of IP protections (TRIPS-plus), thus 
countering the harmonizing role of the TRIPS agreement.384  Thus, the intended cohesive impact 
of the WTO agreement on international trade law is undermined by regional and bilateral 
agreements that splinter the interpretation of international law.385  Dispute settlement mechanisms 
outside the DSU create the potential for forum shopping, forum shifting, and the creation of 
“separate islands” of legal rules, interpretation, and institutions that further contribute to the 
splintering of international trade law, leading to the weakening of the global dispute settlement 
forum envisioned by the DSU and thus of the WTO itself.386  This also creates a ‘back door’ to 
challenge a verdict by the DSU (if that point is even reached), whereby the losing party could 
choose to go to the bilateral dispute settlement forum to reargue it case; there is no double 
jeopardy doctrine here.387 
(a) Civil and Administrative Procedures and Remedies under TRIPS 
TRIPS requires member states to make available to right holders civil judicial 
procedures concerning the enforcement of any IP right covered by the TRIPS 
                                                     
378 The United States and the European Union seem to be the heaviest users of the system.  The United 
States also pursues parallel tracks to achieve the same end result of guarding the intellectual property 
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agreement.388  These procedural rights guarantee an international minimum 
standard for nationals of other member states within the meaning of article 1.3 of 
the TRIPS agreement.389 
The TRIPS agreement also reemphasizes the need for the protection of 
confidential information obtained in the course of evidence gathering and 
requests that courts have the authority to order the reproduction of evidence, 
given that there must be in place measures to assure the protection of confidential 
information.390   
The right of national courts to issue injunctions is granted in cases where such an 
injunction is necessary to “desist from an infringement,” such as for the 
prevention of the entry of imported goods that involve the infringement of an IP 
right.391  But such authority is not required if the protected subject matter is 
ordered by a person who does not know that “dealing in such subject matter 
would entail the infringement of an IP right.”392  Courts must also have the 
authority to dispose of infringing goods without compensation and to order “that 
materials and implements the predominant use of which has been in the creation 
of the infringing goods be, without compensation of any sort, disposed of outside 
the channels of commerce in such a manner as to minimize the risks of further 
infringements, but proportionality between the seriousness of the infringement 
and the remedies ordered as well as the interests of third parties shall be taken 
into account.”393     
The judicial authorities in a member state will have the authority to order the 
knowing infringer to compensate the right holder for the injury incurred as a 
result of the infringement of the right holder’s IPRs.394  Additionally, the courts 
must have the authority to order the infringer to pay the right holder’s expenses, 
which may include appropriate attorney’s fees.395  In appropriate cases, members 
may authorize the judicial authorities to order recovery of profits and/or payment 
of pre-established damages even where the infringer did not knowingly, or with 
reasonable grounds to know, engage in infringing activity.”396     
The TRIPS agreement, however, does not discuss the basis for estimating 
damages, which is a key missing detail.  That issue was addressed in the 
JUSFTA, which stated that damages will be calculated on the retail value of the 
legitimate product that is infringed rather than the street value of the pirated or 
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counterfeit products,397 resulting in the maximization of the value of the infringed 
goods and the damages incurred.    
Indemnification for wrongfully enjoined or restrained parties is provided for 
through compensation for the injury suffered, including appropriate attorney’s 
fees.398  The civil and administrative procedures and the remedies presented in 
TRIPS are reflected in the Jordanian IP laws. 
(b) Dispute Settlement Understanding Under the TRIPS Agreement 
The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) under TRIPS is not limited to 
issues related to IP disputes; rather, it governs the whole multilateral trading 
system that is governed by the WTO.  With clearly defined rules and timetables 
for completing a case, the WTO’s procedure presents a binding, legitimate and 
objective conflict-resolution mechanism, complete with an appeal process.  The 
whole process is not dissimilar to the legal rules and procedures in a domestic 
judicial process, and while a precedent system is not written into the DSU itself, 
the appeal panels have been careful to consider past decisions.  It is therefore 
important to understand such a mechanism as it impacts the interpretation and 
application of the TRIPS provisions.  The de facto precedents set by the DSU are 
key to clarifying ambiguous procedures, concepts, duties and rights that TRIPS 
did not expounded upon with sufficient detail and specificity. 
                                                     
397 “Jordan-United States Free Trade Agreement”, 2000., art. 4(24): “Injury to the right holder shall be 
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Table (5.1): Approximate time for a dispute settlement procedure under TRIPS399 
60 days Consultations, mediation, etc. 
45 days Panel set up and panellists appointed 
6 months Final panel report to parties 
3 weeks Final panel report to WTO members 
60 days Dispute Settlement Body adopts report (if no appeal) 
Total = 1 year (without appeal) 
60-90 days Appeal Report 
30 days Dispute Settlement Body adopts appeals report 
Total = 1 year and 2-3 months (with appeal) 
 
The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which is composed of representatives of 
member states, administers the DSU’s rules and procedures.400  The DSB 
establishes panels, adopts reports by those panels and by the appellate bodies, 
maintains surveillance of implementation of rulings and recommendations, and 
authorizes suspension of concessions and other obligations under the covered 
agreements.  Only member states that are signatories to a specific plurilateral 
trade agreement can present a complaint before the DSB, which makes its 
decisions by consensus (i.e. no member state shall officially object to the 
proposed decision). 
5.7 Jordan-United States Free Trade Agreement (JUSFTA) 
The Free Trade Agreement between Jordan and the United States was signed on October 24, 
2000, and entered into force on December 17, 2001.  It marks a milestone in the economic 
relationship and history of bilateral trade agreements for both countries, because it was only the 
second such bilateral agreement between the United States and any other country (the first being 
with Israel).  Previously, the United States had entered into the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), which is technically a multilateral agreement, as it included three 
countries: Canada, Mexico and the United States.  The JUSFTA was designed to achieve 
significant and extensive liberalization across a wide spectrum of trade issues. Its major 
provisions include: 
1. Tariffs: The JUSFTA eliminates duties and commercial barriers to bilateral trade 
in goods and services originating in the United States and Jordan. 
                                                     
399 Source http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited April 25, 2010).  
The periods are approximate and the countries can settle their dispute themselves at any stage. 
400 “Dispute Settlement Understanding” (World Trade Organization, 1994)., art. 2  
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2. IPRs: The JUSFTA includes the most up-to-date international standards for 
copyright, patent, and trademark-related commitments. 
3. Electronic Commerce: The JUSFTA promotes a liberalized trade environment for 
electronic commerce (e-commerce). 
4. Trade-Related Environment: The JUSFTA includes provisions to implement 
environmental protection laws. 
5. Labour Provisions: The JUSFTA includes provisions to protect the worker’s 
rights. 
6. Services: The JUSFTA provides liberalization in certain sectors of trade. 
7. Consultation and Dispute Settlements: The JUSFTA provides for a dispute 
settlement panel that will issue legal interpretations of the JUSFTA after 
consultation of both countries.  
In order to limit access to the benefits of the agreement, Rules of Origin were specifically applied 
to the JUSFTA in order to determine from what country a product is imported, especially when 
two or more countries contribute to its production.  Since the United States already has a Bilateral 
Investment Treaty (BIT) with Jordan, the JUSFTA does not include an investment chapter. 
Since the signing of this treaty, the United States has made similar agreements with other 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, such as Bahrain and Morocco, as 
well as countries outside the MENA regions like Singapore, Australia and Vietnam. The 
JUSFTA’s inclusion of terms on labour and the environment became standard language for all 
future FTAs signed by the United States.  However, despite its ground breaking nature, there 
since has been a growing concern that the JUSFTA carries imbalances in the area of IPRs, 
resulting from the Jordanian policy makers’ lack of familiarity with that subject and a lack of 
internal consultation when Jordan acceded to the WTO and negotiated the JUSFTA.401   
Further, the JUSFTA’s inclusion of international standards higher than those under TRIPS 
ushered Jordan into an era of what is now known as the TRIPS-plus standard; that is, a standard 
of protection for IPRs higher than that demanded or contemplated by the TRIPS agreement 
itself.402  The consequences and implications of the TRIPS-plus standard are discussed in more 
detail later in this chapter.  Additionally, the JUSFTA grants evidentiary presumption for the 
owners of copyright and related rights for the purpose of ownership of the copyright-related 
rights, in both civil and criminal cases.403  That presumption is not contemplated under the TRIPS 
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agreement, which nonetheless grants member states considerable latitude in designing their 
evidentiary systems and the presumptions that flow from them. 
(a) Overview of the JUSFTA     
The JUSFTA requires that all tariff barriers shall be lifted for the majority of 
goods traded between Jordan and the US within 10 years of the JUSFTA’s entry 
into force.404  Strict rules of origin apply to the goods benefiting from that tariff 
elimination.  The JUSFTA provides for an elaborate and detailed schedule to 
assign a large number of goods into varying categories, with duties removed for 
each category according to a separate timeline.405   
The JUSFTA emphasizes the inappropriateness of encouraging “trade by relaxing 
domestic environmental laws.”406  As such, both countries are asked to strive to 
ensure that they do not “derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate 
from, such laws as an encouragement for trade with” one another.  Interestingly 
enough, however, there is no demand for higher environmental standards for both 
parties similar to those demanded for IPRs.  Instead the JUSFTA recognizes the 
right of each party to “establish its own levels of domestic environmental 
protection and environmental development policies and priorities, and to adopt or 
modify accordingly its environmental laws.”407  Actions of either party are in 
compliance if they reflect a “reasonable exercise of such discretion,” as self-
regulation and monitoring were considered satisfactory.408 
Customs administration was also addressed by the JUSFTA in very broad terms, 
along with the rules regarding the eligibility for the preferential tariff treatment 
provided under the JUSFTA, including the list included in Annex 2.2 of the 
JUSFTA.409  But the main dispute for customs and borders issues was related to 
IPRs and article 4(26), which stipulates that “[e]ach Party shall provide, at least 
in cases of copyright piracy or trademark counterfeiting, that its authorities may 
initiate criminal actions and border measure actions ex officio, without the need 
for a formal complaint by a private party or right holder.”410  The current 
Jordanian Customs Law only grants the authority to prevent the entry of 
counterfeit goods, leaving the initiation of legal action to the right holder.  This 
issue continues to threaten that Jordan might be included on the list of US Trade 
Representatives (USTR) not fulfilling their trade obligations.  Because the USTR 
list is linked to the level of aid given by the United States government to the 
respective countries, it is a major concern for developing countries like Jordan. 
The dispute resolution mechanism under the JUSFTA is separate and distinct 
from the WTO’s DSU; while the JUSFTA procedure encompasses the same steps 
used under the DSU (i.e. consultation followed by panel adjudication), they have 
little else in common.  The JUSFTA envisions the creation of a three-member 
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Joint Committee to “supervise the proper implementation of the JUSFTA and to 
review the trade relationship between” the United States and Jordan.411   
Section 4, which covers the issues related to IP in the JUSFTA, is its longest and 
most detailed section.  The section’s goal of establishing a high standard of IP 
right protection is evident from its first sentence, which declares that the 
protection levels provided under the JUSFTA are a “minimum.”  It addresses 
several areas ranging from copyright, patents, trademarks and geographical 
indications to enforcement of IP and transition periods.  It also sets standards for 
IPRs protection that exceed the limits demanded by the TRIPS, thus setting in 
motion a TRIPS-plus standard.  The subsections below will address some of these 
elements.  
(i) Initial Provisions 
In addition to the IPRs protections, the JUSFTA also calls on both parties 
to adopt the following provisions from other international IPRs 
treaties:412 
1. Articles 1 through 6 of the Joint Recommendation Concerning 
Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks (1999) 
adopted by the Assembly of the Paris Union for the protection of 
industrial property and the General Assembly of WIPO, which 
deals with the definition of well-known marks;  
2. Articles 1 through 22 of the International Convention of the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV convention, 1991), 
which provides recognition of the rights of plant breeders;  
3. Articles 1 through 14 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT, 
1996),413 with the exception of Articles 1(4) and 6(2) of the 
treaty, provided that this exception should not prejudice the 
obligations to the WCT treaty itself; 
4. Articles 1 through 23 of the WIPO Performance and Phonograms 
Treaty (WPPT, 1996),414 with the exception of Articles 5, 8(2), 
12(2) and 15 of the WPPT treaty, without prejudice to each 
party’s rights and duties under the WPPT, the Berne Convention 
and TRIPS.  
Additionally, each party is required to use its best efforts to ratify the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT, 1984) and the Madrid Protocol 
Concerning the International Registration of Marks (1989).  Jordan is not 
yet a member of either.   
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(ii) Trademarks and Geographical Indications 
The JUSFTA expands the definition of trademarks by encompassing 
geographical indications, even though under the TRIPS trademarks and 
geographical indications are treated separately.  Furthermore, the 
JUSFTA introduced several new obligations in this area, including415: 
1. The commitment to join the Protocol Relating to the Madrid 
Agreement Concerning International Registration of Marks. 
2. The requirement to give effect to articles 1 through 6 of the Joint 
Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of 
Well-Known Marks (1999) adopted by the Assembly of the Paris 
Union for the protection of industrial property and the General 
Assembly of WIPO. 
3. The requirement not to require recording of trademark licenses to 
establish the validity of the license or to assert any rights in a 
trademark. 
4. The requirement to raise the maximum criminal fine to JD 6000, 
which was included in paragraph 3 of the Memorandum of 
Understanding between Jordan and the United States.416  
In response to requirements (b) through (d), the Jordanian government 
presented several amendments to its Trademark Law, which were 
approved by the Parliament in 2008 to bring the law into compliance. 
(iii) Copyright and Related Rights  
The JUSFTA added significant requirements to this area, including:  
1. Giving performers and producers of phonograms the right to 
prohibit unauthorized broadcasting of their works 
2. Giving right holders control over allowing or denying the 
importation of the protected work(s), whether the work is pirated 
or an authorized version.417  
3. Asking the signatories to combat technology that is intended to 
circumvent the effective technological measures that are used by 
performers or producers in connection with the exercise of their 
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rights in accordance with article 11 of the WCT418 and article 18 
of the WPPT.419420 
4. Asking governmental agencies to only use authorized computer 
software.  Both parties must actively regulate the acquisition and 
management of software for government use.421 
5. Requiring “that statutory maximum fines are sufficiently high to 
deter future acts of infringement with a policy of removing the 
monetary incentive to the infringer.”422  
The Jordanian Copyright law was amended first in 1999 to comply with 
the TRIPS agreement requirements and then again in 2001, 2003, and 
2005 to bring it into closer compliance with the JUSFTA requirements.  
The criminal fines were increased to a maximum of JD 6000,423 and 
provisions were added to protect performers.424  Further, technologies 
used to circumvent anti-coping measures were prohibited.425  
(iv) Patents   
A new Patent Law was enacted in 1999 to comply with the TRIPS 
agreement obligations.  In 2001, new patent regulations were introduced 
to help facilitate the process of filing for a patent.  While the 1999 law is 
in compliance with the TRIPS agreement obligations, the JUSFTA 
introduced several new requirements in the filing of patents and regulated 
products, including426: 
1. Making available an extension of the patent term to compensate 
the patent holder for unreasonable curtailment of the patent term 
as a result of the marketing approval process.427  Jordan has yet to 
meet this requirement. 
2. Committing to joining the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).  
Jordan has yet to meet this requirement. 
                                                     
418 “Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the 
circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by authors in connection with the 
exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their 
works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law.” 
419 “Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the 
circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by performers or producers of 
phonograms in connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty and that restrict acts, in 
respect of their performances or phonograms, which are not authorized by the performers or the 
producers of phonograms concerned or permitted by law.”  The Jordanian Prime Minister issued an 
executive order to that effect. 
420 JUSFTA, art. 4(13) 
421 JUSFTA, art. 4(15) 
422 JUSFTA, art. 4(25).  Jordan increased the criminal fines to JD 6000. 
423 Copyright Law No.22., art. 51.   
424 Ibid., arts. 53 and 56(d).  
425 Ibid., art. (55)   
426 “JUSFTA” art. 4. 
427 JUSFTA, art. 4(23) 
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3. Clarifying that the exclusion from patent protection of 
“mathematical methods” in article 4(b) of Jordan’s Patent Law 
does not include such “methods” as business methods or 
computer-related inventions.428  The Jordan Patent Office is now 
accepting business methods patent applications in light of this 
commitment. 
5.8 The Jordanian-European Association Agreement (JEUAA) 
The European Union signed an Association Agreement with Jordan on November 24, 1997, 
which was ratified by the Jordanian Parliament in September 1999 and came into effect on May 
1, 2002, after being ratified by European Union countries.  In November 2010, after its accession 
to the World Trade Organization and the signing of the Free Trade Agreement with the United 
States, which highlighted the country’s commitment towards trade liberalization, Jordan was 
accorded advanced status with the EU.  The JEUAA gave Jordan preferential treatment in terms 
of the entrance of goods to the European Union.  
The political and security issues within the JEUAA focused on the creation of a common ground 
for future cooperation, including areas of human rights, personal and public liberties, and rule of 
law.  It emphasized dialogue and the movement towards peace, security, democracy, human 
rights and regional development as an engine for change.  
(a) IPRs under the Jordan-EU Association Agreement  
While the IP component of the JEUAA is not as sweeping as that of TRIPS or 
article 4 of the JUSFTA, it does nonetheless require Jordan to fulfil the following 
IPRs requirements:429 
1. The Berne Convention for the protection of literary and artistic works 
(Paris Act, 1971); 
2. The Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations (Rome, 1961); 
3. The Nice Agreement concerning the International Classification of Goods 
and Services for the purposes of the Registration of Marks (Geneva Act, 
1977, amended 1979); 
4. The Madrid Agreement concerning the International Registration of 
Marks (Stockholm Act, 1967, amended 1979); 
5. The Protocol relating to the Madrid Agreement concerning the 
International Registration of Marks (Madrid, 1989); 
6. The Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of 
Microorganisms for the purposes of Patent Procedure (1977, modified 
1980); 
                                                     
428 “Memorandum of Understanding on Issues Related to the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights 
Under the Agreement Between the United States and Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade 
Area.”, paragraph 5. 
429 JUSFTA, annex VII. 
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7. The International Convention for Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV, Geneva Act, 1991). 
Furthermore, the JEUAA requires Jordan to join the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
within seven years of the ratification of the association agreement.430  Within the 
JEUAA itself, article 56 and Annex VII are the provisions related to IP. 
Article 56 states: 
1. Pursuant to the provisions of this Article and of 
Annex VII, the Parties shall grant and ensure adequate 
and effective protection of intellectual, industrial and 
commercial property rights in accordance with the 
highest international standards, including effective 
means of enforcing such rights. 
2. The implementation of this Article and of Annex 
VII shall be regularly reviewed by the Parties.  If 
problems in the area of intellectual, industrial and 
commercial property affecting trading conditions were to 
occur, urgent consultation shall be undertaken, at the 
request of either Party, with a view to reaching mutually 
satisfactory solutions. 
The term “highest international standards” effectively requires Jordan to adopt 
the highest standards available regardless of their suitability to its needs or 
circumstances.  This could also have a direct impact on Jordan’s ability to 
exercise its sovereignty in deciding which international treaties it will or will not 
join, as it is debatable whether this language obligates Jordan to ratify new 
treaties (e.g., ACTA) as soon as they are introduced.  
Annex VII of the JEUAA stipulates the need to accede to the seven treaties listed 
earlier, as well as the Patent Cooperation Treaty.  It also requires Jordan to 
provide “adequate and effective protection of patents for chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals in line with Articles 27 to 34 of the WTO Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of IPRs, by the end of the third year from the entry into force of 
this Agreement or from its accession to the WTO, whichever is the earliest.”   
The Annex VII language is broad enough to include language that might bind 
Jordan to the provisions of “other multilateral conventions” in the field of 
intellectual, industrial and commercial property.  That broad language is in line 
                                                     
430 The “Patent Cooperation Treaty”, 1970. (PCT), is an international patent law treaty, concluded in 1970. 
It provides a unified procedure for filing patent applications in each of its Contracting States. A PCT 
patent application is called an international application or PCT application. 
The PCT operates by allowing a single filing of an international application with a Receiving Office (RO) 
in one language.  A search is then performed by an authorized International Searching Authority (ISA), 
accompanied with an International Search Report (ISR) and a written opinion regarding the patentability 
of the subject of the application.  International Preliminary Examining Authority (IPEA) can do an 
optional preliminary examination for certain states, called Elected or Designated Offices. The 
international search report can help the applicant to decide whether it would be worth to go ahead and 
seek national protection, what is called 'entering the national phase' and if so, in how many countries.  
The PCT does not lead to the grant of an "international patent", which does not exist.  The PCT member 
states, i.e. the Contracting States, constitute the International Patent Cooperation Union. 
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with the JEUAA’s earlier reference to the term “highest international standards” 
of article 56.  It assures that the JEUAA’s language does not need to be 
constantly amended to reflect changes in IPRs standards.  By virtue of the current 
Annex VII language, The Association Council may decide that the need to accede 
to IPRs treaties and provide effective protection of patents for chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals shall apply to other multilateral conventions in the IPRs field.431 
5.9 Jordan and the Effect of TRIPS-plus on IPRs Protection  
As Jordan moved away from an IP system that was non-compliant with international standards, it 
became engaged at two levels: first, through its involvement in multilateral treaties such as the 
WTO and the associated TRIPS agreement, and second, through its involvement in the bilateral 
framework, as demonstrated by the JUSFTA and the JEUAA.   
(a) TRIPS-plus  
There is no legislative history evidence to suggest that Jordan adopted TRIPS 
with an adequate understanding of TRIPS’ suitability to the local social and 
economic environment.432  That conclusion is supported by the very short time it 
took to negotiate, sign and ratify the JUSFTA (less than one year) as well as by 
the lack of public debate and input.433   
The end result was an underestimation of the burdens and requirements of 
enforcement, and the latter ballooned with the shift to TRIPS-plus standards 
under the bilateral treaties framework.434  Thus, Jordan faced actual 
implementation and enforcement issues accentuated by the move from a TRIPS-
minus standard to TRIPS and then to a TRIPS-plus standard in a speedy 
transition.435   
While there isn’t a standard definition of what constitutes a TRIPS-plus system, it 
is generally agreed that it encompasses any obligations above and beyond the 
requirements set forth in the TRIPS agreement itself.436  The components of a 
TRIPS-plus system, therefore, while common in demanding standards higher 
than TRIPS, differ in what exactly constitutes those higher standards.  Under the 
JUSFTA, for example, Jordan committed to providing protection to plant patents, 
even though TRIPS allows member states to exclude those types of patents.  
Additionally, Jordan is required under the JEUAA to implement shorter transition 
periods than those demanded by TRIPS.437  Both the JUSFTA and JEUAA 
demanded that Jordan join specific international agreements covering specific 
                                                     
431 The Association Council, established under Title VIII of the JEUAA, shall consist of the members of the 
Council of the European Union and members of the Commission of the European Communities, on the 
one hand, and members of the Government of Jordan, on the other.  See “Jordan-European Union 
Association Agreement”, 1999., Title VIII Institutional, General and Final Provisions, article 90(1). 
432 Madanat, “Interview”; Halaiqah, “Interview.” 
433 Abu Rahmeh, “Interview”; Sboul, “Interview.” 
434 Sboul, “Interview”; Uqlah, “Interview.” 
435 Sboul, “Interview”; Uqlah, “Interview.” 
436 El-Said and El-Said, “TRIPS-Plus Implications for Access to Medicines in Developing Countries.” 
437 “JEUAA”, Annex VII, para. 3, states “Jordan undertakes to provide for adequate and effective 
protection of patents for chemicals and pharmaceuticals in line with Articles 27 to 34 of the WTO 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, by the end of the third year from 
the entry into force of this Agreement or from its accession to the WTO, whichever is the earliest.” 
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areas of IP, such as the WIPO’s Internet Treaties,438 the International Convention 
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV Convention), the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT), and the Joint Recommendation Concerning 
Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks. 
As additional examples of the added enforcement requirements, the JUSFTA 
stipulated that the level of IPRs penalties be adjusted, which obliged Jordan to 
raise the criminal penalty for copyright and trademark counterfeiting and piracy 
to JD 6,000.439  It also demanded that the customs authorities initiate criminal 
charges in the case of copyright piracy and trademark counterfeiting, without the 
need for either a formal complaint by the right holder or a court order.440  
Additionally, the JUSFTA obliges Jordan to treat geographical indications as 
trademarks for the purposes of protection, registration and implementation, even 
though they are distinctly treated as separate from trademarks under TRIPS.441   
Stronger protections for famous and well-known trademarks were expanded to 
include goods not similar to but identified by the famous and well-known 
trademarks.442  Stronger protection also applied to new uses for old chemicals, 
such that protection for “new chemical entities” shall also include protection for 
new uses for old chemical entities for a period of three years.443  The meaning of 
“new uses” is not clear; it is not explicitly stated whether it refers to the use of the 
chemical entity alone or in combination with others, nor whether “use” refers 
only to a means to produce something or whether the new use of the material can 
be the desired end in itself.  The Supreme Administrative Court had held in one 
of its earliest patent decisions that the use of a known material (the Arabic word 
for ‘material’ also encompasses ‘chemical entities’) to produce a known product 
was not considered patentable subject matter, unless the production involved an 
inventive step.444 
(b) TRIPS-plus and forum shifting 
The JUSFTA and the JEUAA introduced dispute resolution mechanisms separate 
from those proposed by the WTO.445  Article 17 of the JUSFTA, which is 
devoted to dispute settlement, presents an elaborate scheme for handling disputes, 
from consultation to referral to a dispute settlement panel.  Under the JEUAA 
                                                     
438 These include the “WCT.” and the “Jeuaa” art. 97. 
439 “Memorandum of Understanding on Issues Related to the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights 
Under the Agreement Between the United States and Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade 
Area.”, art. 3 states “with respect to article 4(25) of the Agreement, Jordan shall raise its criminal 
penalties to JDs 6000, so as to meet its obligation to ensure that statutory maximum fines are sufficiently 
high to deter future acts of infringement.” 
440 JUSFTA, art. 4(26) states that “each party shall provide, at least in cases of copyright or trademark 
counterfeiting, that its authorities may initiate criminal sanctions amid border measure actions ex officio, 
without the need for a formal complaint by a private party or right holder.” 
441 JUSFTA, art. 4(6) 
442 JUSFTA, art. 4(7) 
443 JUSFTA, art. 22 
444 Opinion No. 3/1954 (n.d.).  The court’s holding is limited to the use of a known material to produce a 
known commodity, and does not touch on other scenarios such as the use of the known material in a new 
way either to produce something new, or to create a new use for the material itself.  
445 Such as the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the International 
Chamber of Commerce, and the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 
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each party is given the option to refer “to the Association Council any dispute 
relating to the application or interpretation of this Agreement.”  The arbitrators’ 
decisions, which are taken by a majority vote, are binding on all parties, and steps 
must be taken by Jordan and the European Union to implement them.446 
Both of the previously discussed dispute resolution mechanisms bypass the 
WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism, and that arguably weakens the multilateral 
dispute settlement framework of the WTO.447  This fragmentation and splintering 
of international trade law is a worrisome aspect.  Developing countries, with their 
limited legal expertise, stand to lose the most from a bilateral dispute resolution 
mechanism that carries its own rules and regulations outside the scope of the 
WTO. 
(c) Ever Higher Standards 
The term “highest international standards”, as used in the JEUAA, carries with it 
an intrinsic and continued threat of ever-evolving requirements that can make IP 
standards compliance a moving target, especially since the JEUAA does not 
define what is meant by “highest international standards”.  Most likely, this 
ambiguity will affect not only IPRs but also related areas such as FDI and foreign 
aid because the inflow of aid can be potentially linked to meeting such “highest 
international standards”.   
The inclusion of the ‘highest international standard’ language further restricts the 
negotiation options of developing countries because it creates a base in trade 
negotiations with other countries, thus ensuring that the ‘highest international 
standard’ perpetuates itself.448  This has major consequences not only to the 
country’s own ability to determine the levels of IPRs that it deems necessary and 
suitable, but also potentially to other countries with whom a bilateral trade 
agreement is contemplated.  The high standards of protection can lead 
neighbouring countries to compete in applying those high levels of IP protections 
to enhance their perceived chances in attracting foreign investments.449   
It is not uncommon, therefore, for group of countries to urge a neighbouring 
country not to join an FTA that imposes higher IPRs because it might hinder 
regional cooperation among them.  The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), for 
example, called on Bahrain to denounce or drop its FTA with the United States 
                                                     
446 “JEUAA”, art. 97(4) 
447 Drahos, “Expanding Intellectual Property’s Empire: The Role of FTAs.” 
448 For example, the JUSFTA was the first trade agreement to incorporate provisions related to labor and 
environment, making it a template for future free trade agreements. See Mohammed EL-SAID, “From 
TRIPS-minus to TRIPS to TRIPS-plus: Implications of IPRs for the Arab World.” 
449 I say perceived because economic gains from bilateral agreements are not certain at best, and 
overestimated at worst. A simulation study in a World Bank Report estimates that a broad global trade 
agreement, a la WTO, could increase world income by US$ 263 billion by 2015, of which US$ 109 
billion would go to poor countries. If developing countries all had bilateral agreements with big, rich 
trading partners (the European Union. the United Stares. Canada and Japan), global income would rise 
by much less: US$ 112 billion. The rich will scoop all this and more: US$ 133 billion. Although a 
handful of developing countries, such as Brazil and China, would gain a bit, poor nations as a group 
would be worse off than they are today. World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2005: Trade, 
Regionalism, and Development (World Bank, 2004)., page 149.  
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because of its negative effect on future cooperation within the GCC countries.450  
As such, higher international standards within an FTA with a willing country in a 
particular region could turn out to be a force multiplier for the whole region, 
because higher standards applied by a neighbouring country will set the standard 
for all.  An FTA thus becomes an economic and political tool – both a building 
block and a forceful negotiating and pressuring tool.451  Thus, the real effect of an 
FTA’s higher IP standards has yet to be fully recognized and realized.  
The adoption of TRIPS-plus standards and the pursuit of their enforcement, 
however, is a controversial approach that can backfire if it becomes associated 
with economic and technological repression and control.  In light of the fact that 
one of the main features of the TRIPS agreement is its relative flexibility in 
providing opportunities for creative and individualistic interpretation, the 
damaging effect of the TRIPS-plus standard and its circumvention of the WTO’s 
DSU mechanism become more contrasted. 
Coping mechanisms for developing countries that follow the bilateral trade 
agreements are severely restricted, as significant legal and international 
experience is necessary to ensure that the interpretation is in line with the 
accepted norms.  The Jordanian Customs department’s wholesale buying of the 
United States’ interpretation of the clause related to treatment of IP products at 
the border is another example of the lack of initiative.452 
To reduce the monopolistic tendencies that can be fuelled by higher IPRs, Jordan 
should also activate its tools to combat economic concentration, including 
available governmental controls on the prices of commodities and products.453  
Current laws allow for such controls if a commodity or product is considered a 
basic material as per the directions of the MoIT,454 or in the case of exceptional 
circumstances or an emergency,455  Such provisions would not be in 
contravention of either TRIPS or the JUSFTA, as both of them allow for 
compulsory licensing as a remedy for uncompetitive activities.456 
5.10 Conclusion 
The WTO accession resulted in the updating of IP laws and the introduction of several new ones.  
An example of those modifications is the provision of IP protection to computer programs and 
databases that up to that point had not been protected.  Jordan also became bound by the WTO’s 
DSU, thus giving IP disputes the same clout as other trade-related disputes. 
                                                     
450 “Bahrain Defends Right to Sign FTA with US,” Khaleej Times OnLine, November 29, 2004, 
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle.asp?xfile=data/business/2004/November/business_Novem
ber412.xml&section=business.  See also, David Price, “The U.S.—Bahrain Free Trade Agreement and 
Intellectual Property Protection,” Journal of World Intellectual Property 7, no. 6 (2004): 829-850.. 
451 A clear example of this is the U.S. suspension of negotiations of an FTA with Egypt in response to 
Egypt’s decision not to join the United Stares in a WTO complaint against the EU ban on genetically 
modified food.  Cited by Mohammed EL-SAID, “From TRIPS-minus to TRIPS to TRIPS-plus: 
Implications of IPRs for the Arab World.” 
452 Wasfi Tawahiah, “Interview”, August 4, 2011; Enad Uqlah, “Interview”, July 28, 2011. 
453 Competition Law No.49. 
454 Ibid., art. 4(a) 
455 Ibid., art. 4(b)  
456 “JUSFTA.”, art. 4(20)(a) 
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The JUSFTA, which was signed shortly after the WTO accession, introduced TRIPS-plus 
elements into Jordanian IPRs laws.  It emphasized the enforcement-end of the IP equation by 
asking, among other things, for higher financial penalties for violations, stricter compulsory 
licensing requirements, and easier filing of legal action against violators starting at the borders.  
The JEUAA reinforced the TRIPS-plus components of Jordanian IPRs laws by mandating that 
Jordan be in compliance with the “highest international standards” for IP laws. 
Both the JUSFTA and the JEUAA also introduced bilateral dispute settlement forums separate 
and distinct from the WTO’s DSU, which undermined the effectiveness of DSU as a global 
clearinghouse for international IP disputes and splintered the efforts for the development of 
international law jurisprudence.  
Additionally, the dispute settlement mechanisms under the JUSFTA and the JEUAA are more 
restrictive in the venues they propose and the appeal options they provide, and, because the 
mechanism is collaborative and essentially unique to the needs and requirements of each dispute, 
there is not a clear timeline as to how long a dispute can take to be resolved, unlike the much 
clearer DSU process.  There is also little chance that the body of DSU decisions, which carries 
some precedential weight under the DSU process, will carry any weight under the bilateral 
dispute settlement mechanism.  This adds a considerable dimension of unpredictability to the 
dispute resolution process and places an added premium on superior legal and dispute settlement 
expertise, which usually are lacking for developing countries like Jordan.  The DSU process 
creates a more coherent and standardized interpretation of the TRIPS agreement provisions, 
which is undermined by the bilateral dispute settlement panels created under the bilateral trade 
treaties.   
The Jordanian government should, endeavour to estimate and clarify the costs associated with 
higher IP standards.  This is an important starting point towards the development of a national IP 
policy, which must be incorporated into the country’s development goals.  For that to happen, the 
debate on IP must move beyond the cliché that IP is indispensable to spur innovation and instead 
examine its socio-economic role.  Without such understanding, Jordan will not be able to 
ascertain the proper levels of IP protection that actually are suitable for Jordan, and will continue 
to be beholden to the one-size-fits all approach espoused under TRIPS and RBTs.  
 111 
 
6. CHAPTER VI: THE ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF IPRS IN JORDAN 
Even though Jordan had an IP legal framework prior to the turn of the century, up to its joining of 
the WTO, the JUSFTA and the JEUAA, the Jordanian IP laws owe all of their major 
developments to those three treaties.  Moreover, even though all the Jordanian IP laws are TRIPS 
compliant, not all the provisions in the JUSFTA and the JEUAA agreements are codified.  The 
overall result was that right holders entering the Jordanian market in the past decade saw rapid 
changes to the legal structure of IPRs and considerable growth in the perceived role of those 
rights.  
As a result of these developments, the issue of IPRs enforcement gained considerable importance, 
especially with the enactment of the DSU, which handles disputes among WTO nations, 
including those dealing with TRIPS.  The DSU raised the sceptre of trade and aid sanctions for 
IPRs violations, but it was not the only tool in the compliance toolbox.  The US, for example, 
initiated through the USTR its own monitoring of IPRs, with potential violators facing reduction 
of US aid or trade sanctions.  Thus, substantive rights and legal codes are not enough; 
enforcement is also a major issue. 
This chapter will discuss the administrative framework that governs the enforcement of the 
Jordanian IP laws.  It will discuss the administrative agencies within the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade (MoIT), the National Library (NL) and other agencies. 
6.1 Overview of Administrative Enforcement of IPRs in Jordan  
For a developing country like Jordan, enforcement is a balancing act between two competing 
concerns.  On the one the hand, there is the need to show ample and sufficient compliance with 
obligations and commitments resulting from the international agreements and treaties it had 
signed.  On the other hand, there is the significant challenge of limited resources and ever 
increasing economic pressures, which makes it difficult to allocate limited financial and 
economic resources to enforcement.  This balancing act is further complicated by the 
governmental realization that pirated products, especially in the audio-visual field, may represent 
the only financially feasible way for the majority of the Jordanian population to have access to 
those works. 
Unfortunately, one cannot assume a direct link between the level of expertise in IPRs 
enforcement and the body of legislation covering IPRs.  It is the case for Jordan that there is not a 
direct link between these two things.  The Jordanian public never viewed IPRs seriously until 
Jordan joined the WTO in 1999 and the laws of IP were overhauled.457  Prior to that point, the 
paucity of the judicial opinions pertaining to IP opinions (with a notable exception in the area of 
trademarks) reflected a lack of attention to the area of IP and, thus, a lack of experience in 
developing and enforcing modern laws.  That weakness was carried over into the negotiations 
phase of the WTO, JUSFTA, and JEUAA, all of which were signed within the span of a few 
years.458 
Many of the enforcement and regulatory agencies that exist today, such as the Food and Drug 
Administration, did not exist a decade ago, nor did the registrars for the various IPRs, and they 
                                                     
457 Mohammad Halaiqah, “Interview”, August 9, 2011; Lina Haddad, “Interview”, July 31, 2011; Rula 
Madanat, “Interview”, August 9, 2011. 
458 Madanat, “Interview.” 
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have yet to fully mature into capable regulators.459  The same can be said of the court system 
regarding IPRs, as it has yet to develop a level of sophistication that signals the maturing of the IP 
legal practice.460  Ten years after TRIPS, Jordan does not have a patent litigation practice, and the 
extent of the legal work done in the IPRs arena is largely limited to filing trademark 
registrations.461  This trend is likely to continue, as inventors demonstrate a lack of knowledge of 
the elements of patent drafting and are largely unwilling to pay for its services, especially as they 
do not anticipate much economic gain from the patents filed as the patented product/process are 
generally of poor quality.462  The private sector lacks a research and development base to justify 
the establishment of a patent prosecution legal practice, as the majority of the private sector 
companies either focus on using imported technology, which is protected by IPRs and therefore 
cannot be imitated or improved, or simply use outdated technology and see no need to invest in 
research and development.463 
The number of IP cases referred to courts by the Jordanian administrative agencies exceeds those 
filed by private citizens or companies, which suggests that either the Jordanian citizens do not 
have enough economic interest in IPRs to justify litigation, or they find the cost-benefit analysis 
for litigation not favourable.464  Keeping a close eye on the involvement of the judicial branch in 
enforcement is one way of measuring the future significance of IPRs in the Jordanian economy, 
because judicial involvement is an indicator of how much emphasis the business entity places on 
IPRs to justify litigation costs.  To affirmatively speak of an ascendancy of IPRs for Jordanian 
businesses one must, among other things, be able to point to a growth of IP litigation both in 
volume and, more importantly, in sophistication. 
On the administrative side, the Jordan Institution for Standards and Metrology (JISM) primarily 
deals with trademark enforcement, and it does not refer cases to court on its own; rather, it 
destroys counterfeit goods after confiscation.465  A court case will be filed only if the owner of the 
alleged counterfeit goods goes to court in order to stop the JISM from destroying the goods or to 
seek restitution.  This explains the low number for trademark enforcement in table 6.1, below.  It 
should be noted that the JISM Law466 does not explicitly address counterfeit trademarks; rather, 
the JISM interprets article 30(c) of that law to allow for the destruction of counterfeit goods.  
Article 30(c) of the JISM law actually addresses the destruction of goods only if they do not meet 
the JISM standards, and the JISM seems to have adopted a prima facie presumption that 
counterfeit goods fall under the category of goods to be destructed.467 
Pharmaceutical enforcement falls to the Jordanian Food and Drug Administration (JFDA), and 
the number of pharmaceutical enforcement cases in table (6.1) below reflects the cases associated 
with IP violations.468  The majority of the cases are for copyright infringement, which reflects the 
increased importance authors are giving to asserting their copyright.  Whereas the total number of 
                                                     
459 Yaseen Khayyat, “Interview”, August 7, 2011. 
460 Zain Alawamleh, “Interview”, August 2, 2011; Haddad, “Interview.” 
461 Haddad, “Interview”; Alawamleh, “Interview.” 
462 Haddad, “Interview”; Alawamleh, “Interview.” 
463 Halim Abu Rahmeh, “Interview”, August 7, 2011; Hanan Sboul, “Interview”, July 26, 2011. 
464 Mohammed Jabali, “Interview”, August 4, 2011. 
465 Khayyat, “Interview.” 
466 Institute of Standards & Metrology Law No. 22, 2000. 
467 Ibid., sec. 30(c). “If the product or material is found not to be in compliance with the applicable 
technical regulation issued by the Institution, the Director General shall issue a written order to seize, 
dispose of, or re-export the product, or alter its manufacture in such a way as to bring it into compliance 
with the technical regulation.” 
468 Laila Jarrar, “Interview”, July 26, 2011. 
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cases referred in 2008 by the JFDA was actually 66.  The total number of violations since 2004 
show a dramatic drop in the number of cases referred by the JFDA since 2008.  The main catalyst 
for that change seems to be the Public Health Law, which criminalized, with up to five and no 
less than three years imprisonment, the sale, importation or smuggling of counterfeit drugs.469 
Table (6.1): Number of cases dealing with IPRs enforcement in 2008470 
 
Copyright 
Enforcement 
Pharmaceutical 
Enforcement 
Trademark 
Enforcement 
Custom 
Enforcement471 
Cases Filed by 
Private Entities 
354 14 5 109 216472 
 
                                                     
469 See Public Health Law No. 47, 2008, sec. 65. 
470 Jordanian Judicial Council, Annual Courts Report - 2008 (Jordanian Judicial Council, 2008). 
471 Jabali, “Interview.” 
472 Because the number of cases filed reflects the total number of cases filed through administrative and 
private entities, the number of judicial enforcement cases comes from subtracting the number of all cases 
referred to Jordanian courts by the administrative agencies from the total number of cases filed. 
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Table (6.2): Number of Cases Referred by JFDA (2004-2008)473 
 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total No. of Cases 11 75 100 144 66 
IP Cases NA NA  61 14 
 
In order to discuss the administrative enforcement system, it is important to recognize the 
numerous different administrative agencies that handle different types of IP. These are as follows: 
Patents: Regulated by the Industrial Property Protection Directorate (IPPD), within the MoIT, 
which is responsible for supervising the registration and classification of trademarks, designs, and 
layout designs of integrated circuits and patents.  
Trademarks: Regulated by the IPPD department, which is in charge of trademark registration; 
however, the JISM is in charge of the actual implementation of enforcement against counterfeit 
trademarks. 
Copyright: Regulated by the Author’s Right Protection Office (ARPO) at the National Library 
(NL), which is responsible for protecting copyright rights. 
Customs: Regulated by the Customs Department, which established a special section to deal with 
IP issues called the Customs Procedures Section (CPS).  The CPS enforces only copyright and 
trademarks. 
Product-specific agencies:  In addition to the state agencies and departments listed above, several 
other agencies play a role in IP enforcement.  The Jordanian Food and Drug Administration 
(JFDA), for example, deals with IPRs related to pharmaceuticals. 
6.2 Administrative Enforcement of IPRs within the Ministry of Industry and Trade 
(MoIT)  
The MoIT founding dates back to the 1950s. According to its law,474 it is in charge of regulating 
the industrial activity in Jordan and preparing the programs aimed at improving its 
competitiveness.475  It also takes on the responsibility for the regulation of internal and external 
trade through monitoring and the preparation of the studies and agreements that serve those 
purposes. 
The scope of the MoIT’s significant role in IP administration and enforcement revolves around 
the IPPD and the JISM.  The IPPD is responsible for supervising the registration and 
classification of trademarks, designs, layout designs of integrated circuits and patents.  The JISM 
works through the border points to inspect and validate goods bearing a specific trademark to 
assure their authenticity.  Nonconforming goods with counterfeit trademarks are confiscated and 
destroyed. 
The IPPD registers trademarks and maintains records of active ones in accordance with the 
requirements of the Trademark Law, which stipulates that a trademark registrar be established to 
                                                     
473 Jarrar, “Interview.” 
474 MoIT Law, 1998. 
475 Ibid. 
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carry out those duties.476  Similarly, the IPPD houses the registration function for patents, designs 
and industrial models, and layout designs of integrated circuits as mandated by those respective 
laws.477  
By virtue of being the registrar for trademarks, patents, designs and industrial models, and 
integrated circuits, the IPPD is responsible for managing the opposition to trademarks, patents, 
industrial design and integrated circuits, as well as, handling trademark cancellation requests.  
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 reflect the limited numbers of patent applications and patents issued, 
respectively.  Table 6.3 shows that the majority of patent applications are international, while 
national patent applications are a minority.  The small number of patents filed and granted raises 
questions about the feasibility for resource allocation for the development of a patent 
administration and enforcement system, which would require considerable resources and 
expertise, especially if it includes the highly technical patent prosecution phase.  Currently, it 
seems that Jordan had opted not to allocate considerable resources to a patent administration and 
examination system, as it is relying on the WIPO and its technical integration into the network of 
Western world patent offices for the examination and searches of patents.478   
For patents filed outside Jordan, a Jordanian patent award is almost automatic, which explains the 
surge in the number of international patent applications, as Jordan has become an easy and 
inexpensive patenting venue.  But filing and award times can vary, likely due to the dependency 
on foreign agencies for patent examination, as the Jordanian patent office has only four 
examiners.479  The discrepancy between the number of national and international patent filings, 
with the latter far outstripping the former, can be the result of the weak local research and 
development spending.  
Table (6.3): National and International Patent Applications480 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Nat’l 
App’s 
71 52 21 25 42 49 75 59 50 60 43 
Int’l 
App’s 
127 147 117 157 141 169 428 507 535 446 431 
 
 
Table (6.4): National and International Patents Granted481 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Nat’l Patents 
Granted 
12 0 13 
 
8 4 9 10 23 10 11 22 
Int’l Patents 
Granted 
59 0 16 39 56 46 50 40 11 40 64 
Total Patents 
Granted 
71 0 29 47 60 55 60 63 21 51 86 
                                                     
476 See Trademarks Law No.33, 1952, sec. 3; Tradenames Law No. 9, 2006, sec. 3. 
477 See Patent Law No.32, 1999, sec. 7; Integrated Circuits Law No. 10, 2000, sec. 3.  Designs & Industrial 
Models Law No. 14, 2000, sec. 3. 
478 Haddad, “Interview.” 
479 Ibid. 
480 “Ministry of Industry & Trade Website”, n.d., http://www.mit.gov.jo/Default.aspx?tabid=571. 
481 Ibid. 
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Trademarks have the highest number of registration requests and court filings, as shown by table 
6.5 below, which shows that the number of filings for trademark registration is much higher than 
that for patents registration.  The majority of the national filings come from foreign companies in 
Jordan.482   
Table 6.6 shows the number of trademarks granted preliminary and final approvals, respectively, 
and, since the majority of the trademark filings were done by non-Jordanian entities, the same 
applies to the trademarks awarded.  This discrepancy in the number of local versus foreign 
trademark filed and approved, ten years after accession to the WTO, poses questions as to the 
success of the trademark law amendments in spurring the growth of Jordanian trademarks.483  
Furthermore, there is no clear indication that even the existing local trademarks amount to a 
critical economic mass, as the level of franchising of Jordanian trade or service marks is 
extremely low, with only a handful of brands reaching beyond the Jordanian borders.  This is 
further supported by the fact that the major Jordanian exports come from mining industries 
(potash and phosphate) as well as exporting garments, vegetables and fruits,484 without a 
significant input from the service sector, which usually holds the highest weight in trade and 
service marks. 
Table (6.5): Trademark Applications485 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Natl. 
Apps 
3307 2352 2353 2690 3206 3638 4163 4512 4484 3992 1904 
Intl. 
Apps. 
3266 2623 2279 2386 3051 3078 3850 4633 4956 3741 4056 
 
Table (6.6): Trademark Preliminary and Final Approvals486 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Prelim. 
Aprvl. 3622 5220 3720 4226 4940 4665 6490 6845 7500 
5471 5715 
Final 
Aprvl. 2612 2175 4190 5277 4444 4538 5792 6824 6710 
6359 4286 
 
6.3 International vs. National Trademark and Patent Applications 
An international patent or trademark application is one that is filed under either the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT)487 or the Madrid Protocol,488 respectively.  The Madrid Protocol offers 
                                                     
482 A. H Khoury, “Measuring the Immeasurable”-The Effects of Trademark Regimes: A Case Study of 
Arab Countries,” Journal of Law and Commerce 26, no. 1/2 (2006): 11. 
483 Khoury, “Measuring the Immeasurable”-The Effects of Trademark Regimes.” 
484 This despite the fact that Jordan is one of the poorest countries in the world when it comes to water 
resources, thus it is effectively exporting water through vegetables and fruits.  See, 
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=61829 (last visited July 4, 2009) 
485 “Ministry of Industry & Trade Website.” 
486 Ibid. 
487 The PCT is an international treaty, administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), between 
more than 125 Paris Convention countries. 
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a trademark owner the opportunity to have a trademark protected in several countries by simply 
filing one application directly with his or her own national or regional trademark office.  An 
international mark so registered is equivalent to an application for a registration of the same mark 
made directly in each of the countries designated by the applicant.  If the trademark office of a 
designated country does not refuse protection within a specified period, the protection of the mark 
becomes effective as if that office had registered it.489   
The PCT, meanwhile, makes it possible to seek simultaneous patent protection by filing a single 
“international” patent application instead of several separate national or regional patent 
applications. The granting of a patent license remains under the control of the national or regional 
patent offices in what is called the “national phase.”  
The use of the term “international application” under either a patent or a trademark application 
therefore effectively means a filing under the PCT or the Madrid Protocol as described above.  
Jordan, however, is not a member of either the PCT or Madrid Agreement; therefore, the term 
“international application” in this context refers to applications filed by foreign companies 
directly with the Jordanian patent or trademark registrars rather than to a PCT or Madrid Protocol 
filing.  A more appropriate and accurate description, therefore, would be “foreign application,” 
but the use of the term “international application” is consistent with the term used by the 
Jordanian authorities.  
Many local practitioners in Jordan still confuse the foreign applications made directly with the 
Jordanian patent and trademark registrar with those made under the PCT and Madrid Protocols.490  
To a certain extent, this misplaced presumption is justified, because both the Jordanian trademark 
and patent laws have several articles that allow for the process of filing a trademark and a patent 
application under the PCT and the Madrid Protocol.   
Trademark law, for example, defines an international application as one that is filed under the 
Madrid Protocol and designates articles 42, 43, 44, and 45 to cover such a filing.491  Article 46 of 
the trademark law, however, states that those articles shall not come into effect until three months 
after Jordan’s joining the Madrid Protocol.492  Since Jordan has yet to join the Madrid Protocol, 
none of those articles are yet in force, even though they are incorporated into the text of the law.  
Local practitioners usually assume that Jordan has already joined the Madrid protocol without 
checking the validity of that assumption and, as a result, wrongly advise as to the possibility of 
filing an international trademark application. 
The situation under the Jordanian Patent Law is equally confusing.  Similar to the trademark law, 
the patent law defines an international application as one filed under the PCT and has several 
articles that explain the process for filing such an application.493  It does not have the language 
that prevents such articles from coming into effect until Jordan joins the PCT (i.e., language 
similar to article 46 of the trademark law discussed above).  This is a glaring omission, and 
discussions with Jordanian officials indicate that it was an inadvertent omission by the legal team 
                                                                                                                                                              
488 The Madrid system for the international registration of marks (the Madrid system) established in 1891 
functions under the Madrid Agreement (1891), and the Madrid Protocol (1989). The International 
Bureau of WIPO located in Geneva, Switzerland administers it.  
489 http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/ (last visited September 3, 2009) 
490 Alawamleh, “Interview.” 
491 Trademarks Law No.33. 
492 Ibid., sec. 46. 
493 Patent Law No.32. 
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that drafted the patent law.  The Jordanian law, therefore, allows for the filing of an international 
patent application under the PCT, even though Jordan is not party to that agreement.   
Under the PCT, an application can be filed with the WIPO or the national office, but the 
Jordanian patent registrar currently refuses to accept such applications.  The author recommends 
that the Jordanian government should remedy this issue soon by introducing an amendment to the 
patent law that excludes the articles on international patent applications from coming into effect 
until Jordan joins the PCT.  The fact that such a mistake occurred, however, is indicative of the 
haste with which the legal code on IP was amended to accommodate the requirements of joining 
the WTO, thus resulting in many of these laws being translated into Arabic from English.494   
6.4 Administration of Author’s Right  
The Jordanian copyright law495 came on the heels of the Ottoman copyright law, which was in 
effect until 1992.  The copyright law, embraced computer programs and compiled works as 
protected by author’s rights.  The copyright law designates the NL as the repository for authors’ 
works seeking registration in Jordan.  The NL still plays an important role even though the 
current law no longer requires that a work be registered with it in order to attain protection,496 as 
the law grants the NL the authority to prevent a work, not previously registered with the NL, from 
being commercially circulated in Jordan.  Similarly, no work can be printed in Jordan until it is 
registered with the NL.497  Therefore, while the foreign work is protected from infringement in 
Jordan, even if it is not registered with the NL, the NL has veto power over its commercial 
circulation in Jordan.  Similarly, the NL controls the right to publish works in Jordan by asserting 
its right to approve those works ahead of publication.    
Both the NL and the Department of Press and Publications (DPP), can confiscate a publication 
and remove it from circulation.498  Recently, the Department of Press and Publications has also 
referred to religious authorities for their opinions on the content of certain books, indicating that 
if the Mufti (the religious authority charged with interpreting religious texts to create religiously 
acceptable solutions to modern problems) does not approve or condone the content of the books, 
they will be banned from circulation.  This unofficial veto power by the Mufti is not codified in 
any of the laws governing the work of the DPP or the NL, including the copyright law.499    
Within the NL, ARPO is charged with the registration of works, as well as the enforcement of the 
Author’s rights against infringement.  Its members are vested under the copyright law with law 
enforcement officer powers, enabling them to carry out inspection and search activities related to 
the enforcement of author’s rights, if there is probable cause to suspect that such rights were 
violated or infringed.500   
(a) Software Piracy 
Table 6.7 show that software piracy has been steadily declining in Jordan for the 
past 10 years.    
                                                     
494 Alawamleh, “Interview.” 
495 Copyright Law No.22, 1992. 
496 Ibid., sec. 45. 
497 Copyright Law No.22. 
498 Press and Publications Law No. 8, 1998, sec. 35. 
499 Ranah Al-Amer, “Poet Samhan Sentenced to One Year and His Poetry Collection Referred to the 
Mufti,” Alghad Daily Newspaper, June 22, 2009.Alghad Daily Newspaper, June 22, 2009 
500 Copyright Law No.22, sec. 36.  
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Table (6.7): Software Piracy Per Centage501 
 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2010 
Software 
Piracy % 
87 87 83 80 80 75 71 67 64 65 64 63 61 60 58 57 
 
This author argues that the economic boom witnessed between 2004-2008, 
encouraged many Jordanian businesses to shed pirated software in exchange for 
original copies with warranties, technical support and customer service.  The 
economic returns from the increased economic activity from 2004-2008 justified 
the extra cost of original business software.  This theory will be tested by the 
global economic downturn, which, if the above rationale is correct, may cause the 
Jordanian businesses to reconsider their software compliance options and result in 
an upswing in the percentage of business software piracy in Jordan.  Additionally, 
the general attitudes of Jordanian college students, as demonstrated by the 
questionnaire results in chapter 3, indicate a significant level of apathy towards 
the piracy issue and the alleged losses of MNCs.  The piracy issue is not viewed 
as a moral or legal problem by a large segment of the Jordanian college students, 
who are typically the largest users of pirated products, especially software.   
(b) Litigation and Author’s Rights 
The number of cases referred by the NL to the Jordanian courts in the 2000-2008 
period is reflected in table 6.8.502  Within the NL, the ARPO, which was 
established in 2000, is in charge of making those referrals to the courts.  The 
numbers show that it was quick to the task, as the number of cases sharply 
increased from 2000 to 2003; since then, the numbers have slightly fluctuated but 
have largely stayed within the same general range since 2005.   It is not clear why 
these numbers fluctuate or why they are not increasing, as data are not readily 
available and often hard to obtain.  One reason might be that enforcement by the 
NL takes into consideration the economic and social aspects of Jordanian society.  
In other words, while the NL is technically charged with fighting copyright 
infringement, it is also aware of its limited resources and the particularities of 
Jordanian society.  Therefore, the NL might be striking a balance between 
fighting piracy and accommodating the needs of citizens to have access to 
copyrighted material.    
Table (6.8): Cases Referred by the National Library 2000-2008503 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Cases 6 149 298 384 218 296 285 357 354 
 
                                                     
501 BSA, “Business Software Alliance - IDC Study,” Global Software Piracy Study, April 27, 2010, 
http://global.bsa.org/idcglobalstudy2007/. 
502 Source:  The National Library 
503 “National Library”, n.d., http://www.nl.gov.jo/AR/Pages/OnlineServices.aspx. 
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The NL has yet to produce any analyses for the piracy situation in Jordan.504  This 
situation is further compounded by the difficulty of obtaining data in Jordan.505  
Table 6.9 shows the number of IP cases decided by Jordanian courts from 2000 to 
2008.  The numbers clearly reflect a gap between the cases filed, as demonstrated 
in part by the numbers in table 6.8 , and the courts’ ability to resolve the disputes.  
Generally, though, cases will not be resolved in the same year they were filed.  
The numbers indicate that the number of cases resolved in 2007 and 2008 exceed 
the number of cases filed by the NL for the same period, which could reflect 
increased efficiency on behalf of the courts in handling cases turned over from 
previous years, as well as the increase in the number of judges appointed during 
that period.506  
 
Table (6.9): Intellectual Property Cases Decided by Jordanian Courts 2000-2008507 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Cases 10 9 15 31 49 133 172 656 584 
 
Table (6.10): Intellectual Property Cases Per Type of Court508 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Small Claims Courts 9 8 12 25 33 76 58 264 122 
First Instance Courts 1 1 3 6 16 57 114 392 462 
 
Available statistics allow for these aggregate numbers to be further broken down 
into the number of cases filed with each type of court, as demonstrated by table 
6.10.509 
Under Jordanian Civil Procedure Rules, the splitting of jurisdiction between 
Small Claims and First Instance courts is made on two grounds.510  The first is 
the general rule of monetary threshold, which specifies that general jurisdiction 
for cases with an estimated value of JD 7000 ($10,000) or less falls to Small 
Claims Courts.511  Second, some types of cases are assigned jurisdiction based on 
case type, regardless of the monetary value.512  For example, labour disputes are 
always assigned to Small Claims Courts regardless of their value.513  Intellectual 
                                                     
504 Ibid. 
505 Please see the section on obtaining empirical data in chapter 3, 
506 The total number of working judges in Jordanian courts increased from 630 in 2006 to 676 in 2008, a 
7.3% increase (Source: the 2008 Annual Court Report, issued by the Ministry of Justice). 
507 Ministry of Justice, Number of Intellectual Property Cases Sorted by Year & Court Type., Compiled for 
the author upon a written request, 2010. 
508 Ibid. 
509 Source: Ministry of Justice. 
510 Civil Procedure Law No. 24, 1998. 
511 Ibid. 
512 Ibid. 
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property cases are not pre-designated by type; as such, the court’s jurisdiction is 
primarily based on the monetary threshold. 
While the number of Small Claims Court decisions on IP issues steadily 
increased from 2000 to 2007, it dropped in 2008 by almost 53% from the 
previous year.  This is in contrast to the steady increase in the number of IP cases 
decided by the First Instance courts, which increased by 18% during the 2007-
2008 period.  Given the monetary threshold rules for jurisdiction between small 
claims and First Instance courts, those numbers clearly point to the increased 
value of IP claims in excess of JD 7000 and thus explain the continued increase 
in the number of cases reviewed by First Instance courts. 
6.5 The Customs Department    
Similar to other laws and regulations affected by the WTO accession, the Jordanian Customs Law 
was amended in 1998.  Further, a new unit, the Intellectual Property Rights Section (IPRS) was 
established to deal specifically with enforcement of IPRs. 
 
Generally, the Jordanian Customs’ authority to deal with IP infringements stems from article 41 
of the Customs law, which states that “The entry of foreign goods which do not meet the terms 
incorporated in the Laws and regulations for the protection of origin and ownership, shall be 
forbidden unless the relevant authorities agree to remove such prohibition.”514  Based on that 
language, non-complying foreign goods cannot be admitted unless a waiver is granted.  Table 
6.11 presents the number of cases filed by the official commercial agent with the Jordanian courts 
as a result of letters from Customs to the official commercial agent informing it that it temporarily 
holds suspected counterfeit goods.  For the years 2009 and 2010, the number of cases filed by 
right holders represented 27% of the number of reports filed by the Jordanian Customs.515  In 
other words, in 73% of instances, once notified by Customs that suspected counterfeit goods were 
impounded, the right holder chose not to file a court action.  The Customs attribute the high 
percentage of right holders choosing not to file an action to the small size of the Jordanian market 
as well as the small size of some of the confiscated goods.516 
 
Table (6.11): Number of Cases Filed by Right Holders After Notification of 
Counterfeiting  by the Jordanian Customs517 
 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
No. of 
Cases 
1 5 23 17 145 109 87 96 
 
Article 41 allows for two mechanisms to prevent counterfeit goods from entering into Jordan.  
First, a right-holder can file a temporary injunction request for the suspension of the suspected 
goods’ clearance.518  The rules and regulations governing the request for an injunctive order 
include the posting of a security, the need to show a prima facie case of infringement, and the 
possibility of being sued by the importer if he or she is unrightfully damaged.  The second 
                                                     
514 Jordan Customs Law No 20, 1998, sec. 41. 
515 Jabali, “Interview.” 
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mechanism allows the Customs to suspend the clearance procedure.519  Unlike private right 
holders, the Customs is not required to post a security, and the department is protected from any 
claims for damages by the importer.520 
Once the Customs has temporarily impounded any goods and suspended clearance, it contacts the 
authorized legal representative of the right holder, informing him or her of the impounded 
goods.521  The temporary impounding by the Customs is tantamount to a temporary injunctive 
order, and the legal representative of the right holder has eight days to file a legal action 
otherwise, the suspected goods will be released.522  The Customs, by law, bears no legal 
responsibility for any claims for damages by the importer of the allegedly infringing goods.523   
(a) The Customs Law and TRIPS 
The above discussion corresponds with the requirements presented under TRIPS 
Section 4.524  Table 6.12 below represents a comparison of the corresponding 
requirements in article 41 and TRIPS section 4, which shows that the existing law 
meets all of the requirements under TRIPS, including those that deal with 
notifying the right holder when there is belief that goods are pirated and allowing 
ample time (10 days under TRIPS and 8 days under Jordanian law) to start legal 
proceedings against the alleged infringer.  Article 41 also grants the alleged 
infringer the right to remove the goods once the right holder declines to press 
legal charges, and gives  the alleged infringer the right to challenge the 
infringement charge before a court of law.525 
                                                     
519 Ibid., sec. 41(d). 
520 Jordan Customs Law No 20. 
521 Instructions Governing Border Measures for IP Protection, No. 7, 2000. 
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523 Ibid., sec. 41(g). 
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Table (6.12):  JUSFTA Article 41 vs. TRIPS’ Section 4  
Article 41 Requirements Section 4 Requirements 
Based on personal belief that goods are pirated, 
customs agents can suspend the clearance on 
the suspected goods and temporarily impound 
them.  The importer of the goods and the legal 
representative of the right holder are notified of 
the impoundment. 
Members may also provide for corresponding 
procedures concerning the suspension by the 
customs authorities of the release of infringing 
goods destined for exportation from their 
territories.526  The importer and the applicant 
shall be promptly notified of the suspension of 
the release of goods.527 
Alternatively, the right holder can sue sponte 
file a temporary injunction with the proper 
court requesting, upon prima facie showing, 
the impoundment of the suspected goods, 
provided a security is posted and a suit is filed 
within eight days.  Otherwise, the injunction is 
automatically lifted and the right holder is 
subject to damages claim by the importer. 
Members shall adopt procedures to enable a 
right holder to lodge an application in writing 
with competent authorities, for the suspension 
by the customs authorities of the release into 
free circulation of such goods.528  The right 
holder shall be required to provide adequate 
evidence that there is prima facie 
infringement.529 The applicant should  provide 
a security to protect the defendant.530 
If within eight days the right holder has not 
filed a suit, then the impoundment is lifted and 
the goods are cleared if there are no other 
issues related to the goods. 
If, within a period not exceeding 10 working 
days after the applicant has been served notice 
of the suspension, the customs authorities have 
not been informed that proceedings have been 
initiated by a party other than the defendant, 
the goods shall be released.531 
The importer of the suspected goods may 
challenge the temporary impoundment within 
eight days of being informed of the 
impoundment decision.  The court must rule on 
the importer’s challenge to the customs’ 
decision within three days. 
If proceedings leading to a decision on the 
merits of the case have been initiated, a review, 
including a right to be heard, shall take place 
upon request of the defendant with a view to 
deciding, within a reasonable period, whether 
these measures shall be modified, revoked or 
confirmed.532 
The Customs Department does not bear legal 
responsibility for damages claimed by the 
importer as a result of the temporary 
impoundment decision, or does it post any 
security. 
Members shall only exempt both public 
authorities and officials from liability to 
appropriate remedial measures where actions 
are taken or intended in good faith.533 
 
                                                     
526 “TRIPS,” sec. 51. 
527 Ibid., sec. 54. 
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531 Ibid., sec. 55.  
532 Ibid. 
533 Ibid., sec. 58. 
 124 
 
(b) The Customs Law and JUSFTA 
Article 41 of the Customs law does not require that a right holder’s case be 
presented before a court to obtain a temporary injunction order; rather, the right-
holder can ride on the coattails of the Customs Department’s impoundment order 
and proceed to file a legal action.534  Article 4(26) of the JUSFTA requests that 
Jordan “provide, at least in cases of copyright piracy or trademark counterfeiting, 
that its authorities may initiate criminal actions and border measure actions ex 
officio, without the need for a formal complaint by a private party or right 
holder.”535  This requirement is turning into a yearly sticking point in the USTR’s 
review of Jordan’s compliance with the JUSFTA.  Jordan claims that its Customs 
Department has prepared a draft amendment to article 41, “which is in line with 
Jordan’s international obligations and aimed at providing additional protection 
for [IPRs].”536 The language used by the Jordanian government in describing the 
proposed amendment is very broad.  This vague and non-committal language 
reflects the general internal struggle occurring within the various governmental 
agencies regarding IPRs compliance requirements.   
The current official Jordanian position, however, does not challenge the analysis 
proffered by the US, which is supported by compliance reports prepared by local 
attorneys funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID).  
One such report concluded that the current text of article 41 does not satisfy 
JUSFTA obligation for the following reasons537: 
1. It is an ex officio authority to suspend clearance and release of infringed 
goods, and does not therefore provide the right to seize goods; if the right 
holder fails, within eight days after being notified of the decision to 
suspend release and clearance procedures, to notify the JCD that a court 
case has been instituted, the suspended goods are released even if JCD is 
aware that they are in fact counterfeit.    
2. This ex officio authority does not include powers to initiate criminal 
actions.  
3. This ex officio authority does not apply to transit goods, for which the 
right holder must file a petition.  
Point one refers to the inability of the Customs Department to “seize goods”, 
however, there is no mention in the language of article 4(26) of the JUSFTA that 
such an indefinite seizure should occur in the first place.  Indeed, the language 
mentions authorities initiating criminal actions and border measures without a 
formal complaint by the right holder, which is what article 41 provides for, as it 
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allows for the impoundment of suspect goods either through a direct action by the 
right holder, or, sue sponte, through the Customs Department. 
The main cause of concern for the USTR, it seems, is the release of the goods if 
the right holder does not file any charges.538  However, this course of events is 
not in violation of any of the requirements of article 4(26) of the JUSFTA and is 
in direct compliance with article 55 of the TRIPS agreement, which actually 
mandates such an outcome.539  What the USTR and the USAID-funded report fail 
to explain is why the language of article 41, which seems to be in line with 
JUSFTA and TRIPS, would need to be amended to force the Jordanian State to 
initiate a legal proceeding when the right holder does not want to file a claim. 
Point two states that article 41 is not in compliance with JUSFTA because the 
Custom Department’s ex officio authority does not include “powers to initiate 
criminal actions”, but that is not technically true; while their language itself does 
not specify a criminal action per se, the copyright and trademark laws specifically 
provide for criminal and civilian penalties.540  The extent of the penalty should be 
determined by the court.  It is not clear how any amendment to article 41 would 
force a court to mete out criminal punishment rather than civilian fines; in fact, to 
do so would violate the principle of judicial independence and compromise the 
court’s discretion, thus dangerously affecting the constitutional principle of the 
separation of powers.  It is also a question of common fairness that not all 
prosecutions should be criminal, especially if the law itself allows for such a 
variation.  The current language of article 41, which allows for a legal action, 
clearly includes the possibility of a criminal punishment if the court so chooses; 
thus, it meets the JUSFTA requirement.  Furthermore, the setup of the copyright 
and trademark laws specifically allows for criminal or civilian penalties. 
The third point in the USAID-funded report finds fault with the “ex officio 
authority” not applying to transit goods, yet there is no mention of such a 
requirement in the language of 4(26); in fact, that requirement is completely out 
of the scope of article 4(26).  
The previous discussion raises questions as to whether some elements within the 
Jordanian bilateral trade agreements are turning out to be more stumbling blocks 
than building blocks for economic development.  The JEUAA specifically calls 
for the applications of the “highest international standards”, and while the EU and 
Jordan have yet to go to the negotiating table to debate what exactly this means, it 
is not unlikely that their interpretations will differ.  Jordan, it seems, has 
approached its trade agreements’ IP commitments with the assumption that 
constant harmony will forever govern its relationship with its counterparties, 
whereas those counterparties have relied on calculated and enforceable rules 
carrying the burdens of legal liability through enforcement mechanisms.   
Under the current mechanism, the customs agents have the ex officio authority to 
suspend the clearance and release of infringing goods.  If a case is not filed within 
eight days, then the suspended goods should be released.  The current mechanism 
is based on the presumed right holders’ vested interest in confirming that the 
                                                     
538 Jabali, “Interview”; Wasfi Tawahiah, “Interview”, August 4, 2011; Uqlah, “Interview.” 
539 “JUSFTA” art. 55. 
540 Trademarks Law No.33; Copyright Law No.22. 
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confiscated goods are counterfeit and preventing their entry into the country by 
filing a legal action, which is logical and fair.  Conversely, the request to amend 
the Customs Law to grant customs agents’ ex officio authority to initiate criminal 
actions does not make economic or legal sense.  On the one hand, the Jordanian 
Customs should not act as a private enforcement agency for right holders, 
because the Customs Department would then have to shoulder the administrative, 
legal and financial burden to investigate and prosecute the alleged counterfeit 
goods.  On the other hand, by bypassing the need to have the right holder present 
his or her case before a court within the eight-day window, the owner of the 
alleged counterfeit goods is denied the right to due process and to present his or 
her case before a court.  The court’s role in weighing all the evidence before 
allowing the legal action to move forward is denied, in favour of a sue sponte 
decision by the Customs Department. 
6.6 Jordan Institute of Standards and Metrology 
The Jordan Institute of Standards and Metrology (JISM), which was created pursuant to 
Standards and Metrology Law541, has four stated objectives:542 
1. Adopting a national system for standardization and metrology based on accepted 
international practices.   
2. Keeping pace with scientific and technical developments in the fields of 
standards, metrology, conformity assessment and laboratory accreditation. 
3. Ensuring the health and safety of the Kingdom’s citizenry and protection of the 
environment by making sure that products approved are in compliance with the 
technical regulations adopted by the Institution for that purpose.  
4. Raising the quality of local products through the adoption of appropriate 
Jordanian Standards in order to enhance their competitiveness in the local and 
international markets and thus support the national economy. 
Administratively, the JISM has four divisions: Border Control, Factories Surveillance, Market 
Surveillance, and the Inspection Division.  The main tasks and duties of the four divisions are:543 
1. Controlling all imported materials (except for pharmaceuticals, veterinary 
medicines and vaccines) to assess their conformity to Jordanian Standards and 
Technical Regulations and labelling requirements. 
2. Controlling local products and assessing their conformity with Jordanian 
Standards, technical regulations and labelling requirements. 
3. Inspecting electrical elevators prior to usage to ensure that they meet the JESS 
safety requirements. 
4. Participating in preparing and modifying Jordanian Standards. 
5. Following up with customer complaints regarding non-conforming products. 
                                                     
541 Institute of Standards & Metrology Law No. 22. 
542 http://www.jism.gov.jo/ (last visited August 2, 2009) 
543 http://www.jism.gov.jo/ (last visited August 2, 2009) 
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6. Issuing export conformity certificates.  
7. Issuing tender conformity certificates for governmental institutions upon request. 
None of the previously listed duties contain any specific reference to enforcement of any IPRs.  
The JISM’s mandate explicitly exclude pharmaceuticals and medicines – they fall under the 
purview of the Jordan Food and Drug Administration.  However, the JISM has exercised 
enforcement authority over trademarks, including the confiscation and destruction of fake and 
forged products and goods.544  For example, in association with customs, the JISM systematically 
destroys large volumes of non-compliant foreign goods on a yearly basis, even though its 
governing law does not grant it any such authority.545   
The newly proposed amendments to the current JISM law seem to acknowledge this lack of 
authority by proposing new language to grant the JISM authority to “confiscate or condemn to 
destruction goods bearing fake or forged trademarks.”546  Until that language is officially 
approved, however, there is little or no legal support for the role the JISM is currently playing in 
enforcing IPRs.  This is not to say that JISM is never within its rights when it confiscates or 
condemns for destruction a counterfeit product; by law, it is allowed to do so if the product is not 
in compliance with an existing Jordanian standard.547  Under the language of the current JISM 
law, there is no legal basis for confiscating goods bearing a fake trademark if they are in 
compliance with the specific Jordanian standard. 
This debate about the extra authority claimed by the JISM, however, is not taking place in Jordan, 
and it is not clear why. Potentially its absence is the quickest and easiest way of destroying 
possibly infringing goods and showing the US that the Jordanian government is fighting pirated 
goods.  The Jordanian government is actually relying on figures drawn from the JISM’s 
“enforcement” statistics to demonstrate to the USTR and other international agencies its efforts in 
combating piracy.548  Stretching the law to cover areas it actually does not cover undermines the 
legislature’s will and, by extension, the will of the people.  Further, it weakens the concept of the 
orderly and reasoned progression of laws through discourse and public debate.     
6.7 The Courts and Enforcement of IPRs 
This section will look at the current setup of the courts and judges, examine the level of IP 
disputes handled by them, and consider the issue of establishing specialized IP courts. 
(a) Judicial Reform in Jordan   
The judicial sector in Jordan continues to go through a modernization and 
development phase, which affects the structure and functions of the Ministry of 
Justice and the Courts.   While the judicial branch, in theory, is a separate branch 
of the government and should be managed exclusively by the head and members 
of the Judicial Council, the Ministry of Justice still plays a role in the 
organization and setup of courts, as well as the appointment and transfer of 
                                                     
544 Khayyat, “Interview.” 
545 MoIT, “Official Letter No. 19/2/23/5610, Annex 5.” 
546 Proposed draft – Standards, Metrology and Product Safety Law, article 32(a)(15).  There is no indication 
when this proposed draft would be presented to the Jordanian parliament.  
547 Institute of Standards & Metrology Law No. 22. 
548 MoIT, “Official Letter No. 19/2/23/5610, Annex 5.” 
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judges.  This symbiotic, albeit odd, relationship seems to have been deployed 
thus far for the benefit of the judicial system as a whole. 
The overall effect of this trend has been a move towards expanding the authority 
of Small Claims Courts by expanding the financial limit that would bring a case 
under their purview from JD 3000 ($4250) to JD 7000 ($9900).549  This has led to 
the lessening of the load on the First Instance courts, while at the same time 
allowing citizens to benefit from the more facilitated approach to adjudication 
allowed under the Small Claims Courts system.  In accordance with international 
conventions on human rights, the court fees on criminal appeals were abolished.  
The impact of those reforms on IP enforcement should be tangible, as cases under 
an IP claim will benefit from any improvements in the litigation and adjudication 
process that these changes will bring about. 
The number of judges has also been steadily increasing, including the number of 
female judges.550  In 2007, 38 new judges were appointed, including five female 
judges; this raised the total number of female judges to 42, accounting for 6% of 
the total number of judges.551  Recently, the Ministry of Justice initiated the 
Future Judges Program aimed at recruiting judges; it targets high school 
graduates and law school students.552  The program intends to recruit qualified 
candidates and fast-track them into the judiciary by the time they are 28-30 years 
old.553  The Ministry of Justice and the Judicial Council promote the program as 
key to recruiting bright, young, educated judges, especially since the program 
involves scholarships to obtain undergraduate or graduate degrees in law.554   
It is not clear, however, how recruiting high school and law school students will 
actually help enrich the level of experience of the Jordanian judicial system.  
Rather, the Future Judges Program threatens to make the role of the judge as that 
of a functionary who meets the requirements of the job by simply obtaining the 
requisite legal education, greatly discounting the importance of experience, which 
must be obtained by working in the legal profession.   
(b) Progression of Claims and Execution of Verdicts 
Registration decisions for patents, trademarks, and other registerable types of 
IPRs are considered final governmental decisions, and as such are reviewed by 
the Supreme Administrative Court.  First Instance courts, on the other hand, 
address rights and privileges arising from owning an IPRs.  Decisions by the 
Supreme Administrative Court are final.555 
When it comes to resolving disputes, the Jordanian legislation does not set time 
limits on the court action, but Civil Procedure law does include some rules meant 
to limit prolonged litigation by setting time limits on presenting defences and 
                                                     
549 Small Claims Courts Law No. 30, 2008, sec. 3. 
550 Jordanian Judicial Council, Annual Courts Report - 2008. 
551 Ibid. 
552 Ibid. 
553 Ibid. 
554 Ibid. 
555 Supreme Administrative Court Law No.12, 1992, sec. 26(b). 
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responses.556  Generally, a case cannot be postponed more than 15 days, except in 
extreme situations, and a case cannot be postponed more than once for a reason 
related to the circumstances of one of the parties.  Also, a judge must render a 
verdict no more than 30 days after the conclusion of the trial.  Overall, the 
Annual Courts Report for 2008 points to a very high percentage of cases being 
resolved by the courts less than one year from filing.  The average percentage of 
cases resolved per the annual load of every type of court (small claims, First 
Instance, appeals, cassation, and special courts) exceeds 93%.557  The real 
problem, however, lies with the execution of court orders, which poses a serious 
challenge for any enforcement effort in general, and for the enforcement of IP in 
particular. 
Judicial civil orders are executed pursuant to Execution Law No. 36 (2002), 
whereupon execution departments in each First Instance Court carry out judicial 
orders within their respective jurisdictions.  Every execution unit is headed by a 
judge who is assisted by one or more other judges as need be.  The Judicial 
Council’s statistics indicate that in 2008, there were 177,909 execution cases 
carried over from the year 2007, and an additional 70,289 were added in 2008, 
raising the total number of execution orders to 248,198 orders, of which only 
66,164 were executed in 2008.558  That left a total of 182,034 execution orders 
still outstanding, which means that 73% of the total number of execution orders 
in 2008 were carried over to 2009.  The Amman Governorate execution units, 
which are the place for filing and executing the majority of the IP cases, suffer 
from a significant back-log in execution, with 51,560 pending execution orders, 
amounting to 29% of all execution orders for all of Jordan.559  In Amman, 65% of 
the execution orders are carried over, annually.   
While it is not clear what percentage of those cases relate to IP disputes, because 
the existing numbers are not broken down by case type, it is clear that execution 
should be a significant concern for any entity seeking resolution through judicial 
channels in Jordan.  The numbers point to a possible systematic problem with the 
execution system as a whole, the mechanism by which court orders get shuffled 
back and forth between appellate and lower courts, and the process of giving 
notice to various parties in the legal dispute. 
The execution of judicial criminal orders according to article 353 of the Criminal 
Procedure Law falls to the prosecutor at the court that issued the criminal order or 
verdict.  In courts that do not have their own designated prosecutor, criminal 
execution is the responsibility of the small claims judge.  The problems with civil 
execution seem to be shared with criminal executions, as shown in table (6.13) 
below. 
                                                     
556 Civil Procedure Law No. 24. 
557 Jordanian Judicial Council, Annual Courts Report - 2008.   
558 Ibid. 
559 Ibid. 
 130 
 
Table (6.13):  Execution of Criminal Orders560  
 
Unit Rotated 
from 2006 
Incoming 
2007 
Total 
2006-
2007 
Executed 
in 2008 
Rotated 
from 
2008 
Per Centage  
of execution 
in 2008 
Criminal 
Court 
Prosecutor561 
637 234 871 211 660 25% 
First Instance 
Prosecutors 
163699 70734 234433 75939 158494 32% 
Small Claims 
Prosecutors 
37866 24748 62614 24843 37771 40% 
As to the specific issue of courts dealing with IP, Jordan shares a similar burden 
with other developing countries of not having the judicial system contribute much 
to the evolution of IP systems.  This is due to several factors, primarily: 
1. The limited role of stare decisis, which greatly hampers the courts’ 
ability to influence legal interpretation,  
2. The lack of experience and knowledge of the judicial staff in the area of 
IPRs, and  
3. The limited scope of application of IPRs within the judicial system, 
which seems mainly concerned with trademarks to the detriment of other 
branches of IP. 
Although a considerable amount of training is taking place for judges and 
Ministry of Justice staff, as indicated by the number of training seminars and 
conferences devoted to IPRs,562 there does not seem to be an integrated approach 
towards IP enforcement, as evidenced by the number of enforcement agencies 
with overlapping responsibilities and duties.  There is also no IP strategy other 
than the obligatory, but notional, governmental reference to the need to abide by 
and respect IP laws.   
Of course, the absence of even a semi-sophisticated IP practice contributes to the 
lack of such an integrated approach by the legal profession and continues to sap 
the energy of any efforts to elevate the practice in the area of IP.563  Without a 
more sophisticated IP practice, the role that patents play in Jordan will be 
marginal. 
                                                     
560 Ibid. 
561 The Criminal Court, also known as the Serious Crimes Court, is one of a recent vintage that was created 
by law No. 19 (1986), and has exclusive first instance limited jurisdiction in crimes involving murder, 
rape, kidnapping, and sexual assault.  In effect it was envisioned to take over cases that were considered 
blood or honor crimes under the tribal law in Jordan, which theoretically is no longer applicable since 
1976, but still has a significant role in such crimes, in instances like forcing the relatives of the 
perpetrator of murder crimes to be evacuated from their homes to other areas. 
562Jordanian Judicial Council, Annual Courts Report - 2008; Ministry of Justice, First Annual Ministry of 
Justice Book (Ministry of Justice, 2008). 
 
563 Haddad, “Interview.” 
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(c) Specialized Courts 
The main argument presented for specialized courts is that the role played by 
them can help bridge the judges’ IP knowledge gap, and thus provide a more 
efficient administration of justice.  Furthermore, it is argued that specialized 
courts will provide for speedy and swift adjudication of claims.  The USA’s 
Federal Court of Appeals (Federal Circuit) is often cited as an example 
supporting both of these contentions.  Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that the 
claims presented by these arguments are not necessarily supported either by the 
history of that court or by the particularities of the Jordanian situation. 
The history of the Federal Circuit began with its historic predecessor, the US 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), which began as the US Court of 
Customs Appeals, created in 1909 and officially operational on April 22, 1910.  
In 1929, the US Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was created and vested 
with appeals from the US Patent Office.  In 1982, the Federal Courts 
Improvement Act (FCIA) abolished the CCPA and transferred its jurisdiction, 
docket and judges to the Federal Circuit.  The IPRs appeals reviewed by the 
Federal Circuit, which are often cited as the reason behind the call for an 
exclusive IP court in Jordan, are only one of sixteen areas over which the Federal 
Circuit has appellate jurisdiction.  Thus, despite the fact that patent practice in the 
US is among the most vibrant and developed in the world, the Federal Circuit is 
not solely dedicated to patent appeals.  By contrast, the IP practice in Jordan is in 
an embryonic stage, and patent litigation is almost non-existent.  Under these 
circumstances, it is hard to argue that there will be any practical justification for 
the creation of judicial panel to exclusively review IP claims. 
A more useful suggestion is the creation of a judicial body to review claims on 
corporate and commercial issues in general, including IP issues.  The creation of 
such a panel or court makes practical sense because the number of cases in that 
area is large enough to justify the allocation of the needed resources.  It also 
makes legal sense because it will help to create a unified body to review 
commercial and corporate issues, thus creating a unified body of jurisprudence 
that will go a long way towards the stability of the corporate and commercial 
environment as a whole, including IPRs. 
Another argument presented to support the call for an exclusive IP judicial panel 
is to help bridge the judges’ IP knowledge gap and thus provide a more efficient 
administration of justice.  However, this argument does not acknowledge the 
reason there is an IP knowledge gap to begin with, which is the limited scope and 
negligible volume of the IP practice.  A judge’s practice and judicial knowledge 
are directly linked to the legal areas he or she reviews and to the type of cases 
presented before him or her.  For example, the Federal Circuit judges can be 
expected to have a knowledge gap regarding tribal law in general and Jordanian 
tribal law in particular.  Such a shortcoming will not be remedied by creating an 
independent judicial panel for tribal law, but rather by the independent education 
of those who might need such knowledge.  The same, I argue, applies to the issue 
of Jordanian judges’ knowledge gap in the area of IP law, which can be remedied 
by the selective training of judges in that area. 
6.8 Impact of Intellectual Property Standards Compliance on Economic Development 
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IPRs and their enforcement do not exist in a vacuum; rather, they are tightly linked to existing 
and prospective economic factors.  A key question from a socio-economic perspective is whether 
any benefits are reaped from the cost of enforcement and compliance.  The direct overall effect 
for foreign corporations from the introduction of uniform IP systems/standards has been the 
expansion of the number of foreign territories in which Western corporations can consider doing 
business.  The introduction of uniform IPRs, therefore,  made large exporting companies the clear 
winners in the early phase of introduction of the TRIPS agreement.564  The relationship between 
IPRs systems and the other modernization factors (e.g., GDP, health care and electricity) were 
explored by researchers,565 but those factors link IPRs relative to existing infrastructure-related 
aspects, which might, or might not, be caused by strong IPRs systems.566 
(a) Intellectual Property Standards and Foreign Direct Investments 
The discourse on the link between IPRs and major economic indicators has 
certain noteworthy anomalies.  When it comes to measuring the economic effects 
of higher IPRs and the level of compliance with IPRs, it is easy to be side lined 
by a generalized discussion that centres around an increase in the levels of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) without considering whether such an increase 
actually had any impact on the level of welfare.  Another point often missed 
concerns what percentage of the FDI increase was actually contributed by 
intellectual-property-sensitive products, goods, or services.  Similarly, general 
FDI numbers do not tell much about the impact of IPRs on increasing FDI flow 
into any country or region; this means that, while useful inferences can be 
extracted from comparative or multi-country studies, any actionable conclusions 
based on the economic impact of IP standards must be country-specific.  In 
Jordan, the general discourse about the effect of IPRs on economic development 
suffers from all these shortcomings; general numbers for FDI, for example, are 
commonly cited as an indication of the impact of IPRs on attracting investment 
into the country without providing a breakdown for those numbers.  Additionally, 
there is a negative stigma attached to any dissenting opinions on the value of 
excessive IPRs.567  The former tendency to term such voices anti-progressive has 
been tempered by the recent global economic turmoil and by the increased 
realization that the economic liberalization plans did not deliver the sustainability 
or the growth promised.  
                                                     
564 Su, Evelyn, “The Winners and the Losers: The Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights and Its Effects on Developing Countries,” Houston Journal of International Law 23 
(2003): 169. 
565 See for example, Rozek, R.P. Rapp, R.T., “Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property Protection in 
Developing Countries” (National Economic Research Associates, Inc., White Plains, N.Y., 1990), 
Working paper No. 3. The paper finds a strong statistical relationship between IPR and modernization 
factors, but there is no indication of causality.  
566 Park, W.G. Ginarte, J.C., “Determinants of Patent Rights; A Cross National Study,” Research Policy 26 
(n.d.): 283–301.  Arguing that in less wealthy countries most R&D is done by the public sector, which is 
less inclined to use strong IPR.  The corollary being that less developed countries with low levels of 
R&D stand to benefit less of Stronger IPR, and should lessen the institutional cost of strong IPR through 
cooperation. 
567 Jordan’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008 was estimated at $30.8 billion (purchasing power parity, PPP) and 
per capita GDP is estimated at $5,000 (PPP). Jordan’s official unemployment rate for 2008 was estimated to be 12.9 
percent, although unofficial estimates range up to 30 percent. While about 86.3 percent of Jordan’s GDP is from the 
services sector, such as tourism, 3.6 percent is from agriculture, and about 10.1 percent is from other industries 
including garment and clothing, phosphate mining, fertilizers, and pharmaceuticals.  
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Jordan’s top exports are garments, vegetables, phosphate, pharmaceuticals, 
potash (fertilizers), and transportation equipment.  Of these items, only 
pharmaceuticals fall within a major area of IPRs.  If economic development is 
judged based on the increase in levels of FDI, then imports should present an 
equally important insight.  Data released by Jordan Central Bank reveal that 40% 
of Jordan’s imports for 2009 were transportation equipment, crude oil, iron and 
steel, electrical machinery, raw material for the garment industry, and heavy 
equipment for industry and agriculture.   
Closer examination of those items further reveals that the raw material imported 
for the garment industry is used almost exclusively by the garment industry for 
re-exportation to the United Stated in accordance with the Qualified Industrial 
Zones Agreement (QIZA) and the JUSFTA.  Such imports, therefore, present 
very little added value to the national economy.568 Also, two thirds of the 
employees in the garment industry are foreign workers,569 and the garment 
industry, valued at $1 billion in 2008, secured an exemption from Jordan’s 
monthly minimum wage requirement of JD 150 ($210); thus, it is allowed to pay 
its workers JD 120 ($170).  Similarly, exported transportation equipment 
represents an almost exclusive use of Jordan as a transit zone for re-exporting 
transportation vehicles to surrounding countries, especially Iraq.  So there isn’t an 
IP component to either of these segments.  Such mediocre labour standards are 
actually common wherever the US advocates it transnational labour protections, 
which are characterized by legal weaknesses – in particular, their failure to 
institutionalize the minimal rudiments of modern formal legality.570 
As to correlating the standards of IPRs with FDI and imports, the literature offers 
only empirical evidence supporting the expectation that the relationship is 
positive.  The results vary according to factors such as degree of industrialization 
(the more industrialized the nation, the more positive the response to strong 
IPRs), the sector (the more technically advanced the sector, the more sensitive it 
will be to IPRs), and even the level of existing FDI (the more FDI a country has, 
the more likely it is that it will get more).571  Other studies point to a picture that 
                                                     
568 Even when it comes to employment of local work force, the benefits are not clear in the garment sector, 
as only 10,000 Jordanians are among the 45,000 employed by the garment exporting industry.  This 
researcher’s discussions with the factory owners revealed that local workers require up to 12 months 
training and therefore, it makes more economic sense for the factories to import skilled labor form 
Bangladesh and else where.  The garment industry also suffers from discrimination against married 
female local employees, because the industry prefers unmarried female workers who will work the 
various shifts, and not be constrained by the demands of their families.  
569 This extensive use of foreign labor, along with the fact that many FDI funds are not targeting production 
or job-generating projects helps explain why despite the steady increase in FDI for over nine years the 
overall “official” rate of unemployment has remained unchanged hovering around 14%.  Of course, 
unemployment rates within certain age groups are much higher, as for example the age group 20-24 with 
unemployment rate of 28%; and for women in general it is around 27%. 
570 William E. Scheuerman, “False Humanitarianism?: US Advocacy of Transnational Labour Protections,” 
Review of International Political Economy 8, no. 3 (2001): 359–388. 
571  See, Lesser, W., “The Effects Os TRIPS-Mandated Intellectual Property Rights on Economic Activites 
in Developing Countires” (WIPO, 2001), www.wipo.int.  Finding that there is compelling evidence that 
stronger IPR does provide some domestic benefits for developing nations, and hypothesizing that the 
protection and legal enforcement aspect that comes hand-in-hand with stronger IPR is a key factor that 
enables IPR to have a positive impact on FDI. 
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too complex to assume a simple and direct correlation between increased trade 
and higher IP standards.572   
As to levels of FDI, Jordan has not historically had a concerted strategy to attract 
FDI based on a strategic placement of IP standards; it did not matter where the 
money came from, as long as a significant portion was channelled into the 
kingdom’s economy.  Data supports this contention. In 2002, FDI totalled only 
$186 million, whereas in 2006 it totalled $1.5 billion, with more than 90% from 
Arab sources573 and with the US, Canada and Europe investing a shockingly low 
combined total of $42.9 million in new projects.574  Those figures shed light on 
the minuscule role IPRs played in attracting FDI to Jordan.  Since more than 90% 
of the 2006 FDI came from Arab countries, which do not have much of an IP 
base to speak of, it is safe to assume that the majority of those funds neither had 
an IP component nor were influenced by IP standards in Jordan.  In fact, this 
increase in the inflow of FDI probably reflects the excess of petro-dollars that 
needed to be invested and did not reflect any intrinsic advantage for Jordanian 
economy.  This is clear from the collapse in FDI inflows to Jordan at the start of 
the global economic crises, which plummeted by more than 80% and then started 
to rise again as oil prices moved upwards in 2010.575  
The 2006 FDI data shows that 80% of the FDI was poured into the industrial 
sector, with 14% earmarked for the country’s growing tourism industry.576  Yet 
when it comes to measuring the impact of IPRs on FDI levels, there is little 
evidence that any relationship exists between the two.  Effectively, for Jordan, the 
importance of IPRs for FDI should not be overstated.  The above analysis 
supports the opinion that the “evidence that maximum enforcement of all sorts of 
IP law – especially patent law – will stimulate investment should not remain 
unchallenged”.577  What is equally important for developing countries is “to take 
into account the costs and benefits of protection in the context of their unique 
economic situation” and even to consider minimal compliance.578 
(b) Intellectual Property Standards and the Pharmaceutical Sector 
The pharmaceutical sector, which for Jordan is economically the most significant 
intellectual-property-sensitive sector, had minimal technology transfer until 
                                                     
572 See, The Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (UK), Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and 
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2003.579  Evidence further points to heavy dependence on generics, with no 
discernible effect of joint ventures on the growth of the assets, capital profit, 
sales, weighted assets, weighted capital, weighted profit and weighted sales of the 
pharmaceutical industry.580  The minimal technology transfer comes about 
despite the fact that the surveyed pharmaceutical companies agreed that joint 
ventures are the most important method of technology transfer.581  Another 
review that covers the period until early 2007 indicates that there are only three 
companies out of the 17 in the pharmaceutical sector with strategic alliances, 
licensing agreements, or production facilities outside Jordan.582   
The recent global recession has the growth projections for the Jordanian 
pharmaceutical industry, with a 19% decline in the 2009 export volume compared 
to the 20% increase originally projected, representing a 39% gap.583  Further, the 
Jordanian pharmaceutical industry remains fundamentally without a research and 
development base and a prime candidate for acquisition by larger foreign 
pharmaceutical companies.584  There is little evidence of well-defined benefits 
that would not have materialized for the pharmaceutical sector had Jordan not 
acceded to the WTO or signed the JUSFTA.585     
It is important to point out, however, that there is no evidence, either in the 
literature or in the data reviewed, of a concerted effort to prevent the Jordanian 
pharmaceutical sector from achieving those goals.  In the areas of licensing and 
technology transfer, for example, analysis indicates that the Jordanian 
pharmaceutical failure is a result of misguided assumptions that western 
pharmaceuticals will overlook economies of production in favour of Jordanian 
companies.  As to exporting to the Western markets, Jordanian pharmaceuticals 
were slow to understand the importance of acquiring and implementing the 
regulatory and quality standards of the American Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) and its EU counterpart. 
Even though the public debate about the value of the JUSFTA among the 
industrialists and their lobbying group in Jordan – the Jordanian Association Of 
Manufacturers of Pharmaceuticals and Medical Appliances (JAPM) – has 
focused on unequivocal positive results, it seems their conversations with US 
government officials carried a different slant.586  A report by the US Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) noted that for generic medicine producers there was 
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some frustration with IPRs related to data exclusivity that dealt with a lack of 
transparency in rights and obligations.587  The GAO report cites a 2007 study by 
Oxfam on Jordan’s pharmaceutical industry, stating that as a result of the TRIPS 
provisions of the WTO and the TRIPS-plus provisions of the JUSFTA, many 
Jordanian generic pharmaceuticals are precluded from the market through the 
acceptance procedure of “data exclusivity.”  Data exclusivity means that, for 
market approval of a generic drug that had already been shown to be equivalent 
to the original one, drug regulatory agencies are prevented for a period of 5 years 
from using the clinical trial data developed by the originator company to establish 
the safety and efficacy of the medicine.  These delays, according to Oxfam, 
impede or prevent generic competition and can lead to higher prices than would 
otherwise be the case.588 
Rebuttals to the Oxfam report, including the one cited by the GAO, mention 
exceptions to Oxfam’s assertions of that lack of a Jordanian pharmaceutical 
research and development (R&D) base, but they are so few (two companies 
specializing in drug delivery systems) that they end up proving Oxfam’s point.  
Rebuttals to the lack of pharmaceutical production facilities and agreements are 
aspirational in nature (using language like “Multinational managers expect that 
manufacturing deals will be struck as Jordanian companies come into 
compliance”), and lack sufficient numbers to show a trend.   
Some of the more outrageous claims of purported positive effect of increased 
IPRs include linking IPRs to improvements in public health and to medical 
tourism.  Yet the share of medical tourism as a percentage of the total tourism 
sector has been more or less constant throughout the past decade and it mainly 
focuses on the expertise of the medical professionals rather on the availability of 
medical drugs.  Jordan relies on medical tourism that is supported by hospitals 
and trained medical staff not because it has any reputation as a centre for 
pharmaceutical research.  If anything, medical trials have negative connotations 
in the minds of Jordanians, as they associate them with abuse of third-world 
citizen by pharmaceutical companies that use them to conduct experiments that 
are otherwise prohibited in the Western world.   
IPRs cannot take any credit for continued improvements in public health statistics 
either, as those mainly result from improvements in general hygiene and the use 
of vaccination and other affordable and accessible medications, which are not 
related to high-end pharmaceutical research or patented drugs.  This is especially 
the case in Jordan and other MENA countries since HIV-AIDS does not register 
as a national health issue, and thus the patented drugs required for its treatment 
are not a priority as is the case in sub-Saharan African countries or in South 
America.589  
(c) The Diminishing Returns of Higher Intellectual Property Standards 
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Overall, a sufficient level of IPRs which provides an adequate level of protection 
is an essential, but not sufficient, component of increased trade and FDI flow into 
intellectual-property-sensitive goods and services in countries above a certain 
economic development threshold.  But IP legislation is not sufficient for such 
promised benefits to materialize; an economic plan is needed.  Essential to such a 
plan is a definition of what constitutes a sufficient, yet not excessive, level of 
protection; otherwise, the rush to adopt the latest IPRs will continue to be “out of 
touch with the existing problems in the countries concerned”.590  Poor countries 
like Jordan may find IPRs useful, provided those rights are customized to their 
needs by deciding what level of IP protection is best for their development and 
basing governmental decisions on those needs.591  The application, therefore, of 
IP policies and laws must involve an understanding of the dynamic that drives the 
economic and technological domains.  Otherwise, the country stands to gain little 
from the application of such standards and laws, and they might actually act to 
hamper development and innovation.592 
As suggested by the data discussed above, Jordan must do more than engage in 
regulatory compliance to assure an equitable return on their investment in IPRs, 
because the rewards are not guaranteed, let alone instantaneous.  It should 
definitely make more of an effort to define protection levels and strike a balance 
between its economic realities and its international obligations.  In that regard, 
Jordan faces a particularly difficult task, as it is further restricted in its use of the 
policy flexibilities afforded under TRIPS by the more stringent standards required 
under JUSFTA and JEUAA, discussed before.  
In the absence of a national IP strategy, however, Jordan and other developing 
countries stand to benefit little from maximum enforcement of TRIPS and 
TRIPS-plus IP standards that protect content those countries neither produce nor 
possess.  
6.9 Impediments to the Enforcement of IPRs in Jordan 
Jordan’s thrust into the IPRs arena has been remarkable in its intensity, consistency, and scope.  
One would be hard pressed to think of another country that has moved into TRIPS standards and 
then TRIPS-plus standards with such speed.  Yet as admirable as Jordan’s drive might have been, 
such sudden progress must inevitably have side effects and unintended consequences, especially 
given Jordan’s speedy transition into TRIPS and TRIPS-plus IP standards combined with its lack 
of experience in the drafting and enforcement of IPRs legislation. 
Given the declining levels of software piracy, reaching around 66%,593 one can argue that the 
Jordanian market now provides users with both original and pirated products, and the choice of 
one or the other is an economically rational one.  Additionally, while Jordan is not oblivious to its 
challenges with IPRs enforcement and compliance,594 any negative impact of IPRs infringement 
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on Jordanian businesses and welfare is anything but clear, and equally opaque are any economic 
benefits generated by TRIPS and TRIPS-plus standards. 
The points below, which were culled from the discussion throughout this chapter, are presented 
here in a more condensed and direct form in order to more clearly address the main impediments 
to the enforcement of IPRs in Jordan. 
(a) Multiple Enforcement Teams and Poor Coordination 
The enforcement of IPRs is particularly problematic because of the poor 
coordination between the various enforcement agencies; for copyright, for 
example, these are the National Library, the Public Security Department, and the 
Department of Press and Publications.  Overlapping responsibilities further 
compound the problems caused by the poor coordination.  For example, all of the 
above-mentioned departments claim authority to handle counterfeited audio-
visual products.  Similar issues arise regarding counterfeited trademark products 
between the Customs Department, the Jordan Institute of Standards and 
Metrology (JISM), and the Public Security Department.  Rather than having IP 
cases dealt with expeditiously, overlapping responsibilities among the multitude 
of agencies lead to poor cooperation and coordination. 
Jordanian authorities’ efforts to harmonize the workings of its various 
governmental agencies are, as a result, a work in progress.  A contributing factor 
to the confusion is the pressure exerted by various international community 
agencies and donor countries to ratchet up the enforcement of IPRs.   
Jordan should be more aware of the adverse effects of weak coordination among 
its multiple agencies, and the world community should be aware that its constant 
demands for enforcement can backfire if issued without considering the roles 
played by the various governmental agencies.  Those roles should be revised, and 
the enforcement of IPRs should be streamlined in the interest of quality rather 
than quantity. 
(b) Poor Drafting by the Legislator and Weak Governmental Perspective 
There is a split between the legislative language and intent and the actual 
implementation, caused by the inexperience of both the legislative drafters and 
the implementers of the IP legislation.595  The discussion below will outline 
several examples. 
Poor drafting of IP legislation is evident from the inclusion of the Madrid and 
PCT clauses into the Jordanian trademark and patent laws, even though Jordan is 
not a signatory to either.596  For trademark law, the inclusion of the clauses was 
somewhat mitigated by the inclusion of language stipulating they come into force 
only after the Madrid Protocol is actually signed.  Yet in light of Jordan’s lack of 
progress in signing the Protocol, there is no clear justification for the addition of 
the language in the first place.  In the meantime, the current de-activated portion 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
595 Halaiqah, “Interview.” 
596 Patent Law No.32; Trademarks Law No.33. 
 139 
of the Trademark law is left at the risk of becoming obsolete should the Madrid 
Protocol guidelines be revised.   
The inclusion of the PCT language in the patent law presents a more extreme 
example of poor drafting because the patent law does not even include language 
postponing its activation until Jordan’s signing of the PCT.597  Jordan, has yet to 
sign the PCT, yet its Patent law contains language that allows for immediate 
filing of international patent applications under the PCT. 
The weak governmental implementation perspective is evident from the dispute 
over the interpretation of the JUSFTA’s article 4(26), which requests that Jordan 
“shall provide, at least in cases of copyright piracy or trademark counterfeiting, 
that its authorities may initiate criminal actions and border measure actions ex 
officio, without the need for a formal complaint by a private party or right 
holder.”598  The US government’s position has been to request the amendment of 
the Jordanian Customs law to comply with this language.  The Jordanian 
Customs Department accepted this argument and did not present an opposing 
point of view (even though several are available).599  As discussed earlier, 
however, the current language of article 41 of the Jordanian Customs Law allows 
the Customs Department to initiate the first step in a legal proceeding, which can 
result in civil or criminal prosecution.  This indicates that the current Customs 
Law is in compliance with the language of JUSFTA article 14(26) and, therefore, 
no amendment of the Customs law is necessary.   
Jordan’s acceptance of the US’ position, however, hampers Jordan’s ability to 
formulate workable solutions on implementation and enforcement issues.  
Proffering a second view on the interpretation of article 14(26) of the JUSFTA, 
even if it fails, will help expand institutional legal thinking and capacity.  But 
maybe Jordanian governmental officials in charge of interpreting IPRs are 
confined to the US interpretation, because the majority of training seminars and 
their funding sources occurred in the US.600   
Weak governmental interpretation is also evident in JISM’s destroying 
counterfeit goods after confiscating them, even though that is not allowed under 
its current law.  It is up to the owner of the alleged counterfeit goods to file a 
claim with the court to stop the JISM from destroying the goods or to seek 
restitution.  The work of the JISM in the area of IP enforcement is outside the 
scope of its law, which does not explicitly address counterfeit trademarks.  The 
JISM interprets article 30(c) of its law to allow for the destruction of counterfeit 
goods, but article 30(c) actually only addresses the destruction of goods that do 
not meet the JISM standards.601  The JISM seems to have adopted a prima facie 
presumption that counterfeit goods always fall under that category, which is not 
necessarily true.602  The JISM understands that its position is not legally 
supported, and consequently has declared that it is, under pressure from 
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international donors, in the process of amending its law to reflect a clearer 
mandate to pursue counterfeit products.603 
(c) Weak Patent Prosecution 
The Jordanian patent prosecution system is centred on outsourcing the patent 
examination and prosecution process to the WIPO.604  The patent prosecution 
process governs the interaction between applicants, their representatives, and the 
patent office and is divided into two parts.  The pre-grant prosecution refers to 
negotiations with the patent office for the grant of a patent, and the post-grant 
prosecution refers to the amendment of a patent and any opposition filed against 
it.  Both the pre-grant and the post-grant parts of the prosecution process 
represent important elements of the national patent system.  They are vital for the 
development and cultivation of local technical and legal talent and the building of 
necessary skills for local examiners.  A sophisticated and developed local patent 
prosecution staff will inevitably cause the legal practice of IP law to evolve and 
develop accordingly.605 
The current outsourcing of patent examination to the WIPO allows the Jordanian 
patent office (which is located within the Industrial Property Department of the 
MoIT) to benefit from the technical capabilities of the WIPO and helps reduce 
the costs associated with providing the same service by full-time staff in 
Jordan.606  However, this is being done at the expense of developing Jordan’s 
own patent examination and prosecution capabilities.  If Jordan is to take the 
enforcement of patent rights seriously, it must be willing to develop its own 
technical and human resources for patent prosecution.  In order to do so, it has to 
train legal-technical individuals along the same path as patent prosecutors in the 
US and Europe.   
(d) Escalating IPRs Protections 
One of the key assumptions behind promoting the implementation of TRIPS and 
TRIPS-plus standards has been the promised economic development and 
innovation resulting from such implementation.607  Some have denounced that 
point of view as patently false because it ignored the necessary balance between 
the public domain and private property to produce the desired innovation.608  Too 
much IP protection is argued to be just as harmful and distorting as too little 
protection.609    
By constantly attempting to extend, by both direct and indirect means, the initial 
IPRs protection under TRIPS, TRIPS-plus is placing further restrictions on the 
dissemination of knowledge and delaying the eventual placement of proprietary 
knowledge and know-how in the public domain.  Such attempts create an 
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atmosphere that encourages the culture of infringement because they undermine 
the basic tenet of the IP system, which is based on offering a limited period of 
exclusivity, after which the protected knowledge eventually reverts to the public 
domain.610   
TRIPS standards, for example, resulted in the near-universal adoption of patents 
for pharmaceutical products, an area traditionally excluded from patent protection 
in developing countries, where only process patents were allowed.611  TRIPS also 
assured extended protection beyond the designated 20-year patent period by 
introducing data exclusivity periods.  Under data exclusivity pretences, drug 
regulatory agencies can for a limited time prevent the use of data presented to 
them to approve a pharmaceutical product from being used for the registration of 
a generic version of the same product.612  That exclusion period is five years in 
Jordan, which effectively grants pharmaceutical companies a five-year protection 
period in addition to any patent protection they might have.613 
Similarly, the JUSFTA adds more time to the 20-year patent period by granting 
an ill-defined protection to new uses of old chemicals.614  It is not clear what 
“new uses” means in this context, whether it refers to the use of the chemical 
entity alone or in combination with others, whether the use must be to produce 
something else that is desirable, or whether the new use of the material can be the 
desired end in itself. 
In the area of copyright, the JUSFTA added significant requirements and thus 
higher standards of protection, giving right holders the power to allow or deny the 
importation of the protected work(s), whether the work is pirated or an authorized 
version.615 
The above examples represent a trend in the application of IP standards that 
seems to deviate from the notion of IPRs as a limited and finite privilege granted 
to the right holder for a limited period of time and meant to enhance public 
knowledge, not to engender monopolistic activity.  This trend will ultimately 
serve as a catalyst for the escalation of infringing activity, because it provides an 
argument for the circumvention of IPRs. 
(e) Low Levels of Innovation 
                                                     
610 Hamed El Said and Mohammed El Said, “TRIPS-Plus Implications for Access to Medicines in 
Developing Countries: Lessons from Jordan’s;United States Free Trade Agreement,” The Journal of 
World Intellectual Property 10, no. 6 (2007): 438–475. 
611 A product patent refers to the chemical structure of a drug, regardless of its method of manufacturing.  
Process patents, on the other hand, offer protection for the method used to make the final product, and 
how the product is specifically used to reach certain goals.  A process patent is most useful if there is but 
one technically and financially sound way to produce the product in question. 
612 M. El Said, “The Implementation Paradox: Intellectual Property Regulation in the Arab World,” Journal 
of International Trade Law and Policy 9, no. 3 (2010): 221–235. 
613 Patent Law No.32, sec. 36(d). 
614 JUSFTA, article 22 
615 JUSFTA article 4(11): “Each Party shall provide to authors and their successors in interest, to performers and to 
producers of phonograms the exclusive right to authorize or prohibit the importation into each Party’s territory of 
copies of works and phonograms, even where such copies were made with the authorization of the author, performer 
or producer of the phonogram or a successor in interest.”  
 142 
Jordan’s companies fall in the bottom 20% (ranked 108 out of 133) in spending 
on research and development according to the Global Competitiveness Report 
(GCR).616  This is indication that companies have little incentive to abide by or 
push for the enforcement of IPRs, as they have little at stake and little to gain 
from such enforcement.  Yet, Jordan’s low ranking is rather at odds with its 26th 
position out of 133 on the GCR’s ranking for the availability of scientists and 
engineers, the so-called innovation enablers, which is measured based on the 
number of academic degrees awarded.617  This lopsided result is even more 
puzzling when one considers the case of Vietnam, which the GCR ranks as 27 in 
company spending and 62 on availability of scientists and engineers.618  The 
GCR also gives Jordan a low ranking (68 out of 133) on the cooperation between 
industries and universities in research and development.619  Contrasting the lack 
of Jordanian innovation against the large supply of Jordanian engineering and 
science graduates indicates that most university studies are theoretical in nature.  
The low number of Jordanian patents filed on a yearly basis substantiates this 
conclusion.  
The lack of funds should not be blamed, because Vietnam, which is ranked lower 
than Jordan in the number of engineering graduates, is ranked higher than Jordan 
on company R&D spending, even though it has a per capita GDP of $1,040 
compared to Jordan’s $5,421.620  The problem, rather, seems to lie with the 
institutional and cultural response to the need for innovation, which apparently is 
lacking and/or deeply misunderstood by the Jordanian official planners and their 
counterparts in the private sector.621     
6.10 Conclusion 
Although Jordan’s economy has seen large strides forward over the last decade, Jordan will 
remain a developing country for the foreseeable future, plagued by infringement and enforcement 
issues of IPRs.  How to reap the full potential of administrative and judicial protection while 
sustaining and improving economic growth is still an open question for Jordan.  Even though 
Jordan has an IPRs legal framework that is in compliance with the international standards under 
TRIPS and other bilateral agreements, the resulting enforcement and implementation regime has 
many shortcomings.  Clear delineation of lines of responsibility and better-defined roles for each 
of the administrative agencies involved are still needed.  In some cases, as with the JISM, such 
clarification will require amendment of existing legislation that governs the scope of its work. 
Better and more developed approaches are needed for interpreting the legal texts governing IPRs 
in bilateral treaties, as evidenced by the case of the Customs Department’s lack of ability to 
present an alternative point of view to the US government’s interpretation of the IP clauses of the 
JUSFTA.  This observation leads us to consider the broader need for better and more competent 
IP training of relevant officials in both the administrative and judicial agencies.  Only when those 
officials have a sufficient grasp of the elements of IP law and how they interact with the various 
areas of the Jordanian legal code will they be able to present cogent, independent, and reasonable 
interpretations of such laws. 
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Weak implementation needs to be considered; policy-makers should remember, and should 
formulate policy based on, the fact that the strongest possible IPRs protection should not always 
be pursued.  In the absence of such a reasoned formulation, there is increased risk that IP will be 
viewed by Jordanians as hostile to their interests and needs.  As such, IPRs varying standards 
should be welcomed as long as they meet the needs of the local economy, at reasonable social and 
economic costs.  The current maximum-protection model is bad not only for developing countries 
but also, in the long run, for developed countries, yet short-sighted corporate pressures and 
lobbying will assure the dominance of maximum-protection models for the foreseeable future. 
Given the above, one can conclude that piracy rates will not decrease until the pricing for original 
products starts to make economic sense, at which point the price gradient that drives the demand 
for pirated products will shrink significantly.  Ultimately, that point will not be reached until 
right-holders realize that pricing schemes designed for the developed countries do not make 
economic sense for developing countries like Jordan.  An alternative pricing model must be 
introduced.  Western publishing corporations have already reached that conclusion; for years 
now, they have offered original products at significantly lower prices for students in developing 
countries, with the caveat that the copies cannot be shipped in bulk outside designated 
geographical areas.  While the application for audio-visual works might not be as straightforward, 
the principle is still valid, because enforcement models and mechanisms that do not make 
economic sense are not effective and will invariably create an underground market for the 
controlled product.  
Overall, there is also an absence of economic solutions, and an over reliance on judicial (civil and 
criminal) ones.  Taking economic considerations into account will reduce an enforcement model 
that is based on balancing the economic interests of the infringer and the right holder.  Such a 
model would emphasize the introduction of original products at rates reasonable to the local 
community thus undercutting the economic incentive for infringers.  Until this occurs, the 
Jordanian government should not continue to act as the enforcement agent for the interests of 
MNCs, often at the expense of the economic realities of its own people. 
If Jordan continues to fail to raise its efficiency and effectiveness and thus its innovation levels, it 
will not place much emphasis on IP standards except to the extent necessary for window dressing.  
Continuing to define acceptable standards downwards might provide some easy comfort for the 
short term (and can generate some cheap publicity as well), but in the long run it is nothing short 
of burying one’s head in the sand.  Instead, there must be a moment of reckoning when the 
Jordanian economic and political decision-makers must answer the key question of whether they 
realistically see Jordan as an international, or even a regional, technological innovator and power-
house.  If they do not, then they must explain why Jordan has such stringent IP laws.  Given the 
positive link between the use of imitation and increased innovation, stringent IP standards are 
actually hampering any chance that an innovative technical critical mass will ever germinate in 
Jordan.  Right holders will need to focus not only on standards adopted elsewhere, but also, and 
primarily, on standards that accommodate the specifics of the Jordanian economic, social and 
legal context.  Such a novel approach will be a good start for the whole region. 
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7. CHAPTER VII: CURRENT ISSUES IN ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE 
7.1 TRIPS, TRIPS-plus and Enforcement 
It is justifiable to wonder why any developing country, or any developed country that is a net IP 
importer like Canada, would agree to join and implement TRIPS standards.  After all, the World 
Bank – an organization not known for anti-globalization tendencies – estimated in 2002 that 
TRIPS implementation would cause annual losses of $530 million for Brazil, $5.1 billion for 
China, $903 million for India, and $15.3 billion for South Korea.622 The view presented by some 
scholars that stronger IP protection is not a prerequisite for technology transfer adds one more 
layer to the argument.623  The history of TRIPS actually belies the concerns of developing 
countries that they do not stand to gain much from TRIPS implementation. Yet as the promises of 
global trade and economic empowerment through globalization took root, TRIPS became a 
reality, and, despite any dissatisfaction with TRIPS they might have had, developing countries 
within the WTO embarked on IP reforms of varying magnitude and scope. 
Broadly speaking, TRIPS implementation went through two distinct phases.  Some countries 
embarked on a path that involved enacting new laws and amending older ones to be consistent 
with TRIPS, thus meeting the minimum standards under TRIPS, while others went beyond the 
minimum standards by taking a TRIPS-plus approach.  Jordan falls in the latter category; it 
amended its laws to conform to TRIPS standards and further undertook more stringent 
amendments through its various bilateral treaties with the US and other governments.   
Jordan’s accession to TRIPS and the varying levels of amendment to IP laws can be attributed to 
two major and broad drivers.  At one level, Jordan’s economy is subject to international power 
dynamics.  Its attempt to shift to a knowledge-based economy could not go far without attracting 
input from multinational companies who are the purveyors of knowledge and innovation, who in 
turn requested tighter and more stringent protections for their IP assets.  Jordan did not have 
much negotiating power or leverage to deny such requests.  The economic bubble of the first 
decade of the 21st century simply meant that there were many countries standing in line to comply 
with the multi-national companies’ requests for IP assets protection in return for their investment 
in the local economy.  In addition, Jordan’s heavy dependence on foreign aid became increasingly 
linked to meeting the commercial and legal guidelines imposed by the donors.  Those two 
dynamics are built around meeting certain goals and so-called growth and development criteria, 
mainly focused on the existence of sufficient IP laws, the availability of enforcement agencies, 
and a minimum statistical indicator of raids and confiscations of pirated and counterfeit products.  
Little attention was paid to the actual compatibility of those measures and indicators with 
Jordan’s local economic, social, and developmental needs.  The USTR Special 301 Report is but 
one example of how those pressures have played out into a veritable arm-twisting carrot and stick 
scenario, which made the enforcement of IP laws a coercion-driven process.   
Those ideas and policies became infused into the aid culture within Jordan.  Whole programs and 
projects are now vetted for their compliance with the IP politics of the developed countries, 
including TRIPS and TRIPS-plus standards.624  Capacity development is the new gateway for the 
penetration of developing countries’ decision making circles and the creation of a monolithic 
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point of view, mainly that of the donor country, on IP’s role and importance.625  For example, US 
government-financed technical assistance programs were designed explicitly to implement 
TRIPS-plus standards.626 
Additionally, the haste with which IP laws were introduced and approved into the Jordanian legal 
framework calls into question the Jordanian government’s intent to actually comply with them.627  
Jordan currently has thirteen laws that deal directly or indirectly with IP.  Some of them, like the 
patent and trademark laws, have drafting mistakes.  One can assume that Jordan calculated that 
the reputational rewards and economic favours far outweighed any concrete thinking on the 
possibility and economic feasibility of enforcing them.  Unfortunately, the overall factors 
influencing enforcement of IP laws show that was a misguided calculation. 
Developing countries, particularly in the Middle East, fully understand the importance of 
window-dressing and lip service to donors in the areas of so-called sustainable economic 
development, democratization and human rights.628  At the same time it is important to 
understand the domestic politics and setup of the enforcement agencies, as well as the socio-
economic factors impacting compliance.  Without understanding those factors, one will not 
understand the variations in the implementation of IP laws and, consequently, will be unable to 
offer ways to enhance enforcement.  An analytical approach based on empirical data, like the 
approach adopted in the previous chapter, is necessary for piecing together the variations in the 
enforcement picture.  Another key factor is an understanding of the role of the various IP 
enforcement agencies and how they interact.  The unifying aspect of these factors is that unless 
there is value to be exerted from the use of national resources for enforcement efforts, there is no 
national incentive to exert such an effort.   
Governmental sectors such as the JISM, the JFDA and the Patent Office clearly view the 
heightened enforcement of IPRs in Jordan as important to their capacity-building and their ability 
to continue to attract funding and support from the US and the EU.629  The private sector, 
including the pharmaceutical sector, feels it is left without any benefits from this rush to 
heightened enforcement and additional IP standards, especially since there is no research and 
development expenditure, and the ability to imitate and copy to help innovate is restricted by the 
very IPRs that are supposed to spur innovation.630  The main policy-making failure in Jordan is 
the inability to reconcile the two sides.  When discussing the issue of acceding to the ACTA, the 
MoIT projects an image of haplessness.  It protests the suggestion that it is unable to formulate a 
policy position because there aren’t sufficient studies about the effect of IPRs in third-world 
countries, and because it cannot support such a study on its own because of the lack of funds. 631  
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Disregarding the need for broad policy analysis, the Ministry is basing its support of Jordan’s 
accession to the PCT on limited input and data.632 
7.2 RBTs and the Attrition of the Unified Global Trade System 
The most important development in IP standard setting since the adoption of TRIPS has been the 
advance of the RBT system.  Though this system predates TRIPS in its conception, it has taken a 
whole different role with the adoption of TRIPS.  This section provides an overview of the 
evolution of the role of IP laws and standards in the interaction of developed countries with the 
developing countries, which underpins the developed countries’ current stance on enforcement 
issues. 
(a) Pre-TRIPS Unilateral Activities 
From the mid-1970’s to the early 1980’s, both the US and the EU made efforts to 
strengthen their trade laws, which included stronger IP protection.  As their trade 
relations expanded into the developing countries, it was only natural that stronger 
protections were pushed on those developing countries.  The 1974 amendment of 
section 337 of the US Trade Law allowed the US government to take unilateral 
action against foreign products in ways that violated the IPRs held under US 
laws.633  This unilateral approach had its drawbacks, not the least of which were 
the conflicts that arose between the language of section 337 and the requirements 
under the GATT.  Reports were issued finding that certain aspects of section 337 
violated the national treatment provision contained in Article III of GATT, thus 
prompting subsequent amendments. 634  In 1984, the US Congress authorized the 
US administration, through Sections 301 and 305 of the US Trade and Tariff Act, 
to link the benefits it offers its trading partners to their performance in the area of 
IP protection, and to link US trade negotiations objectives with its IP interests.   
Section 301 and its so-called Special Provisions specifically authorized the USTR 
to specify priority countries that failed to make sufficient progress in negotiations 
with the USTR and to initiate investigations that could lead to remedial action, 
which ranged from the use of monitoring to the threat of actual imposition of 
trade sanctions.  The USTR’s Special 301 Report reflects the annual review of the 
IP practices of the US trade partners, identifying countries that, in the USTR’s 
opinion, failed to provide adequate IP protection or fair and equitable access to 
markets for US nationals relying on IP. 
Given the broad scope of authority assumed by the Special 301 Report 
provisions, as well as their explicit extraterritoriality, it is little surprise that their 
legality has been intensely debated by trade scholars.  Such extraterritoriality, 
they argue, is “highlighted by the fact that it does not refer to any sense of norm 
or principles in order to define adequate IP protection among US trade partners – 
the implicit assumption being that any level of protection inferior to that provided 
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by US law is unfair trade practice.”635  The absence of any set of standards 
according to which IP protection is defined has drawn criticism because it implies 
that standards can be assigned according to the wishes of the reviewer (i.e., the 
USTR) and quite possibly can be judged against the levels of protection provided 
under US law.636  The resulting outcry does not seem to have caused the USTR to 
revise its approach in preparing the Special 301 Report.  In effect, this means that 
there is no set definition of applicable standards for the Report except those under 
the Report itself.  The end result is that “non-compliant” countries continue to be 
threatened with retaliatory action, including aid reduction.   
As a result of this approach, IP compliance has become a moving target for 
Jordan that gets shifted and focused based on the requirements of the Special 301 
Report, as Jordan annually attempts to avoid being listed as a non-compliant 
country.  The absence of objective standards in the Special 301 Report and the 
resulting ad-hoc governmental reaction to its pronouncements have also had the 
negative effect of draining the energy out of the calls for a national IP strategy.637  
Because the goal of avoiding getting listed on the Special 301 Report has become 
the main drive for shaping the national policy on IP, Jordan has had little policy 
incentive to think about the long-term implications of IP on its economic and 
developmental goals.638 
(b) RBTs as the Continuation of Special 301 Report by Other Means 
The expansive approach of the Special 301 Report regulations is further 
augmented by the US’ approach of incorporating IP standards and provisions in 
its RBTs.  The EU has followed the same route, but it thus far lacks a platform 
similar to the USTR’s Special 301 Report that allows it to bring to the fore, on an 
annual basis, countries that are not in compliance with those provisions.  In the 
EU’s RBTs, IP provisions are less prominently featured than those typically used 
by the U.S., which tend to be much more detailed.  Yet the language used by the 
EU is equally effective.  The JUSFTA and the JEUAA both exemplify that 
approach.   
Section 4 of the JUSFTA, which covers IP, is the longest section of the 
agreement and touches upon several areas of IPRs, as well as enforcement 
measures and transition periods.  The JEUAA, on the other hand, devotes less 
space to IP provisions but states that Jordan and the EU shall abide by the 
“highest international standards” to ensure the adequate and effective protection 
of IPRs.  The JEUAA’s IP provisions, therefore, are more subtly inserted but are 
no less significant in scope, and actually are more open-ended by virtue of the use 
of terms like ‘highest international standards’, thus creating an open ceiling for 
enforcement and implementation efforts.  More often than not, the EU has ridden 
the coattails of aggressive IP provisions introduced by the US, “sometimes 
sending in negotiators to conclude a bilateral agreement on IP with a developing 
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country after US negotiators had brought that country to the negotiating table 
using the 301 process.”639   
Therefore, the overall result of the US and EU’s bilateral trade agreements with 
Jordan is making IPRs standards more stringent and moving Jordan into the 
TRIPS-plus area.  The progression from pre-TRIPS to TRIPS to TRIPS-plus 
standards exemplifies a “take and demand” approach by the developed countries.  
On the one hand, TRIPS was supposed to represent the universe of IPRs 
regulation.  On the opposing hand, developing countries are asked to sign RBTs 
with TRIPS-plus provisions, when most of them have yet to fully implement the 
TRIPS standards in the first place. 
The consequences of this assault on TRIPS provisions from an enforcement point 
of view could not be more distorting and confusing, as TRIPS-plus encroaches on 
the flexibilities allowed under TRIPS.  An additional consequence of the 
expanding universe of RBT’s IP provisions is the limiting of the developing 
countries’ ability to tailor their IP laws to national priorities at a reduced cost.640  
The adoption of country specific IP regulations and enforcement models simply 
became more difficult as a result of Jordan’s speedy move from TRIPS to TRIPS-
plus.  By signing an RBT with the US and the EU shortly after adopting TRIPS, 
Jordan was robbed of the opportunity to obtain a sound understanding of the 
economic and social effects of the somewhat flexible TRIPS provisions before 
embarking on the more rigid TRIPS-plus provisions. 
RBTs negotiated by the US and the EU indicate that they both view the 
‘minimum standards’ of TRIPS as the beginning, rather than the end, of the road 
towards higher standards.641  The U.S., it seems, has altogether abandoned the 
WTO forum as a venue for accomplishing a more stringent IP standards goal and 
instead shifted to the forum provided through the bilateral and multilateral 
RBTs.642  The direct consequence from an economic perspective is the ability of 
MNCs to further cement the ‘original’ status of their products in foreign markets 
by using the local legal system to pursue infringers.  Furthermore, TRIPS-plus 
brought added protections above and beyond those under TRIPS, which would 
otherwise have been impossible to negotiate through the WTO into TRIPS.  From 
an enforcement perspective, the end goal of meeting the compliance requirements 
for TRIPS is made into a moving target by virtue of TRIPS-plus standards.  The 
developing economic status of the majority of countries that have entered into 
RBTs with the US since 2000 (Jordan 2001, Singapore 2003, Australia 2004, 
Chile 2004, Bahrain 2006, Morocco 2006, Oman 2006, Peru 2007, Dominican 
Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement 2005), brings into question the 
value of higher IP standards when these countries have yet to identify the value 
gained from the TRIPS standards.  
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(c) The Battle for Influencing IP Standards 
In this section, we will discuss factors that continue to make the global IP system 
more complex and, as a result, add to the enforcement burdens.   
(i) Forum Shifting 
Developed countries, aware of the developing countries’ growing 
attempts to counter the strengthening of TRIPS, shifted the debate to 
where the developing countries’ ability for collective, and therefore, 
effective action was weakest.  This “forum-shifting” occurred as the 
developed countries pushed their expansive agenda across multilateral 
organizations that were less resistant to it.  For patents, that agenda has 
three components: (i) ratification of the Patent Law Treaty (PLT), (ii) 
amendment of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), and (iii) a new 
Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) to supplement the substantive 
obligations contained in TRIPS.643  All three components would place 
considerable compliance requirements on Jordan, forcing it to more 
readily accept foreign patents and give them equal protection under 
Jordanian law, without having the necessary infrastructure to properly 
examine them, as Jordan currently relies on WIPO to review patent 
applications. 
The developed countries’ frustration with the level of progress on those 
issues prompted them to intensify their efforts towards substantive patent 
harmonization by bypassing more experienced representatives in Geneva 
and going directly to the capitals of developing countries,644 as well as by 
seeking former developing country officials to participate in the 
advancement of that agenda.645  For Jordan, the top political leadership 
often met with the USTR during its visits to Jordan, and the USTR often 
pays annual visits to Jordan during which it tours various facilities and 
meets high ranking officials.646  Jordan has been under intense pressure 
by the USTR to amend its Customs Law to give border agents the 
capacity to initiate legal action sue sponte even if the right holder does 
not.647 
The proliferation of international organizations and forums that deal with, 
and aim to impact, the level of IP standards regulation has resulted in the 
growing complexity, and therefore the weakening, of the global IP 
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system. This is because the ability of international organizations to 
extend harmonized IP standards has been decreased, and therefore the 
likelihood of their global adoption has been weakened.648  Even when 
such adoption took place, the added complexity made the enforcement 
and compliance process at the national level more difficult. 
As a result, the developing countries have sought assistance from 
international donors and NGOs to meet their compliance requirements, 
creating a major conflict of interest; most of those international donors 
and some of the NGOs had vested interests in promoting right holder’s 
positions and therefore influenced the developing countries’ policies to 
that effect.  Jordan is one of the examples where such conflicts existed for 
both international donors and NGOs like the Jordan IP Association 
(JIPA), which is funded or sponsored by right holders.  In contrast, NGO 
work on IPRs in developed countries has advocated a more cautious 
approach to IP standard setting and often called for a full review of 
TRIPS to address its impact on development.649  Questioning the claimed 
economic benefits of the increased IP standards is one of the glaring 
omissions of the economic and legal discussion in Jordan over the past 
decade. 
(ii) IP’s Expanding Connectedness 
The branching out of the IP standard-setting battles ultimately led to 
making IP a component in areas traditionally beyond the realm of the 
classic IP laws, including patent, copyright, and trademarks.  This has 
made the definition of IP more expansive, made the negotiations in those 
newer areas more complex, and added enforcement requirements where 
previously there were none.  For example, IP debates arose during the 
efforts to finalize a treaty for the management of plant genetic resources 
at the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).650  Similarly, the 
US tried and failed to derail a UNESCO document on cultural diversity 
that the US alleged “could be used by other countries to construct trade 
barriers to US exports of film, music or other cultural products.”651  
Along the way, the US sought to include in the UNESCO document more 
than a dozen references to IPRs but was prevented from doing so by 
developing countries.652   
This intermingling of IP standards within areas that would usually not 
have been associated with them is a tool that, in the case of Jordan, was 
used to influence changes in policy on several fronts.  Whereas the 
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enforcement of the JUSFTA’s IP standards is a mainstay of the 
discussions between the US and the Jordanian governments, the JUSFTA 
also included articles on labour and environmental policy – the first of 
their kind in any RBT signed by the US government.653  Over the past 
decade since the signing of the JUSFTA, not only have IP issues arisen 
between the two countries, but disputes on the issues of rights of workers 
and the quality of environmental standards have also surfaced.  In an 
example of strategic manipulation, the US has shifted pressure for 
compliance and enforcement from one area to another (labour to 
environment to IP); as a result, an enforcement dispute in one area is 
swiftly linked to enforcement issues in other areas.  For example, the 
issue of better working circumstances for workers within Jordanian 
industrial areas allowed to export to the US market, known as QIZ 
(Qualified Industrial Zones), was linked to the enforcement of a 
prohibition on the sale of knock-off products in the local market by the 
same QIZ entities.654  Similarly, the push for the enforcement of 
environmental standards is often coupled with calls to regulate low-cost 
factories that also produce what are considered infringing goods.655 
The relationship between IP and human rights, similar to the QIZ 
situation discussed above, has also been steadily growing globally.  In 
1998, to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the proclamation of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, WIPO, in collaboration with the 
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) Mary Robinson, organized a Panel Discussion that linked IP 
and human rights.  The OHCHR remarks linked the concepts of ‘non-
discrimination’ and ‘national treatment’ to concepts of human rights, thus 
asking that indigenous peoples and local communities are consulted and 
notified by companies and researchers, and their consent sought.656  That 
ushered in the increased interest of the international human rights 
community in IP issues, and several NGOs subsequently highlighted 
areas of conflict between TRIPS and human rights as part of their 
examination of the human rights implications of the different facets of 
economic globalization.657  In 2001, the OHCHR issued a report on the 
impact of TRIPS on human rights, with special attention to access to 
medicine.658  Other UN bodies, like the United Nation’s Committee on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC), also followed suit and issued 
recommendations regarding the impact of Free Trade Agreements and 
TRIPS on public health, emphasizing the need to assure that 
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implementation does not impact the health of the poor or their access to 
medication.659 
The growing prominence of the social and economic effects of IP 
standards turned the question of controlling the international IP 
organizations into a major issue in its own right and further influenced 
the developed countries’ push for forum shifting to avoid places where 
their ideas were strongly challenged.  One of the first victims of this 
approach was WIPO, which was increasingly attacked by developing 
countries and civil society activists who accused WIPO of not providing 
sufficient technical assistance on the issue of flexibilities within TRIPS 
and called upon WIPO to abandon its current culture of expanding 
monopoly privileges without regard to social cost.660  WIPO was 
criticized for its ‘faith-based’ approach for ever-stronger IP protection 
driven by special interests and right holders.661  The implication was that 
WIPO was no longer regarded as a neutral arbiter but rather as an 
institution with its own agenda,662 which further intensified the call by 
developing countries for a new WIPO Development Agenda, first 
advocated in 2004 by Argentina and Brazil, who were later joined by 
thirteen other Friends of Development developing countries.   
At the centre of that Development Agenda was the call to decelerate the 
continued push for ever-stronger IP standards and to address the 
Development Agenda’s co-sponsors’ needs.663  The Development 
Agenda sought to re-orient WIPO towards a more development-focused 
set of concerns, and set out the argument that the effort to protect and 
enforce IPRs cannot be seen as an end in itself.664  The Development 
Agenda also detailed a list of complaints that were supported by NGOs 
and other civil society institutions, including poor recruitment practices 
of IP technical cooperation providers, conflicts of interest, low-quality 
seminars, and biased content training programs.665  The Development 
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Agenda eventually bore some fruit for its advocates in 2007, when WIPO 
adopted a series of recommendations related to it and suspended the new 
SPLT.666  But it seems that much of the implementation of the 
Development Agenda will require reforming WIPO’s governance.667 
7.3 Effect of IP Enforcement on Access to Pharmaceuticals 
Advocates of equitable access to medicine want to bring the World Health Organization (WHO) 
into the battle for control of IP policy within international organizations.  In recent years, the 
WHO has become one of the main arenas for debate between NGOs and the pharmaceutical 
industry.668  At the forefront of this debate have been issues such as access to medicine, extended 
patent rights, and the industry’s lack of focus on research and development on some drugs that 
disproportionately afflict the developing world, because the markets cannot meet the costs of drug 
development.  The WHO itself concedes that the implications of trade agreements on public 
health have been among the most debated topics in recent years, particularly the impact of the 
WTO-TRIPS Agreement on access to essential medicines.669  In 2004, WHO member states were 
further encouraged to ensure that RBTs take into account the flexibilities contained in the WTO-
TRIPS Agreement on Public Health.670   
For Jordan, the most immediate effect of the adoption of TRIPS on access to medicine has been 
the tightening of access to counterfeit brand-name drugs; however, the more lasting effect has 
been the on-going struggle to fix the prices of brand-name drugs, which undergoes a constant tug 
between affordability and availability.671  Jordan, not being a major regional drug importer or 
having a significant regional market population, has never had the necessary leverage or 
bargaining power to counter the effects of escalating drug prices as a result of the implementation 
of TRIPS.672  As a result, to lessen the impact of price increases by pharmaceutical brand-name 
producers, Jordan must rely on a complicated mechanism that ties the prices of brand-name 
pharmaceuticals to various benchmarks.673 
The JFDA regulates the pricing of drugs in Jordan using the Provisional Drugs and 
Pharmaceuticals Law674 and the relevant pricing standards.675  If the product is only registered 
and priced in its country of origin, then it will be priced based on the price of other drugs with 
similar chemical compositions or treatment effects.676  The prices of imported products with 
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generic equivalents registered and priced in Jordan are determined by the following pricing 
mechanisms:677 
1. If purchased on a Cost, Insurance and Freight (CIF) basis, the factory price plus 
customs duties, insurance, clearing, inland transport, local client’s margin (for 
products purchased on a Free on Board (FOB) basis, shipping costs must be 
added); or 
2. The public selling price in the country of origin (after deducting the said 
country’s wholesaler’s and retailer’s margin), plus freight costs, insurance, 
custom duties, inland transport and local client’s margin; or 
3. The export price from Saudi Arabia. In the event the product was not registered 
in Saudi Arabia, the price shall be reviewed upon its registration in Saudi Arabia 
(where the Agent importing the product must inform the FDA of the requested 
price within four months of its registration in Saudi Arabia).  Saudi Arabia is 
chosen because it is the largest in market population and in spending per capita in 
the region. 
7.4 Effect of Economic Pressures on the Adoption of IP Standards 
The tension that exists between developing and developed countries in how each views the role of 
IPRs is at the centre of the pressures exerted by the developed countries to spread their vision of 
those rights.  The developed countries are interested in promoting IPRs as a way of spurring 
innovation, which in their minds justifies concepts like exclusive ownership, the right to limit use, 
and the ownership right of control over proprietary goods.  Little attention is paid to claims that 
their current IPRs policies will not help the developing countries grow out of complete 
dependence on the technology of developed countries. 
Developed countries, however, recognizing the strong resistance to TRIPS, have adopted a 
divide-and-conquer approach to TRIPS implementation, whereby they target a subset of 
developing countries with economic pressures to adopt TRIPS-plus standards.  Such pressures are 
the primary explanation for the developing countries’ eventual agreement to adopt TRIPS and 
TRIPS-plus standards.678  Jordan is not an exception to that rule; when compared to the lack of 
any significant economic or technological transfers, the progression of IP standards in Jordan can 
only be explained by economic pressures and/or initial promises which later failed to materialize.   
If we consider the developed countries’ selling of the “idea” of economic progress and national 
innovation as going hand in hand with ever-stricter IP standards, then Jordan can be seen to have 
been one of the first and most avid adopters of those economic promises.  This explains to a large 
extent the adoption of TRIPS-plus standards under the JUSFTA and the JEUAA, even though 
severe economic pressures were not apparently applied; it was simply the combination of 
economic and ideational pressures that provided the developed countries with a formidable 
carrot-and-stick approach.  In an open society, however, the influence of, and support for, 
ideational hopes will diminish if that society realizes the lack of progress made on the economic 
and development promises.  The following section discusses the use of soft economic incentives 
and the coercion-based approach to IP enforcement. 
                                                     
677 Ibid.,  sec. 5  
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(Cambridge University Press, 2004)_.  
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7.5 The Incorporation of TRIPS-plus Standards 
RBTs like the JUSFTA and the JEUAA are among the most common and potent tools for 
encouraging developing countries to adopt TRIPS-plus standards.679  Both the JUSFTA and the 
JEUAA are model agreements in that regard, as their terms include obligations to accede to 
specific international agreements, decrease copyright requirements, expand patent coverage to 
new subject matter, and (under the ultimate catch-all requirement used in the JEUAA) adopt the 
‘highest international standards’.680  One example of these TRIPS-plus standards for IP is the 
JEUAA’s requirement, in addition to the ‘highest international standards’ requirement, that 
Jordan provide patent protection for chemicals and pharmaceuticals two years earlier than 
required under TRIPS.681 
The trend of including TRIPS-plus standards in trade agreements is also used by smaller trade 
groups like the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries (Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, and 
Switzerland), who include TRIPS-plus standards, such as joining intellectual-property-related 
treaties and providing stronger patents and data protections, in their negotiations with developing 
countries.  The EFTA–Jordan Free Trade Agreement reflects such measures and TRIPS-plus 
standards and calls for the provision of enforcement mechanisms under national laws at the same 
level as that provided for in the TRIPS agreement.682 
These agreements have had a significant impact on a regional basis, and on trade agreements 
between developing countries, by acting as a force multiplier for TRIPS-plus standards between 
developing countries.  In general, RBTs between developing countries have not included 
provisions addressing IP.  Where one developing country has already implemented TRIPS-plus 
standards, they will most likely be reflected in trade agreements with other developing countries 
to maintain consistency and equal treatment requirements. 
A recently noted development in the scope of IP treaties is the drive for the development of a 
plurilateral Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) for establishing international standards 
on IPRs enforcement within the participating countries.683  ACTA’s proponents describe it as a 
tool to provide an international framework that improves the enforcement of existing IPRs 
without creating new one.  They argue that ACTA will create improved international enforcement 
standards regarding how to act against large-scale infringement of IPRs.684  The intended scope of 
ACTA is broad, including counterfeit goods as well as “piracy over the Internet”, with a focus on 
counterfeiting and piracy activities that significantly affect commercial interests, rather than 
                                                     
679 In certain cases such as China the U.S. signed a series of bilateral agreements prior to China’s accession 
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activities of ordinary citizens.685  The claim that ordinary citizens are not targeted by ACTA is 
challenged by various groups who maintain that leaked versions indicate that ACTA will target 
individuals, by demanding that they prove that copyrighted material on their electronic devices 
does not infringe copyright law, and that internet service providers will be required to divulge 
information about their customers without a warrant.686  Ascertaining the nature of ACTA is not 
made easier by the shroud of secrecy placed around its negotiations.687   
Additionally, negotiations for ACTA are not part of any international organization (e.g., the 
WTO).688  In October 2007, the US government, the European Commission, Switzerland and 
Japan first announced that they would negotiate ACTA; since then, countries that have confirmed 
their involvement in the ACTA negotiations include New Zealand, the US, Australia, Canada, the 
EU, Japan, Korea, Mexico and Switzerland.689  The last round of ACTA negotiations (held in 
Washington, D.C., on 30-31 July 2008) included, in addition to the above, the US’ RBT partners 
like Jordan, Morocco, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates.  On 15 November 2010, a final 
text of the treaty was released, further confirming that it is intended as an international legal 
framework that countries can join on a voluntary basis, while creating its own governing body 
operating independently from international institutions such as the WTO, WIPO and the United 
Nations. 
From a political economic perspective, ACTA is another step towards ‘new constitutionalism’, 
under which ‘public policy is increasingly premised on the goal of increasing the security of 
property owners and minimising the uncertainty of investors.’690  In effect, the goal is to 
‘strengthen surveillance mechanisms and institutional capabilities to reinforce…market discipline 
at the multilateral level, and to help sustain the legal and political conditions for trans-national 
capital.’691 
7.6 Effect on WTO’s Dispute Settlement Process 
The dispute settlement process within the WTO, commonly known as the DSU, has been both a 
victim of trade agreements and a tool for developed countries to promote the pro-intellectual-
property climate. 
Typically, trade agreements carry with them their own dispute settlement mechanisms, which 
cover potential dispute areas under those agreements, including the area of IP.692  This has had a 
corrosive impact on the ability and potential for the trade agreement’s contracting parties to use 
the DSU as they commit themselves to a new forum outside the DSU venue.  The developing 
country is left alone in the arena against their better-prepared counterparty.   
None of the dispute settlement mechanisms under the RBTs with Jordan reference DSU cases or 
contemplate using them as precedent in future disputes.  This dispute-settlement forum shifting 
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occurs mostly at the expense of developing countries, which are less technically sophisticated in 
navigating this new venue of dispute settlement, as well as at the expense of the DSU’s potential 
to become a universal forum for trade resolution with established precedents and uniform 
procedural rules that apply equally to all WTO member countries.   
One obvious benefit for developed countries that seek such forum shifting is the added flexibility 
in managing future disputes with trading partners.  Jordan, therefore, should it choose to contest 
any enforcement requests or interpretations similar to those issued under the Special 301 Report, 
is bound to address them through the JUSFTA dispute settlement mechanism and suffer from the 
above shortcomings of such a forum.  The JUSFTA specifically calls for the creation of a Joint 
Committee “to supervise the proper implementation” of the Agreement.693  That Committee’s 
authority is open-ended and not well defined, but its functions are broad enough to include 
considering and adopting amendments to the Agreement and developing guidelines and rules for 
its proper implementation.694   
That approach by developed countries, particularly the US, is not recent or new, as the US 
pursued it long before the DSU system was perpetuated.  US trade policy was described as 
moving towards the pragmatic, ad hoc approach of dealing with trading partners on a bilateral 
basis and ‘rewarding friends’.695  
In a real-life example of the realist theory of international relations, the US government 
simultaneously supported the continued evolution of RBTs and the DSU.  On the one hand it 
became the heaviest user of the DSU system, while on the other hand it pushed for RBTs with 
dispute resolution clauses that undermined the DSU system.  For developed countries, trade 
agreements presented the opportunity to regulate the unilateralist retaliation among themselves.696  
To developing countries, they also presented the opportunity for preferential access to markets.   
However, the increased criticisms targeting TRIPS, especially its patent provisions and their 
impact on access to medicines, caused the US companies and their lobbyists to turn their attention 
to the possibilities offered by RBT’s, both for forum shifting and for ushering in TRIPS-plus 
standards.697  For instance, Article 6 of TRIPS states that, for the purposes of dispute settlement, 
nothing in TRIPS can be used to address exhaustion issues, but the US can use RBTs to address 
the issue of exhaustion.698 
But do the dispute resolution mechanisms in RBTs supersede Jordan’s dispute resolution rights 
under the DSU? Article 23 of the DSU provides that699 “when Members seek the redress of a 
violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered 
agreements, or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they 
shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.” The 
interplay between the DSU and the dispute resolution mechanisms in RBTs, to the extent that 
there is any, will also determine if the DSU is still considered a valid dispute resolution 
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mechanism between countries that have RBTs, or if the RBTs dispute settlement process 
effectively deprive parties of access to the WTOs dispute settlement process.  The flip side of this 
issue is whether the WTO can accept complaints initiated through the WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings in possible violation of their RBT obligations.700  To date, the WTO appellate panel 
has not declined any cases based on exclusive jurisdiction under an RBT.  Examples include the 
request by the US to review Mexico’s actions against non-cane sugar sweeteners, which Mexico 
argued the WTO panel should refuse to address in light of Mexico’s efforts to initiate North 
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Chapter 20 proceedings.  The Appellate Body held 
that the panel could not decline to exercise jurisdiction and that the WTO had no basis to 
determine whether or not the US had acted consistently with its NAFTA obligations.701  That 
ruling offers hope that Jordan can always take any potential case to the WTO’s DSU, as the DSU, 
it seems, would not decline to exercise to jurisdiction.702  
The position that Jordan can always take any potential case to the WTO’s DSU is also supported 
by, article 23 of the DSU, which provides that WTO violations can only be resolved through the 
WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism even if an RBT has already adjudicated the matter.703  This 
has been the case in cases involving members of the Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR),704 
which has been commonly appealed to the WTO even though a MERCOSUR panel had already 
adjudicated the matter.705  This shows that the issues raised by conflicts and forum choices 
between the WTO and RBTs include several factors, such as disputes over jurisdiction, 
duplicative proceedings that can lead to conflicting rulings, various procedural issues related to 
the lack of res judicata,706 and the preclusion of defences afforded by using the WTO as back 
channel to re-litigate an unfavourable RBT verdict.   
Another important concern is the impact RBT decisions can have on third parties.  
Hypothetically, the US and Jordan could settle a trade dispute through the RBT mechanism, only 
to have one or both sued through the DSU by third parties claiming that the resolution causes its 
goods or services to be treated unfairly or discriminated against.  This was the case, for example, 
when the European Commission (EC) sued Brazil through the DSU to object to restrictions on the 
importation of re-treaded tires, which were implemented after Brazil lost a claim to Uruguay at 
the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal.707 
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The outcome of a dispute is never certain for developed countries, as shown by the outcomes of 
the US TRIPS disputes against India in 1996 (alleging absence of patent protections for 
pharmaceuticals), Argentina in 1999 and 2000 (alleging, inter alia, failure to protect against 
unfair use of undisclosed test data, and denial of certain exclusive rights for patents), and Brazil 
in 2000 (alleging, inter alia, inconsistency of measures for enjoyment of exclusive patent rights).  
The Indian government adopted administrative delays to lessen the impact of the dispute 
settlement body.708  Argentina still retains several provisions in its laws, and Brazil does the 
same, albeit agreeing to consult with the US in the case of compulsory licensing.709  In the face of 
these obstacles, the US deployed the Special 301 Report powers as another pressuring tool 
operating outside the realm of the WTO. 
7.7 Special 301 Report and Enforcement by Coercion 
We have already examined the historic roots of the Special 301 Report powers and the way the 
USTR has been deploying them to threaten trade retaliation and to induce policy changes in 
targeted states.  But have such powers been a more effective coercion tool than the WTO and the 
RBT dispute settlement mechanisms in improving the actual level of IP protection or 
enforcement? 
There have been instances when private investors were successful in obtaining concessions from 
their joint venture partners that the US government, Section 301 notwithstanding, has been unable 
to secure.710  At the same time, research has shown that the substance and timing of the US’ 
policies that induced changes to improve IP protection in targeted countries can be explained as 
the product of a strategy of coercion, including the use of Special 301 Report powers.711 
That strategy, which exemplifies the asymmetry in economic power between developed and 
developing countries, uses Special 301 Report powers to draw targeted countries to the 
negotiations table, while at the same time requiring that stronger IP standards be agreed to in 
exchange for greater market access.  This strategy goes hand in hand with the use of RBTs, as 
discussed above.  A targeted country for a bilateral trade agreement is often pre-listed on the 
Priority Watch List, as was the case with Jordan, thus placing it at risk of trade sanctions or the 
withdrawal of unilateral trade preferences.  The carrot side of the strategy consists of being 
removed from the Priority Watch List or, at a minimum, being downgraded from the Priority 
Watch List to the Watch List.  Jordan is a classic example of that strategy; it was listed on the 
Watch List of the Special 301 Report but was removed in 2000, when it agreed to TRIPS-plus 
standards incorporated within the JUSFTA.   
But the signing of the RBT and the acceptance of TRIPS-plus standards are only the beginning of 
the enforcement road, as the added commitments under the RBT are used to provide more 
ammunition for future threats of placement on the Special 301 Report Watch List.  The theory 
that countries like Jordan signed agreements like the JUSFTA without seriously considering 
implementing or enforcing them is not valid, because the Special 301 Report powers are 
continuously threatened to nudge the targeted country towards complete compliance.  Any 
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illusions of lackadaisical monitoring by developed countries are quickly displaced as the various 
corporate lobbyists in Washington, D.C. start requesting that the targeted country meet its full 
obligations under the RBT.  Even a disagreement on the interpretation of certain clauses is a basis 
for threatening the targeted country with the Special 301 Report powers.  Again, Jordan 
represents the classic example of that scenario.  Within four years of signing the JUSFTA, in its 
2005 Special 301 Report Submission, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PhRMA) 
called for Jordan to be placed on the 2006 Priority Watch List, claiming that the health authorities 
were not effectively implementing the JUSFTA and that ‘unsupportable adverse interpretations’ 
were being applied to the protection of data.712  In addition, the report claimed that PhRMA 
members were facing some market access barriers, particularly through pricing directives and 
regulatory requirements.713 
PhRMA also requested that Jordan be listed on the Watch List in 2007 due to recent weaknesses 
in IP protection and alleged barriers to market access for US firms in Jordan; however, Jordan 
was not actually placed on the watch list that year.  Similar calls were made in 2009, when again 
Jordan was ultimately not included on the Watch List, but only after a letter to the USTR by local 
industry representatives’ detailing commitments to push for stronger implementation of IP 
standards.714  This method of avoiding being listed on the Special 301 Report Watch List is worth 
considering, because it essentially consisted of accepting all the positions advocated by the US 
government and acknowledging that they had not yet been met. 
Even though the 2009 letter to the USTR was issued by private organizations rather than by the 
Jordanian government, it is highly unlikely that it had not been authorized by governmental 
agencies, especially since it involved the dreaded Special 301 Report Watch List.  References 
within the letter to helping Jordan avoid the negative impact of being listed on the Watch List hint 
at behind-the-scenes governmental drafting.  The quasi-official sanctioning of the 2009 letter to 
the USTR, therefore, is one that will likely come back to haunt Jordan if future questions arise 
regarding whether or not the letter’s self-imposed enforcement benchmarks were met.  The letter 
further limits Jordan’s ability to interpret the JUSFTA clauses by accepting the US’ position on 
the contested issues.   
7.8 Socialization by External Inducements and Effectiveness of Coercion 
In examining the reaction of Jordan’s private and public sectors to the enforcement demands and 
coercion of the US, both sectors can be characterized as being influenced by “socialization by 
external inducements”, in which socialization plays an important role both in establishing an 
international order and in facilitating the functioning of that order.715 Such socialization, which in 
Jordan’s case originates from the institutionalized cooperation formalized in bilateral agreements, 
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leads the political and economic elite to believe that US norms are in their best interest.716  This 
change in belief can result from technical assistance, capacity-building programs or the frequent 
contacts with foreign authorities that usually follow the signing of an RBT.717  The importance of 
socializing policy makers through training and education can produce advocates in domestic 
policy elites for the new protections of IPRs, thus helping to overcome and silence the local 
objections.718 
Further, in conjunction with the coercion approach discussed above, the US applies considerable 
diplomatic pressure to ensure that any negative view of the effect of TRIPS-plus standards on 
development is not granted the imprimatur of any international body or organization.  Examples 
include the pressure exerted on the World Bank in 2005 to retract and revise an analytical note 
examining the impact on development caused by TRIPS-plus provisions in US RBTs. 719  
Similarly, the US called on the WHO to withdraw its sponsorship of two WHO papers, one 
published jointly with the South Centre addressing TRIPS flexibilities and the other published 
jointly with ICTSD addressing guidelines for the grant of pharmaceutical patents.720 
While we have seen that Special 301 Report powers can be effective in enforcing the IP policy on 
the national level, do these powers impact the adoption of TRIPS-plus standards on a multilateral 
level?  Morin, after examining six potential roads from bilateralism to plurilateralism, argues that 
claims of the huge impact of bilateral trade deals on international patent law making is 
unsubstantiated.721  Bilateral agreements, however, can have a positive effect on promoting 
accession to existing multilateral agreements.722  That is certainly true in the case of Jordan, 
whose accession (or promise to accede) to several international multilateral IP agreements 
occurred after concluding its bilateral agreements with the US and the EU, suggesting that the 
multilateral agreements were joined to honour bilateral commitments.  For Jordan the treaties 
referenced by the JUSFTA included the UPOV, which Jordan joined in 2004, as well as the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty and the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the 
International Registration of Marks, both of which Jordan has yet to join.723  Similarly, the 
Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the 
Purposes of Patent Procedure was referenced by the JUSFTA, albeit without a direct requirement 
to join.724 
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In addition to extending the duty to abide by whole agreements, an RBT can reference certain 
parts of multilateral agreements that it sees fit for both parties to abide by, even if the whole 
agreement is not acceded to.  Examples in the JUSFTA include the Joint Recommendation 
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks (1999), WIPO Copyright Treaty 
(1996), and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT, 1996).725  The same applies to 
the requirements under the JEUAA to fulfil the commitments under several multilateral IP 
agreements, including the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the 
Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organizations, and the Nice Agreement concerning the International Classification of Goods and 
Services for the purposes of the Registration of Marks.726  RBTs, therefore, reinforce multilateral 
IP agreements by harmonizing the applicability of those treaties to trade and imposing additional 
enforcement requirements far beyond those required under TRIPS. 
The extent of TRIPS-plus and the reduction in TRIPS flexibilities under RBTs have not escaped 
the attention of regulators within developed countries, even when their counterparties in the 
developing countries, such as Jordan, have ironically been conspicuously silent on the same 
issues.  For example, the legitimacy of imposing TRIPS-plus standards on bilateral partners and 
restricting the Doha Declaration flexibilities was challenged within the US government; twelve 
members of the US Congress argued in a letter that the insertion in RBTs of IP provisions that 
restrict access to generic drugs ‘‘violate[s] the requirement in section 2101 (b)(4)(C) of the Trade 
Promotion Authority Act 2002 to uphold the 2001 WTO Declaration on Public Health.’’727  That 
letter also attacked the USTR’s inclusion of the allowance for such flexibilities in appending 
letters instead of in the body of the RBT itself.  That led in 2007 to a compromise known as the 
New Trade Policy Template, which calls for enhanced provisions in all future US bilateral and 
regional free trade agreements on IP protection.  This compromise aims at striking a balance 
between the rights of drug companies to protect their patents and the need of developing countries 
for life-saving drugs.  As a direct result the US’ RBTs with Colombia, Peru and Panama do not 
reach beyond TRIPS as did RBTs signed previously (including the JUSFTA).  This is evident in 
the relaxing of several patent-related rules in those later agreements, including rules on data 
exclusivity, patent linkage and patent extension.   An unprecedented explicit reference to the 
Doha Declaration and the need for each country to be able to protect the public health of its 
citizens was also added in the body of these agreements rather than as an appended letter.  
Similarly, the importance of ‘‘respecting and preserving traditional knowledge and practices of 
indigenous and other communities’’ was recognized.  Overall, these results seem to indicate that 
the criticisms related to some aspects of the agreements, particularly those concerning the 
reduction of TRIPS ﬂexibilities, have produced concrete results.728 
7.9 Factors Impacting the Enforcement of IP Standards 
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The influence exerted through technical assistance and building capacity for developing countries 
is not less significant than the influence of economic pressures.  Ideational factors such as 
technical assistance are important in explaining compliance and enforcement patterns.  They 
impact and alter the terms of the debate by framing it according to the views of one side.  
Specifically, those ideational factors play a significant role in how developing countries 
understand and interpret their obligations under TRIPS or RBTs, mainly because those factors 
play a role by supporting a certain type of expertise or capacity building to the exclusion of other 
types, resulting in enforcement, executive and even legislative officials accepting the notion of 
stronger IP as a given.729  Below, we will discuss some specific factors influencing the 
enforcement of IP standards within the Jordanian context. 
(a) Framing 
Framing primarily designates meanings.  By doing so, it builds understandings 
and subsequently produces specific actions and solutions to be adopted later as 
policy.730  This is done through the creation of advocacy focal points whose 
assignment is to constantly promote and perpetuate the designation of meanings, 
the building of understandings, and the subsequent adoption into policy of the 
solutions produced as a result.  Such focal points gain their legitimacy by 
claiming that they are knowledge or expertise communities, or communities of 
activists such as experts, journalists, academics, and public officials, and would 
therefore present their views disinterestedly and objectively.  Socialization by 
external inducements, mentioned above, is an important step in such a process.  
Of course, those calling for a more balanced IP system can use this approach as 
well.   
The usual constituents of such knowledge centres are patent attorneys and 
lawyers, patent administrators, and other specialists who collectively play a key 
part in the exploitation, administration and enforcement of the patent system. 
These knowledge centres are also populated with regular users of the patent 
system, like pharmaceutical companies. 731  Within this system, the alignment of 
economic power around “objective” expertise would definitely work to frame the 
positions held by such expertise to become the conventional wisdom within 
regulatory agencies and throughout society.732  This is especially true in 
developing countries like Jordan, where the Patent Bar is almost non-existent and 
the governmental trade and industry facilities are starved for know-how and 
training.   
The pro-IP team’s efforts in Jordan in that regard extend to the private sector 
through Chambers of Commerce and the funding of papers, research, and similar 
products that advocate their point of view,733 sometimes even relying on donor 
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dollars to accomplish such goals.  Overall, such positions intend to link higher IP 
standards with innovation, economic development, integration into the world 
economy, and economic stability, essentially selling the idea that competitive 
advantage can be engineered through regulation.  Even if governmental IP 
administrators privately hold doubts about this, the industry is always there to 
remind them of the argument.734 
WIPO, as an international organization vested in the more aggressive adoption of 
IP standards, played a similar role by exerting soft power through technical 
assistance that emphasized stronger IP protections and linked IPRs with 
development.  Consequently, all of WIPO’s technical assistance, support, and 
publications are geared toward that goal.  A perfect example is the 2003 WIPO 
publication titled “IP – A Power Tool for Economic Growth”, which advocated 
the position that IP is a force for good that is not yet being used to optimal effect, 
particularly in the developing world.735   
The role WIPO plays by emphasizing stronger IP protections is not surprising, as 
WIPO and similar organizations have no economic incentive to hold a different 
position; similar to a patent office, they are unlikely to move in ways that 
diminish the size of their organizational domain (as measured by number of 
members and fees paid).736  In the same vein, those organizations constantly 
reinforce to governments of developing countries the message that the 
governments are good global citizens and promoters of sound economic policies. 
Given that reinforcement, one can have a better understanding of why developing 
countries in general, and Jordan in particular, leapt from pre-TRIPS to TRIPS and 
then to TRIPS-plus IP standards.  Jordan strove, and continues to strive, almost 
with abandon, to promote itself as an avant-garde country on the economic front, 
actively embracing the new economic world order with its good governance, 
economic modernization, and legal reform.  This is an important reality that must 
be taken into account when viewing its IP efforts.  The positions held by its 
government officials clearly point to the diffusion of pro-IP ideas and the success 
of the framing of the issues.  Statements from Jordanian officials frequently 
demonstrate the diffusion of pro-IP ideas in official Jordanian policy through 
framing.  A recent example is an op-ed piece by a former MoIT minister calling 
for stronger enforcement of existing IP laws and, linking piracy, without much 
explanation or proof, to the violation of Arabic cultural values.737  The piece also 
pointedly mentioned the risk of being listed on “watch lists” if IPRs are not 
adequately protected.738   
Similarly, general non-specific and unsubstantiated statements about the effect of 
IP on investments abound, such as the declaration by the Director of the National 
Library that “IPRs are one of the main pillars for attracting investments.”739  This 
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position was similarly echoed by the MoIT Undersecretary, who declared that “IP 
is a key requirement for attracting foreign investments.”740  Local officials and 
foreign donors like the US also linked IPRs to not only economic but also social 
development and described it as key factor for helping society progress.741  
Observing that stronger IP became one of the most vital issues in the modern 
world, the head of the largest economic free zone in Jordan, the Aqaba Special 
Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA), proclaimed that IP is the cornerstone of the 
new economic world order.742  He stressed that IP laws were “attracting 
investments into Aqaba”, despite the fact that at the time of his remarks, there 
wasn’t a single IP related investment project at ASEZA, as the vast majority of 
such investments were related to the real estate and tourism infrastructure.   
Anti-piracy campaigns were also a major component of the pro-IP framing 
efforts, with the launching of periodic high-profile campaigns to promote 
awareness of IPRs,743 protect the public from the dangers of pirated products,744 
safeguard the national economy and assure its integration into the global 
market,745 and pressure the government to do more to enforce IPRs.746  
Additionally, the very obvious involvement of foreign donor organizations and 
state-sponsored aid agencies (such as the USAID)747 in the efforts to promote and 
publicize the importance of meeting IPRs under the JUSFTA signals the use of 
such agreements as tools of foreign policy.748  As Weintraub describes it, an RBT 
is not “necessarily an agreement in which all parties benefit from trade 
expansion, but rather a favour to be bestowed based on support of US foreign 
policy.”749  In that context, TRIPS-plus is part of the price to be paid, in foreign 
policy terms, especially for a small country like Jordan. 
Opponents who advocate a more flexible approach to IPRs by Jordan have also 
engaged in their own framing efforts.  They have attempted to re-frame the 
debate to emphasize the need for less restrictive IP standards or, at a minimum, to 
establish a more accommodating timeline for enforcement and compliance with 
registration and licensing requirements.750  Similarly, they have pushed, with 
minimal success, for offering original products at reduced prices to reflect the 
disparity in income between the intended customer in the developed countries 
and the intended customer in the developing countries, specifically Jordan.751  
Such activities were sometimes undertaken in spite of a governmental decision to 
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the contrary, as when the members of the Engineering Offices syndicate refused 
to abide by a decision of the Engineers Union to open their offices for inspection 
to ensure that software programs used by those offices were original.752   
Overall, however, the popular efforts in Jordan to reframe the debate towards a 
more flexible approach to IPRs are not as successful as those in other parts of the 
world, like Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia.  Similarly, not much 
effort is being made to reframe the debate from an intellectual point of view.  The 
philosophical and logical basis held by the pro-IP camp is not deconstructed or 
seriously challenged by the Jordanian intelligentsia.  Many reasons can account 
for such a weak effect, including the difficulty to present an opposing point of 
view in light of the government agencies’ control of the mainstream media, 
especially if such a viewpoint runs against the national trade policies advocated 
by the government and the Monarch himself.  This also explains the minimal 
coverage of IPRs issues except from the pro-intellectual-property point of view.   
One of the main areas of global convergence for popular opposition to strict IP 
standards has been agricultural liberalization and traditional knowledge. This is 
not a prominent issue in Jordan, as it imports the majority of its grains and does 
not have any significant traditional knowledge.  A general lack of understanding 
of IP issues on the behalf of the legislators also helped push several changes to IP 
laws through the legislature, without much analysis or discussion, and has 
contributed to the lack of a point of view counter to the pro-IP camp views.  
Further, the laws for the WTO accession and the JUSFTA were passed under the 
executive authority of the King while the Parliament was dissolved, without 
much public debate or involvement.  Finally, the technical and financial support 
that the donor countries and the multi-national companies provide for pro-
intellectual-property Jordanian NGOs (e.g., JIPA) and Jordanian professional 
organizations (e.g., the JPMA) helps such entities to promote the pro-IP point of 
view to a credulous public. 
(b) Monitoring and Capacity Building  
Both monitoring and capacity building present a mutually supporting approach 
for influencing enforcement of IP standards.  They allow for the pressuring of 
individual countries on TRIPS implementation through monitoring, while at the 
same time influencing that implementation through the ideational and economic 
power of capacity building. 
In the case of Jordan, the broad spectrum of capacity development tools included 
legislative and policy advice, as when the patent and trademark laws were 
amended after the JUSFTA accession to incorporate references to the PCT and 
the Madrid protocol,753 training and technical development,754 and support for 
enforcement at the institutional level.755  Such programs, however, support a one-
size-fits-all solution and do not take into account Jordan’s stage of development 
as an indicator of the appropriate forms of IPRs protection.756  Overall, those 
                                                     
752 “Engineering Offices Protest Union’s Decision,” Alghad Daily Newspaper, September 12, 2007. 
753 See this thesis, Chapter 4, International vs. National Trademark and Patent Applications. 
754 See this thesis, Chapter 4, Figure titled IP Jordanian Trainees in Foreign Countries (2008) 
755 See this thesis, Chapter 4, The Customs Department.  
756 Alawamleh, “Interview”; Jarrar, “Interview.” 
 167 
programs focus on ‘best practices’ and aim to reorient Jordan’s legal and 
enforcement regime in line with TRIPS, when Jordan has no expertise or tradition 
in the IP field commensurate with the level of TRIPS sophistication.757  The best 
practices approach aiming to reorient Jordan’s legal and enforcement regime 
reflects a global model in the use of capacity development as a tool for political 
and ideological re-orientation, as the capacity development programmes 
emphasize standard solutions for enforcement and compliance, and with 
countries’ specific circumstances accorded weight only where this does not 
conflict with the “best practices”.758 
The US’ Special 301 Report process, which represents one of the most important 
examples of the use of monitoring to influence enforcement, is the EU’s “IP 
Enforcement” surveys.  Those surveys build on the EU Commissions’ “Strategy 
for the Enforcement of IPRs in Third Countries,”759 with the goal of setting out a 
list of priority countries in which the counterfeiting and piracy of IPRs remains a 
serious problem that should be the focus for future EU work.  This strategy, the 
EU Commission states, is not meant to “impose unilateral solutions” or to 
propose a “one-size-fits-all approach to promoting IPRs enforcement”;760 rather, 
it is intended to identify “a limited number of countries on which the efforts of 
the Commission in the framework of the present strategy should be 
concentrated”.  Another stated goal is to assure the meeting of the “very high 
standard of protection of IP (including the enforcement thereof)”,761 included in 
the numerous bilateral agreements established by the European Commission.  
The EU Commission then states, in a clear coupling of monitoring and capacity 
building, that, since most such agreements also include a clause allowing for 
technical cooperation in the area of IP, “those clauses must be carefully 
monitored and effectively implemented.”762 
In addition to the formal governmental monitoring discussed above, industry 
lobbyists and groups conduct and publish their own lists of rankings and reports, 
according to their sector-specific goals, which cover, for example, the 
pharmaceutical industry through PhRMA, the software industry through the BSA, 
and general IP protection through the IIPI.763  Their findings are greatly 
publicized and often find their way into the Special 301 Report. 
The WTO has its own monitoring approach through the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism (TPRM), which is intended to monitor the “adherence by all 
Members to rules, disciplines and commitments made under the Multilateral 
Trade Agreements and, where applicable, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements.”764  
Such monitoring is intended to occur through a Trade Policy Review Body 
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(TPRB), which “will subject the trade policies and practices of all Members to 
periodic review.”765   
For a TPRM meeting, the WTO member under review should provide written 
answers, by the beginning of the review meeting, to questions submitted at least 
two weeks before the meeting.  Questions posed subsequently should be 
answered, to the extent possible, before the start of the second session of the 
meeting.  For Jordan’s first TPRM, held 10-12 November 2008, the following 
delegations submitted questions in writing: Brazil; Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and 
Matsu (Chinese Taipei); Colombia; Argentina; Japan; the Republic of Korea; the 
US; and China. Written questions by Canada, the European Communities, and 
India were submitted after the two-week deadline.766   
Effectively, this review process increases the transparency for TRIPS 
implementation, placing further pressures on Jordan for stronger measures of 
enforcement.  Collectively, this process places an emphasis on compliance by 
giving other WTO members the opportunity to voice concerns on issues that they 
perceive as still lacking proper implementation or clarification, including the 
status of IP laws.  A significant portion of the questions in Jordan’s TPRM came 
from developing countries, such as Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, Korea, and 
India, but the most detailed questions came from the US, Canada, and the 
European Community.  For example, the US posed questions about the creation 
of an “IPRs entity” for enforcement about Jordan’s progress in increasing its 
courts’ specialization (especially their ability to try IP cases), and about the status 
of amendments to the Copyright, JISM, and Trademark Laws. 767  Questions 
posed by Canada included a request for more information on exclusions from 
patentability under Jordanian law, the compulsory licensing amendments of 
Jordanian Patent Law, and the Jordanian courts’ handling of cases covering 
“famous trademarks.”768   
Overall, therefore, the TPRM serves as an additional tool for scrutiny, which the 
developed countries seem to be adroitly using, thus making it harder for Jordan to 
conceal weaknesses in enforcement and compliance and forcing it to confront 
those issues in a global forum on a regular basis.  This process plays a role in 
shaping Jordan’s enforcement and compliance by keeping such issues at the 
forefront of Jordan’s review process. 
(c) Donor Funding 
Jordan’s excessive dependence on donor support is controversial because it may 
allow those donors to become exceedingly involved in policy decisions.  Jordan 
uses donor funds to maintain not only discretionary spending on projects 
supported by those donors, but also to support the national budget and thus the 
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overall national debt levels.769  Thus, donor funding has steadily grown to 
become a fixture in the annual budget preparation process in Jordan.770  Of 
course, this dependence makes Jordan susceptible to the agendas presented by 
donors in return for their largess.  It also seems to contravene research suggesting 
that donors need to recognize the political rationality behind cross-payments and 
spending to maintain important constituencies that political sustainability may 
require reform sequences that are out of step with current donor orthodoxy, and 
that outside actors need to refrain from intervening too directly in the political 
process by supporting particular interests.771 
While resource-poor MENA countries’ dependence on donor support is common, 
Jordan has been skilful in masking its dependence for many years behind figures 
of economic growth, such as the rise in GDP and national economic growth 
figures, which it claimed to show that it was not dependent on donor aid.  This 
concealment finally came to an abrupt end with the onset of the global economic 
crisis in 2008-2010.  The collapse of donor funding over the 2009-2010 period772 
was expected to cause the budget deficit in 2010 to go up to JD 1.105 billion 
($1.6 billion), or 8% of the GDP (up from 5.5% the previous year),773 and the 
national debt level to rise by 12.9% by the end of 2010, to JD 9.66 billion 
(compared to JD 8.55 billion in 2008), or 62% of the GDP.774  The collapse of the 
donor funding clarified the relationship between the levels of donor funding and 
the national fiscal policy in Jordan, as 50% of foreign grants in 2010 were used to 
support budgetary items.775  The high level of donor funding also provided 
support to the claims that such funding has been playing an important role in 
shaping national policies and strategies, including the enforcement and 
implementation of IP laws. 
Using donor aid to influence IPRs, however, is not a recent or accidental 
development, as the WTO itself called on developed countries to assist 
developing countries in their implementation of TRIPS.776  In Jordan’s case, the 
US, through its Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the USAID, was 
heavily involved in the provision of technical assistance in the area of IPRs.  The 
majority of the training courses in the field of IP for 2008 occurred in the US.777  
Overall, 150 trainees from Jordan attended courses in the US, compared to 30 
trainees who attended courses in the rest of the world.778  This is in line with the 
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US Government’s efforts to design its financed technical assistance to help put 
TRIPS-plus standards in place across a range of developing countries, including 
Jordan.  It is also in line with the interview feedback, which clearly pointed to a 
training agenda focused by the US and the EU on the provision of technical 
assistance in the areas of ‘best practices’ and enforcement with little or no focus 
on flexibilities.779  A new US foreign aid agency was created in February 2004 to 
administer the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) initiative. The MCA is 
intended to concentrate significantly higher amounts of US resources in a few 
low and low-middle income countries, including Jordan, that have demonstrated a 
strong commitment to political, economic, and social reforms. 
The agendas behind the technical assistance provided by developed countries, 
international organizations, and multi-national corporations have not gone 
unnoticed.  Such agendas were branded as biased towards compliance-oriented 
policies, which encourage the broadening of IPRs protections regardless of 
specific needs and circumstances.780  Critics have questioned the neutrality of 
international organizations like WIPO.  In some cases, the questioning went 
beyond the organization itself and even included the people in charge of the 
organization, as was the case with UPOV’s Secretary-General, who was targeted 
for the aggressive UPOV approach to promoting plant variety protection and for 
recruiting new members to the Convention, which Jordan joined on 24 September 
2004.781   
For Jordan, whatever takes the King’s shilling must do the King’s bidding.  Its 
dependency on foreign aid is forcing it to move in the same direction as its 
donors, toward tighter IP standards and an ever-expanding enforcement role for 
the governmental agencies.  Because of the national economic model that is not 
heavily dependent on foreign aid, one cannot seriously expect an objective 
governmental review of the realities of IP legislations and obligations in Jordan 
under those circumstances.  
(d) Levels of Adjustment, Technology Transfer & Societal Norms 
For Jordan, adjusting to the IP standards and their enforcement has been an 
accepted official target, as expressed by successive governments from its 
accession to the WTO in 2000 to the present time.  To that effect, the legal 
framework was modified and IP laws were amended or added to be in full 
compliance with the successive TRIPS and TRIPS-plus requirements.  In terms of 
adjusting the legal framework and codes, Jordan has been a leader in the region 
and indeed the world when compared to other developing countries. 
Along with the amendment of laws, Jordan also adjusted the enforcement 
mechanisms and tools for such laws, which has been an on-going process since 
its accession to the WTO.  There are currently multiple agencies with 
enforcement responsibilities of IPRs, including the MoIT, the National Library, 
the JISM, the Food and Drug Administration, the customs department, and the 
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Public Security Department.  Optimally, not all of those agencies should 
necessarily have a hand in the enforcement process, but their proliferation does 
reflect the influence of donor funding on the formulation of public policy, in the 
sense that technical assistance for them is provided through donor funding.  
Overall, Jordan has adapted sufficiently, albeit not optimally, to the need for 
adjustments at the legislative and the executive branches. 
The judicial branch presents a more ambivalent situation; it has not been a truly 
active participant in the evolution of IP, mainly because IP litigation, which is the 
main conduit for the judicial branch’s involvement in this area, is very weak and 
concentrated on trademark registration and infringement.  However, this has not 
exempted the courts from being subjected to donors’ efforts to create specialized 
IP courts. 
Levels of technology transfer, which are most common within industries that are 
technical in nature and undergo technological upgrades in order to become more 
competitive, are not very strong within Jordan.  This can be seen from reviewing 
Jordan’s exports, the majority of which are related to heavy industry and 
agriculture sectors, namely garments, vegetables, phosphate, pharmaceuticals, 
potash (fertilizers), and transportation equipment.782  None of these items falls 
within a technological or intellectual-property-sensitive area except for 
pharmaceuticals.  A similarly weak technologically component exists for Jordan’s 
imports, the majority of which are transportation equipment, crude oil, iron and 
steel, electrical machinery, raw material for the garment industry, and heavy 
equipment for industry and agriculture.783  Closer examination reveals not only 
that those sectors are technologically insensitive, but also that some of them, like 
the garment industry, offer minimal added value to the local economy.  The 
garment industry, which constitutes the majority of Jordan’s exports to the US, 
valued at $1 billion in 2008, relies on raw material that is 100% imported. Also, 
60% of its labour force is foreign,784  despite the fact that Jordan’s “official” 
unemployment rate for the past decade has been around 12-14%.785  Similarly the 
transportation equipment in the export column is mainly a re-exportation business 
to surrounding countries, especially Iraq, as Jordan does not manufacture or 
produce any transportation equipment.   
The one technologically sensitive sector of the Jordanian economy, the 
pharmaceutical sector, is focused on generic drugs.  Jordanian producers of 
generic drugs complain that there are issues with IPRs related to data exclusivity 
that deal with a lack of transparency in rights and obligations.786  A 2007 Oxfam 
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report further states that because of the TRIPS-plus provisions of the JUSFTA, 
many Jordanian pharmaceutical firms’ generic medicines are precluded from the 
market through an acceptance procedure called “data exclusivity”, through which 
drug regulatory agencies are prevented, for a period of 5 years, from using the 
clinical trial data developed by the originator company to establish the safety and 
efficacy of the medicine for market approval of a generic drug that had already 
been shown to be equivalent to the original one.787  Jordan’s FDI numbers are 
also not targeted towards technologically sensitive areas, as 90% of the increase 
in FDI growth between 2002 and 2009 came from Arab sources towards non-
technology related areas.788  
From an enforcement point of view, with its very low research and development 
levels and low patent application numbers, Jordan could not objectively argue for 
much economic benefit from higher patent protections.  Any further 
strengthening of patent protection or facilitation of obtaining patents in Jordan, as 
with the PCT process, will provide substantial benefits for international patent 
holders but negligible benefits for the Jordanian industries or economy.  The 
same can be said of other technology-related IP areas like the Integrated Circuits 
Law,789 an industry that is virtually non-existent in Jordan.  The societal norms 
within Jordan also present a significant challenge for the enforcement of any 
IPRs, especially in the areas of copyright.  The Jordanian society has historically 
relied on education as a social lever to propel individuals out of poverty and into 
the middle class, and it has higher enrolment in elementary, secondary and 
tertiary levels of education than the global average.790   
A relatively new (1992) law governs copyright in Jordan.791  Prior to that law, 
Jordan used the Ottoman-era copyright law, and the Supreme Administrative 
Court confirmed such usage in opinions.792  The older copyright law’s denial of 
any protection for copyrighted material that was not registered with the National 
Library was an acceptable compromise for Jordanian citizens, as intellectual 
works by local individuals had not played an important role in the cultural or 
educational development of the economy.  Material that would otherwise be 
considered copyrighted material, such as books and audio-visual works, were 
produced by non-Jordanians; thus, because they were not usually registered with 
the National Library, they were not offered protection under the older copyright 
law.  Conversely, the 1992 copyright law granted automatic copyright protection 
to any published work whether or not it was registered by the Jordanian National 
Library.793  In addition to expanding the level of protection granted to the author, 
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it clarified as exclusive to the author rights that were previously thought to also 
belong to publishers, editors and the public at large.794  (The duration of 
copyright protection granted under the law varies with the type of work protected, 
as discussed in Chapter 4). 
The 1992 law improving copyright protection, along with the concerns of the 
major donors, brought mostly Western standards for protection and significantly 
improved protection in areas mostly dominated by Western products, such as 
sound recordings, audio-visual products, and computer software.  Considering the 
lack of any local products or substitutes in those areas, as well as the lack of any 
alternative pricing scheme for original products in the local markets, those 
products were placed out of the reach of the vast majority of the local population.  
That helps to explain the proliferation of pirated audio-visual products and other 
copyrightable material.795 
Because copyright law is incompatible with Jordanian economic realities and 
Jordanian culture, which considers education rather than author’s rights to be 
paramount, it will continue to prove extremely difficult to enforce.  Significantly, 
the law’s value in improving creativity in Jordan is in doubt.  The Jordanian 
audio-visual industry, for example, which was a reasonably respectable industry 
in the late twentieth century, is on the verge of collapse, with the number of its 
productions greatly reduced.  This situation might not be directly related to IPRs, 
but it proves that the promises of increased copyright innovation with the 
enforcement of tighter copyright protections were unfounded.796  Similarly, 
Jordan’s levels of research and development are less than half a per cent of the 
GDP, and much of that amount is allocated to the military.797  Any enforcement 
activity in the copyright area will impact low-income citizens, operators of 
kiosks, and street vendors depending on such products for economic survival. 
Therefore, by virtue of its economic set-up as an importer and buyer of most of 
its key products and technologies, Jordan will continue to be restricted in its 
ability to benefit from IPRs.  If anything, higher IP standards under such a 
situation will increase the cost of imports, resulting in higher fees and processing 
costs in some sectors and further diminishing the establishment of domestic 
benefits of IPRs.  This is in direct conflict with the position espoused by donors 
and international corporations, who claim that stronger IPRs are an important 
factor of economic growth. 
(e) Policy Issues and Governmental Capacity 
For Jordan, national policy issues play a role in shaping IP enforcement and give 
domestic effect to international legal obligations.  Such policy issues are also 
influenced by factors like governmental capacity and coordination. 
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The local expertise in Jordan was, and to a certain extent continues to be, weak 
both in the governmental and the private sectors.  This problem is fostered by a 
deep lack of technical knowledge and policy experience of IP issues.  The lack of 
economic advancement, not in absolute numbers of FDI or GDP growth but 
rather in the creation and flourishing of technologically industries, continue to 
preclude substantial development of such expertise.  The implementation process 
for Jordan’s IP obligations was further hampered by the absence of a cohesive, 
long-term approach, especially since the accession and the implementation phase 
has seen the changing of several governmental cabinets.798   
The process of passing IP legislation as part of the adjustment process discussed 
earlier should have helped build the legislative capacity in that area, but in 
actuality it did not, as most of the amendments occurred while the Parliament was 
suspended and were later approved by the Parliament without much debate.799  
This process did not foster conditions for accountability, transparency or rule of 
law, all of which are key factors for the development of good governance and 
political sustainability.800  The overriding rationale for the adoption and 
implementation of IP standards was embedded in the social, economic, political 
and cultural relationship envisioned with the US in particular and the West in 
general.  In that sense, Jordan has not been notably different from other countries 
in the region, which exhibit similar dependence on those entities. 
The fragmentation of the entities responsible for various IP areas impeded the 
emergence of a strategic approach to the implementation of TRIPS based on a 
broad policy framework for development goals and policies.  For example, 
copyright is handled by the National Library and the Department of Press & 
Publications; industrial property is handled by the MoIT, with patent examination 
largely handled through WIPO; plant varieties are handled by the Ministry of 
Agriculture; and border measures are handled both by the customs department, 
which is within the Ministry of Finance, and the JISM, which is an independent 
governmental organization.  The process of organizing IP decision-making is still 
evolving, and the number of involved agencies is subject to increase, as the 
government is pondering the creation of a combined entity charged with all 
matters related to IP.801 
With IP technical expertise within the Jordanian governmental entities strongly 
influenced by the technical assistance, training, support, and other services 
provided by international donors, its positions on implementation of IP standards 
are vulnerable to the donors’ points of view.  The bulk of donor resources to 
Jordan in the IP area are channelled towards public campaigns or training to 
further enforcement activities rather than towards commercializing technology or 
inventions.  This shows that the donors are more interested in protecting their 
own IP interests than in introducing IPRs to promote innovation.  Further, the 
actual drafting of IP laws, which was influenced by the above dynamic, is not 
consistent with the economic and technological levels within Jordan, and the IP 
laws do not meet local economic interests.  All of the above perpetuates 
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ignorance towards them and makes the process of enforcement exceedingly 
difficult.  
A prime example of the disconnect between the IP laws and the realities in Jordan 
is the patent law, from which Jordan stands to benefit little, as it has not reached 
the required stage of development for developing significant, globally 
competitive innovations.  As Jordan is still in its early stages of industrial growth, 
its ability to mature in that regard is hampered by its inability to copy or imitate 
imported technologies.  This in turn counters the drive for innovation, because 
imitation can serve as a stepping-stone that enables firms in developing countries 
to innovate.802  Jordan should, therefore, not sign the PCT as a matter of policy, 
because it clearly does not have an economic incentive to do so and stands to gain 
very little from joining it. To do so would make international patents much more 
easily recognized under Jordanian law, further restricting the ability for local 
imitation.  Until Jordan develops a technological base, stronger patent protections 
will constitute a barrier for innovation and access to important technologies, 
which runs counter to the Jordanian communal value of putting the good of the 
community as a whole ahead of the interests of the individual. 
Jordan should also further refine its process for making trade policy.  Currently, 
there is no systematic process for gathering expert and stakeholder input, and 
consultations are generally restricted to export lobbies, such as the Jordan 
Chamber of Industry, the Jordan Chamber of Commerce, and the Amman 
Chamber of Commerce.  Such entities are mostly the only constituency equipped 
and organized to present views and recommendations.  Higher IP standards under 
TRIPS-plus were not a significant concern for the majority of the members of the 
market-access lobbies in Jordan, because they are not technologically sensitive 
exporters.   
7.10 Conclusion 
As a result of Jordan’s failure to show tangible economic benefits that have materialized from 
applying stricter IP standards, the efforts to convince the Jordanian public of the value of 
enforcement efforts will suffer a setback over the short to the medium term.  The Special 301 
Report’s political arm-twisting, which leads to coercion-based enforcement, will add to the sense 
of resentment and subjugation felt by developing countries, and the aggressive attempts to 
pressure compliance by such means are likely to backfire and produce little in the way of long-
term results.  Developed countries must understand that there will be little to gain from the 
continuous drive to ratchet up the levels of IP standards, when the economic promises made to 
justify the enforcement of those standards ring hollow. 
At the same time, it is important to understand the economic and international pressures exerted 
on Jordan, as such factors help to explain the drive for IP enforcement and TRIPS and TRIPS-
plus implementation.  In the case of Jordan, the weak national political dynamics in the area of IP 
have diminished Jordan’s ability to counter the influence of international pressures and have 
consequently undermined the coalescing of a national position on the adoption and enforcement 
of IP standards. 
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The difficulties associated with the enforcement of IP laws in Jordan stem from a disregard of the 
cultural, social, legal and economic norms in Jordan and how they differ from those in developed 
countries.  Until those norms are linked to IP laws, enforcement will continue to be exclusively 
associated with the threat of punitive measures by developed countries.  Such a link is also 
important to help IPRs deliver on the so far unfulfilled and exceedingly distant promise to boost 
innovation and creativity.   
The US has an unprecedented opportunity to use its stock of knowledge to further the 
development of other countries in the world.  With the vast knowledge within its borders, it 
should move to disseminate that knowledge and not succumb to the calls of multinationals to 
restrict its diffusion.  The US should adopt towards Jordan a position that considers knowledge to 
be part of a global intellectual commons, which, as the free software movement has shown, is not 
inconsistent with the development of business models.  The excessive use of TRIPS-plus 
standards in RBTs has contributed to the anti-development reputation of the US government, 
even as it seeks global support for its IP enforcement goals.   
In the pursuit of IP enforcement in Jordan, there are no easy solutions to the structural 
enforcement problems that have been discussed in this chapter.  The leading developed countries 
have essentially adopted the position that increasing the strength of IP systems is a means of 
engineering competitive advantage through regulation.  Jordan must recognize the disconnect that 
exists at various levels between its IP laws and its economic and developmental goals, and it must 
move in ways that will reconcile that disconnect.  Only then will enforcement be a meaningful 
and self-perpetuating activity, rather than one driven by foreign coercion and local half-measures. 
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8. CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis analysed the IP laws in Jordan, examined the problems and difficulties underlying 
their enforcement, and made policy recommendations in that regard. It argues that IP laws fail to 
be fully enforced in Jordan because they do not fit with Jordan’s culture and level of economic 
development and therefore are unable to advance the economic interests of the Jordanian people.  
The claims of the developed countries that IPRs protections will aid and support the economic 
development of the developing countries do not withstand closer scrutiny in the case of Jordan.  
The same arguments fail to acknowledge the need for national recognition of interests as an 
evolutionary, historically contingent context for IPRs development and enforcement, as opposed 
to the TRIPS universal approach that is presented ahistorically.  The Jordanian national policies 
regarding IP were not developed in parallel with wider social development dynamics.  Jordan’s 
current stage of development indicates that the commercial interests of Jordanians are in free 
access to IPRs to enable them to develop their industrial and service sectors without the 
restrictions of license requirements and payments.  This approach is not much different from that 
taken by developing countries themselves in the era before they achieved high levels of industrial 
development and started proclaiming the reification of IPRs.   
This thesis attempted to reframe the debate on the enforcement of IPRs within the commercial 
and capitalist interests of the parties involved (developing countries, in this case Jordan, and 
developed countries), rather than as the infringement of a reified natural right.  That reframing 
helps locates the IPRs issue within the political domain, makes it accessible to the calculus of cost 
and benefit analysis, and makes it a national issue.  The thesis examined the historical and 
theoretical framework for IPRs development and analysed the legal and socioeconomic issues to 
underline the failure of the current IPRs system in Jordan to deliver the promised economic 
development.  It argues against any further involvement in any RBTs involving IPRs and against 
the narrow interpretation of the current bilateral agreements entered into by Jordan in ways that 
will create further enforcement responsibilities on the Jordanian public and private sectors.  It 
concluded that any such bilateral agreements presented little if any value for the added 
harmonization and enforcement burdens they impose; therefore, they should be rejected, as the 
proposed trade-offs with the ability to formulate national policies are not commensurately 
meaningful.   
Since the start of the IMF’s Jordan Support Program in 1989, many laws have been amended and 
introduced to promote the economic policies that supported the attraction of foreign investment 
and to promote open trade.  The fact that such policies were the result of a foreign formulation 
meant that they ran the risk of ignoring the long-term real interests and needs of the Jordanian 
people in order to meet the more immediate interests of lenders and foreign investors.  IP laws 
were one of the main areas affected by that process. 
Historically, TRIPS was dominated by developed countries that included their proposal for 
TRIPS in the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) as a means to regulate IP protection within the GATT 
rules.  As such, TRIPS represent one view of IPRs that came to be marketed by developed 
countries as the only acceptable form, which counters the process by which IPRs were developed 
and formulated at various national levels throughout the history of IP.  Jordan was not a party to 
TRIPS negotiations, as it was not yet a member of the WTO, and its acceptance of TRIPS as a 
fait accompli within the WTO accession process, as opposed to a debated and properly negotiated 
agreement, partially explains the failure of the WTO membership to positively impact IP 
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enforcement and implementation in Jordan.  It also marked Jordan’s sliding from its centrist 
approach to IP regulation and enforcement, which balanced the public and private interests, to the 
more monopolistic end of the IP enforcement spectrum, where right holders are given precedent 
over public interest.  Other factors contributing to TRIPS ineffectiveness include its non-
compatibility within Jordanian cultural norms and the low level of industrial development in 
Jordan.   
Historically and culturally, the Jordanian society is anchored to traditional communal values that 
favour collective effort and knowledge over individual ownership and monopoly.  These values 
were sustained by the agrarian nature of the Jordanian society for the majority of the twentieth 
century. Jordan’s religious background also supports such a position as reflected in the absence of 
any developed sense of IPRs during the history of the Islamic state, which lasted until the fall of 
the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I.  Developed and sophisticated IP concepts, 
therefore, did not originate within the Jordanian society; rather, these concepts were introduced 
by interaction with developed countries through colonialism.  This is still true today, mainly 
because the economic pressures from developed countries (Jordan’s major lenders) and from 
international financial institutions like the IMF require law reform and subsequent enforcement of 
IP laws. 
The first Jordanian patent law No. 22 (1953) provided for process patents but did not allow for 
product patents.803  It further allowed for a 16-year protection period, which would not be 
extended in the event of any modifications or amendments made to the original patent.804 While 
the law allowed the patent registrar at the MoIT to approve a patent, it placed the responsibility 
for the veracity of the patent’s information on the applicant rather than the registrar,805 effectively 
ensuring that Jordan never developed patent examination expertise.  A new Patent Law granting 
20 years of protection was enacted in 1999, incorporating TRIPS-consistent standards into its 
language.806  The language of the 1999 law presented a significant departure from the language in 
the previous law; it clarified the criteria for awarding a patent, listed areas outside patentability 
domain, detailed the rights and obligations of a patent holder, and outlined some specific 
sanctions that can be requested by a patent holder in the event of a patent infringement. The law 
was amended twice, in 2001 and 2007, to reflect other concepts and to put it in line with Jordan’s 
obligations and international best practices.   
Under the new patent law, product patents were allowed, an examination process was required, 
and several ways to extend the life of a patent were provided, including marketing exclusivity 
periods for data protection.  The law puts forth the following patentability conditions that must be 
met for a patent to be issued: novelty, non-disclosure, non-obviousness, and industrial utility.807  
These requirements restrict the universe of what can be patented under Jordanian law.  The new 
patent law was modelled after similar laws in developed countries; thus, it was not suitable for a 
country with a virtually non-existent patent law practice and whose patent examination duties 
were delegated to the WIPO. 
By expanding the terms of the patentability and enlarging the sphere of patent protection, the 
patent law of 1999 drastically limited imitation and therefore failed to address the needs of the 
Jordanian people for technological and innovation incentives.  This is shown by the patent 
ownership numbers in Jordan, which are predominantly foreign-based, and by the negligible rate 
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of technology transfer.  Up till mid-2010, around 80% of patents granted were for foreign holders, 
and 87% of the patent applications were by foreigners.808  The patent law of 1999 also failed to 
encourage foreign companies to transfer their technologies to their Jordanian counterparts, 
although those foreign companies had benefited from the protections granted to them under the 
Patent Law.  The net result so far is that Jordanian industry is not benefiting from any significant 
levels of technology transfer, is still dependent on importing technology products, and must pay 
high prices for those products. 
The area of trademark law, on the other hand, occupies a more significant place in the Jordanian 
IP jurisprudence, mainly because the law regulating it has been successful in establishing 
trademarks as a legitimate field of commercial enterprise.809  Additionally, there is a general 
acceptance of the notion that trademarks protect the communal public interest by distinguishing 
reputable brands, ultimately resulting in the protection of the Jordanian public from misleading 
counterfeit goods, as well as the protection of trademark owners who act in good faith.  
Trademarks are traditionally acceptable forms of denoting quality, which the public expects the 
government to regulate and protect as part of its official duty to protect private property.  By 
comparison, copyrights and patents, themselves, were traditionally and culturally regarded as 
public property; and the notion of giving private rights precedence over public rights in those two 
areas does not fit with the traditional view of the Jordanian public.  As a result, trademark law 
became relatively well developed in Jordan, as courts played a role both in its interpretation and 
in establishing certain tests in areas that were mentioned, but not clearly expounded upon, by the 
law.  Trademark law, therefore, served the goals of the Jordanian culture and fulfilled the interests 
of the Jordanian people, both as consumers and as trademark owners acting in good faith.  
The amendments made to the trademark law in preparation for accession to the WTO, however, 
provided protections for registered marks and prohibited the registration in Jordan of foreign-
registered trademarks by someone other than the holder of the foreign mark, either for the same 
type of goods or services, or for goods and services other than those with which the famous mark 
is associated if such registration can cause public confusion or defamation to the famous foreign 
mark.810  Famous marks have another advantage in Jordan; they do not need to prove that their 
foreign registration predates the registration requirement in Jordan by someone other than the 
famous mark owner.  By implication, famous foreign-registered marks can obtain registration in 
Jordan even if their application is contested by a similar non-registered mark in Jordan.  
However, this considerable protection to famous marks did not translate into those further 
investment by the mark holders in their Jordanian production facilitates, particularly the QIZs, as 
workers within those areas continue to be among the lowest paid in Jordan, in addition to having 
foreign, rather than local, labour constitute the majority of their workforce. 
Copyright had been a neglected area of Jordanian law until the enactment of the 1992 copyright 
law.811  Previously, Jordan had used the Ottoman-era copyright law, which was not only 
antiquated in its coverage of published works but also did not cover whole areas of copyrightable 
material like audio-visual products.  The 1992 copyright law addressed those issues but fell short 
of international standards; thus, in cooperation with the WIPO, Jordan amended the law in 1998 
and 1999 to bring it in line with the requirements of accession to the World Trade 
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Organization.812  One of the most significant changes brought about by the 1998 and 1999 
amendments was the automatic grant of copyright protection to any published work, whether or 
not it was registered by the Jordanian National Library.813  This did not impact the enforcement 
environment, where the general public, as well as enforcement authorities, were unfamiliar with 
the concept of copyright, as they were and continue to be influenced by cultural values that have 
placed the written word within the public domain for millennia.  Under those values, piracy was 
not considered a crime unless it injured the public interest; otherwise, it was considered a tool to 
help further education and cultural advancement, both considered noble goals by the Jordanian 
society.  This view was historically supported by the fact that the vast majority of intellectual 
works available to the Jordanian public were not of Jordanian origin, but rather were produced in 
neighbouring countries and, as transportation advanced, in the rest of the world.  Under those 
circumstances, considering the limited financial resources of the majority of the Jordanian public, 
strict adherence to copyright laws would cut the supply of intellectual works to Jordanians and 
effectively place them in a time capsule, unable to benefit from recent developments. 
8.2 Findings 
Copyright, is very difficult to enforce in Jordan, because it is not compatible with Jordan’s values, 
culture, or level of development.  The levels of creativity, innovation, and production of 
intellectual works have not been significantly enhanced by the current copyright law; in fact, 
Jordanian audio-visual production has nearly collapsed since the law’s enactment. 
Overall, the ratification of TRIPS and the subsequent JUSFTA and JEUAA agreements have 
resulted in a significant shift in favour of private over public interests; these agreements have 
gone a long way towards establishing a debate about the enforcement of IPRs within the realm of 
the enforcement of universal and natural rights, while producing few economic benefits and fewer 
legitimate mechanisms for balancing competing interests.  Thus, these agreements have produced 
losers before producing winners and have failed to formulate a mechanism for the compensation 
of those losers. 
TRIPS and the changes it effectuated to the Jordanian IP laws have yet to produce tangible results 
in the areas of enhanced innovation, creativity, foreign investment, and economic growth.  As a 
result, the Jordanian public are realizing that they stand to gain little from attempts to assure 
stronger compliance with TRIPS.  Those findings apply to the TRIPS-plus standards incorporated 
in the JUSFTA and the JEUAA, as well as to Jordan’s adoption of IP standards in areas where it 
clearly has no existing industrial base (e.g., integrated circuits and protection of plant varieties).  
The very nature of the current IPRs enforcement model, which is based on coercion, is stocking 
the fires of rejection against increased IPRs enforcement.  Increasingly, current IPRs enforcement 
model is seen as a tool of foreign intervention and bullying by foreign corporations and 
governments.  
As Jordan struggles through the consequences of the global economic downturn, stricter 
enforcement of IP laws brings with it potential economic costs to both the government and the 
Jordanian people.  These costs can have destabilizing consequences on the social fabric and the 
governmental budget.  The public’s daily encounters with the impact of unemployment,814 long 
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waiting lines for public medical services, reduced access to medicine,815 increased costs of 
goods,816 and rising inflation,817 along with the added cost of doing business, leave the average 
citizen with little alternative to pirated and counterfeit products sold by people who have no other 
source of income than that derived from selling them. 
8.3 Recommended Policies for Implementing IP Laws  
A number of policy recommendations for the implementation of IP laws in Jordan result from the 
findings of this thesis. 
Current IP laws are not in sync with Jordan’s economic development levels or its existing societal 
and cultural norms.  The laws, therefore, cannot be justified, as they don’t help to meet the needs 
of the Jordanian people.  Until that obstacle is surmounted, the public will continue to ignore 
those laws and consequently eschew their enforcement, as it continues to view them as irrelevant 
to its daily life and even detrimental to its welfare.818 
The current set-up of patent law provides little benefit for the Jordanian people, as Jordan’s 
industry, universities, and institutions have a low level of research and development and 
innovation.  Consequently, they produce few if any patents or discoveries with global competitive 
value.  At its current early stage of industrial growth, Jordan has no use for a sophisticated patent 
system that will hamper imitation levels necessary to spur innovation and development by the 
local industries and research facilities.  This is especially true considering the patent law’s failure 
to boost the transfer of technology into Jordanian industries.  Had such a boost occurred it would 
have otherwise allowed Jordanians to gain access to advanced technology.  The current patent 
law, with its strengthening of the patent system, prohibits imitation and consequently reduces the 
chances for innovation, leaving little room for the Jordanian public to perceive patent law as 
meaningfully connected to its everyday needs and thus negatively impacting the public’s 
involvement in any enforcement effort. 
The current patent law, with its restrictions on the marketing of generic pharmaceuticals if similar 
brand-name drug is presented for marketing in Jordan, negatively impacts the welfare of the 
Jordanian public by increasing the prices of medications.  The exclusivity period for brand-name 
drugs grants up to five years of protection, even if they don’t have a Jordanian patent.  This goes 
against the societal norms of the Jordanian public, which views medical treatment above the 
narrow calculus of profit and loss.  The current patent law must be reviewed with an eye towards 
those issues whereby it would benefit the Jordanian public.  Until this matter is adequately 
addressed, Jordan should not consider joining the PCT. 
The 1952 trademark law managed to establish a solid base of practical and judicial treatment and 
awareness.  It established and emphasized concepts that were tangible and useful to the general 
public – associating value and quality with certain names and products established and existing in 
Jordan, employing Jordanians, providing added value to the local economy, and providing 
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impetus to the cycle of the capital movement.  The amendments to the trademark law provided 
protection to known trademarks even if they were not registered in Jordan.  This gave them the 
same protection as those marks that are active participants in the local economy, which could be 
perceived by the Jordanian public as unfair treatment, as it grants known trademarks rights 
similar to those granted under the Madrid Protocol, even though Jordan is not a party to it.   
Given the relative sophistication of the trademark review and registration process in Jordan, as 
well as the Jordanian courts’ familiarity with issues on trademark law as a result of its handling 
such claims for decades, Jordan should consider joining the Madrid Protocol on trademarks.  This 
step would give the local trademark owners a mechanism to obtain ‘international registration’ for 
their trademark from the WIPO.  Local trademarks will have a level playing field in terms of 
rights granted to known trademarks under the Jordanian trademark law. 
Copyright issues have real practical significance in Jordan because there is a fairly developed 
shadow economy based on counterfeit copyright materials.  Traditionally, copyright was never 
acknowledged by the Jordanian society at the same level as in developed countries; as a result, 
copyright law drastically conflicts with the Jordanian societal and social realities.  The traditional 
view of copyright emphasizes attribution of used sources, whereas the view advocated by the 
current copyright law emphasizes the need for monetary compensation in return for use.  
Traditionally, given the humble economic realities of most of the population, copying was not 
seen as an issue in Jordan, as it contributed to the acquisition of knowledge.  By contrast, the 
current law demands payment for the copyrighted material.  To be enforceable, the copyright law 
must reflect the social and economic realities of the Jordanian society, and it must provide 
economic alternatives to the interests of people who are financially dependent on what the current 
copyright law considers illegal commercial behaviour.  Such alternatives might be in the form of 
reduced pricing schemes to accommodate Jordanian realities. 
The chequered record for the implementation and enforcement of IP laws in Jordan should sound 
alarm bells for their review.  The various attempts by the developed countries and other 
international organizations to promote strict enforcement of high standards of IP laws through a 
coercion model that is based on framing, monitoring, capacity building, and donor funding is 
destined to prove ineffectual.  Focus, instead, should be on the social realities and cultural values 
in Jordan and other developing countries, which in turn will determine what types of IP laws 
those societies should implement.  Input from the general public, which was excluded from the 
process that produced the existing IPRs, must be solicited.  This integrated approach will prove 
more effective than the punitive ad hoc approach in securing enforcement of IPRs in Jordan.  In 
time, such an approach and the resulting laws may actually have a positive impact on the 
development and welfare of the local economy and consequently result in an enforcement model 
that is not coercion-based. 
8.4 Recommended Approaches to Future Research 
This thesis identifies several points that can be used to guide further research in the IP area for the 
Middle East.  It does so by identifying several central research areas that can serve as a road map 
for scholars.  The areas outlined below draw the attention of legal scholars to outstanding 
questions and gaps in the existing IP literature that can be used as a template to create future 
research objectives for other Arab countries as well. Future research should: 
1. Examine the notions that true and proper enforcement should not be confused with 
amendments in local laws and policies and that direct pressure to adopt IP laws from 
developing countries may lead to little change in enforcement behaviour.  
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2. Address the question of whether there is good reason to assume that country-specific 
knowledge and information is likely to lead to a different set of policies, thereby 
rendering a one-size fits all IP approach similar to TRIPS ineffective.  
3. Focus on the contextualisation of RBTs, such as the JUSFTA and the JEUAA, in order to 
examine expectations and obligations and to determine which, if any, of the RBTs’ 
objectives were reached.  
4. Extend IP analysis to areas beyond access to medicines, which has been its main focus 
thus far.  
5. Focus on examining whether technical assistance provided to patent offices has been 
geared towards the US and EU’s best enforcement practices at the expense of exploring 
flexibilities available under TRIPS and RBTs.  
6. Address the question of whether US and EU patent systems are functionally unfit for 
developing countries because both systems are built around allowing litigation to correct 
for errors in patent examination and granting, whereas developing countries generally do 
not have robust patent prosecution or litigation practices.  
7. Focus on developing a sound economic basis for IP analysis, because all the benefits 
promised by TRIPS and RBTs are based on economic factors.  To be relevant and 
meaningful, economic analysis should focus on country-specific research to establish 
direct correlations, and focus less so on works of a more general nature. 
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9.6 Annex 6: Instructions Governing Border Measures for IP Protection, No. 7 (2000). 
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9.7 Annex 7: Interview Notes 
 
1. Yousef Gurefat – Captain, Jordanian Customs, Department of Intellectual Property 
Protection (20 July 2009) (0799067790) 
• Notes not available. 
• A follow up letter requesting official data answered on 29 July 2009, by letter No. 
104/4/8/45549.  See Annex 1. 
2. National Library request 
• Request letter not available. 
• NL provided bulleted answers.  See Annex 2. 
3. Public Security Department request 
• Request letter not available. 
• PSD provided printed presentation.  See Annex 3. 
4. Laila Jarrar – Drug Directorate Director(2006-2011) at the Jordan Food and Drug 
Administration (26 July 2011)  
• The JFDA follows the Drug and Pharmacy Law, which requires the registration 
of any drug with the JFDA before it can enter into Jordan. 
• The JFDA does not allow any generic drug covered by an already issued data 
protection order to enter Jordan. 
• A data protection order is valid for five years and allows for the exclusion from 
the market of generic drugs with similar formulation. 
• The JFDA has no linkage to patent prosecution at the Ministry of Industry & 
Trade, or any ensuing patent litigation initiated by a private party. 
• Even though there are generic equivalents to brand name drugs on the Jordanian 
markets, the prices for the generic drugs can still be high because the generic 
manufacturer is allowed to price the generic drug up to 80% of the price of the 
brand name drug.   
• The US embassy sponsors activities focused on counterfeit products and how to 
deal with them within the context of the existing Jordanian laws. 
• The U.S. FDA has provided training courses for Jordanian employees of the 
JFDA on registration of drugs and related regulatory activities. 
• The pharmaceutical sector as a whole has seen minimal technology transfer, and 
still has no research and development base. 
• The Jordanian pharmaceutical companies (i.e. those registered in Jordan) have 
limited market entry into developed countries markets. Hikma is still considered a 
Jordanian based company, registered at the Ministry of Industry & 
Trade employing 6100 employee most of whom are Jordanians.  
• The traditional markets for Jordanian pharmaceuticals were the regional and other 
developing countries.  Some of those countries, most notably Saudi Arabia, are 
developing their own pharmaceutical industry and are working towards a model 
that is less dependent on imports. 
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5. Hanan Sboul –Secretary General of the Jordanian Association of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers (26 July 2011) (0795504878) 
 
• The JAPM is an umbrella organization for pharmaceutical manufacturers in 
Jordan with 17 members. 
• The pharmaceutical sector does not benefit from free trade agreements that aim to 
reduce the customs on drugs, because drugs are usually not heavily taxed by 
customs. 
• Jordan did not prepare any study or assessment before joining the WTO or the 
Jordan U.S. FTA exploring the full benefits and drawbacks of such agreements. 
• The WTO and the JUSFTA agreements did not have an impact on the technology 
transfer to pharmaceutical manufacturers in Jordan.  The limited level of 
technology transfer before and after the WTO and the JUSFTA is independent of 
those agreements. 
• JPMA did provide input to the Jordanian government ahead of the WTO 
accession on the negative impact such a decision will have on the pharmaceutical 
industry, but the final decision did not take such input into account.  Suspect that 
other political and economic factors were considered. 
• The potential involvement of Jordan in ACTA is harmful to the pharmaceutical 
industry because ACTA mixes IP infringement with counterfeit medicine, and 
customs officials cannot determine counterfeit pharmaceuticals on their own. 
• The Customs law amendment advocated by the USTR are not in line Jordan’s 
commitments under the WTO or the JUSFTA, and are not reasonable because 
they attempt to place the responsibility of private enforcement on the Jordanian 
government. 
• Agrees that the positions advocated by USAID through various publications, 
especially those by Michael Ryan, are general and lack any specificity to counter 
the detailed criticism levelled against WTO and JUSFTA agreements by other 
organizations like Oxfam. 
6. Imad Uqlah – First Lieutenant, Jordanian Customs, Department of Intellectual Property 
Protection (28 July 2011 & 4 August 2011) (0797711064) 
• The Customs Department has forwarded to the Prime Minister’s office the 
suggested amendments to the Customs law, and in particular to article 41.  The 
suggested amendments will allow the Customs officials to determine on their 
own whether a product is counterfeit or not, proceed to not cleat the cargo, and 
then to destroy it. 
• Mr. Uglah believes that the proposed amendments are suitable, despite the 
opposition presented against them, and should be the de-facto position.  When 
asked how he developed that position he mentioned attending several workshops 
and training sessions discussing that position.  Asked about who organized those 
sessions, he mentioned the Government of Jordan, USAID, and other 
international organizations he does not remember.  Instructors in all the sessions 
were foreigners, he said.  
• Under the current customs law, customs officials will, if they suspect of the 
goods bearing a counterfeit trademark, notify the official agent of the original 
trademark in Jordan, as listed with the Ministry of Industry and Trade.  The 
official agent has, as per samples sent by the customs department from the 
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confiscated goods, to decide if the goods are indeed counterfeit, and if so to 
decide file a court claim demanding the destruction or the exportation of the 
goods.  The window for filing the legal claim is eight days.  The Customs 
department does not have the legal mandate to do either.  The JISM takes over 
from that point forward. 
• If the agent does not respond within the eight days window, the customs proceed 
to lift the restrictions on the goods, and are allowed entry if they meet the relevant 
Jordanian standard.  Otherwise, the goods are re-exported. 
• Discussed the Instructions Governing IP Protection at the Borders No.7 (2000). 
• The Customs barley has enough resources to carry out its mandate under the 
current law.  He does not see how the Customs will be able to also take over the 
responsibility of (i) determining on its own whether a good is counterfeit and (ii) 
initiating legal action against the importer if the legal agent chooses not to. 
7. Mohammed Jabali – Captain, Jordanian Customs, Department of Intellectual Property 
Protection (4 August 2011)  
• Refused to share a copy of the proposed amendment to article 41 of the Customs’ 
Law, and referred me to the department of legal affairs. 
• Provided the following data: 
• Number of letters sent to commercial agents indicating that Customs 
temporarily holds suspected counterfeit goods and giving the agent 8 
days to file a legal action.  He sees an increasing trend for 2011. 
Year Number of Letters 
2009 320 
2010 360 
 
• Number of cases filed as a result of the letters to legal agents 
Year Number of cases 
2007 145 
2008 109 
2009 87 
2010 96 
• His opinion as to why 320 and 360 letters to official agents in 2009 and 2010, 
respectively, resulted in only 87 and 96 cases filed, is that the official agent will 
not take action if the quantities in question are deemed commercially 
insignificant, which differs from one agent to the other.  In other cases the 
commercial agent, happened to be a regional agent as well, and simply expressed 
lack of interest in the Jordanian market. 
8. Wasfi Tawahiah – First Lieutenant, Jordanian Customs, Legal Affairs (4 August 2011)  
• Refused to share a copy of the proposed amendment to article 41 of the Customs’ 
Law, but indicated that the amendment recommends giving Customs to initiate 
legal action against the importer even if the commercial agent declines to do so 
within 8 days from receiving a letter from the Customs that suspected counterfeit 
goods are temporarily held. 
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• Indicated that Customs and the Ministry of Industry & Trade are holding meeting 
on the ACTA meetings but provided no other information. 
• The impression was that the Custom’s legal department considers its role, as an 
implementer of what the donor countries think is the appropriate amendments to 
existing laws.  The Customs does not have any role in formulating enforcement 
policy. 
• He acknowledges that the proposed amendments will place additional 
requirements on Customs, which it is not ready or even capable to carry.  
9. Dr. Lina Haddad – Head of Patent Office, Ministry of Industry & Trade (31 July 2011) 
• The patent office is in charge of examining all patent applications for a Jordanian 
patent.  It comprises of four examiners, with technical training in pharmacy and 
engineering. 
• Patent applications are examined on the merits based on the patent being novel, 
non-obvious, and have industrial application. 
• The filings with the patent office are categorized under two broad groups: first 
time filings and non-first time filings.  Under the later, the patent application can 
have priority, if filed within 12 months of the earliest patent application, or can be 
without priority if filed in Jordan past the 12 months mark.  First time filings are 
processed internally, and the WIPO service for patent examination is used when 
the existing four examiners cannot review the patent. 
• In order for a patent application to qualify for the WIPO review it must meet 
minimum proper drafting standards, which results in patent applications not 
meeting such a standard to be asked to modify the drafting to become suitable, or 
be rejected.  There are no available statistics on the percentage of patents 
examined by the four examiners, and those by the WIPO. 
• The number of foreign filings decreased since 2008, which the patent office 
thinks is a result of the economic crisis. 
• Local filings are not as much affected by the world economic situation, rather by 
the general mood and economic trends in Jordan.  The adverse economic 
situation in Jordan seems to have resulted in reduced patent filings. 
• Local filings are characterized by low quality in drafting, and limited industrial 
application, which makes them of limited or no use.  The patent office has not 
seen much of an effect of a technology transfer factor in the quality of filed 
patents. 
• There is no patent attorney practice in Jordan, and potential inventors draft their 
own claims and applications, which perpetuates the problem of low quality 
drafting. 
• Jordanian culture of applying for patents for the sake of self-aggrandizement, 
without much concern for the quality of the patent itself, reinforces trend in poor 
local patents filed. 
• There is a perception that the current IPRs system is non-negotiable and Jordan 
has no option but to comply with its demands. 
10. Zain Alawamleh – Assistant Director for International Agreements, Department of 
Industrial Property, Ministry of Industry & Trade (2 August 2011) 
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• The senior levels of decision makers have a weak understanding of the 
enforcement and compliance aspects of TRIPS and the JUSFTA.  The same 
applies to legal branch – prosecutors and judges. 
• The level of compliance and enforcement is not based on a specific strategy, 
rather is manager-dependent and fluctuates accordingly. 
• There is still a minimal understanding of the scope of IP commitments under 
WTO and JUSFTA agreements. 
• I asked for data on  
• how many training seminars, workshops, and conferences did the 
members of the department attend?  
• in which countries were they held?  
• which organizations sponsored them?  
• what were the areas and topics covered?  
but was given a verbal answer only to the effect that 2-3 workshops and expert 
visits are conducted each year, which are conducted by WIPO, WTO, USAID, 
and TAIEX (an EU funded donor program) 
• The content of the seminars and training held is dependent on the level of 
attendees, which so far has been more of the beginner to intermediary type, and is 
mainly on the best practices in developed countries. 
• Most of the flexibilities under TRIPS are pre-empted by the legal requirements 
under JUSFTA and the JEUAA. 
• The amendments to Jordanian IP laws were translated into Arabic and not the 
result of a collective and deliberative local process that took into account 
Jordanian needs and particularities.  Some laws like the Geographical Indicators 
and the Integrated Circuits laws were entirely translated. 
• Foreign aid and cash transfers were linked by donors to passing of new IP laws 
such as the Geographical Indicators and the Integrated Circuits laws, and the 
amendment of existing ones, like trademark and copyright laws. 
• Many factors contribute to the modest level of capacity development at the 
departmental level, which include the language barrier, budgetary constraints and 
high employee turnover.  The same factors are limiting the role of the Department 
in the education of the Jordanian decision makers. 
• Jordan is working towards meeting its obligations under the various agreements, 
and is planning to complete the Instructions for the accession to the PCT and the 
Madrid protocol by 2012-2013. 
• There are no Jordanian specific indicators (e.g. reaching a certain GDP per capita, 
achieving a certain added value for all existing industries, or attaining a certain 
level of technology transfer) for the timeline on joining the PCT or the Madrid 
protocol, or on tailoring the level of enforcement of existing laws. 
• The attempt to create an independent IP agency that focuses on registration and 
policy issues did not materialize. 
• Amending the laws of Jordan is the price Jordan has to pay in order for it to 
continue to receive aid and financial assistance from western countries. 
11. Halim Abu Rahmeh – CEO, Jordan Exporters Association (7/8/2011) 
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• Jordanian industry has not benefitted from opening up of the US market, because 
of its inability, with few exceptions, to develop competitive products and invest 
in marketing and development. 
• JEA does not produce any data or statistics. 
• The Jordan Chamber of Industry is not playing any role in expanding the 
potential markets for Jordanian manufacturers, and the JEA is trying to work 
against that but it lacks the financial resources. 
• From the JEA point of view the WTO membership and the JUSFTA have not 
been important in opening new markets for Jordanian products.  Part of that 
problem is caused by the Jordanian manufacturer’s inability to develop its 
products (low quality, no R&D, focus on local market only), and the negligible 
technology transfer to the Jordanian manufacturing sector is another culprit. 
• Industries that were established to benefit from the JUSFTA (e.g. Garment 
industry) do not provide any added value to the economy as they use 
predominantly foreign labour, and all their raw materials are imported.  Also, 
they have an exemption from the already low minimum wage. 
12. Yaseen Khayyat – Director General, Jordan Institute for Standards & Metrology 
(7/8/2011) 
• Jordan does not have a technical specification for everything.  When a product is 
imported, which does not have a technical specification the JISM relies on a 
certificate from an accredited lab in the country of origin. 
• Customs is a fee-collecting agency with no technical expertise in the area of 
identifying counterfeit products.  The proposed amendments to article 41 should 
not be passed. 
• The proposed amendments to the JISM law will allow it to (i) conduct market 
surveys for counterfeit products and charge the merchant for the testing costs if 
the tested goods turned out to be a counterfeit and (ii) confiscate counterfeit 
trademarks. 
• JISM benefitted from training by the US by sending 10 employees to attend 
training courses paid for by the USG.  The 10 employees trained other employees 
upon their return. 
• Amending the laws of Jordan is the price Jordan has to pay in order for it to 
continue to receive aid and financial assistance from western countries.  As far as 
the JISM is concerned that is a price worth paying as it does not cost the JISM 
anything to conform with the requirements and demands for amending the laws, 
but in return it is getting valuable resources and support, which the GoJ is not 
financially capable of providing. 
• JISM is working from a global economy perspective but the Jordanian industries 
are still focus on a national and regional outlook.  The CEO of the Jordan 
Chamber of Industry told him he is not interested in Europe and the US markets. 
13. Rula Madanat – Assistant Director General for Technical Affairs, Jordan Institute for 
Standards & Metrology, (9/8/2011) (Advisor to the Jordanian delegation on accession to 
the WTO.  Member of the Jordanian delegation to the JUSFTA negotiations) 
• The WTO accession was started on a take-it or leave it basis, but the Jordanian 
negotiator make concessions when possible (e.g. stop using ‘expiration date’ on 
food products and instead use ‘best before’, which date to be determined by 
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manufacturer) and rejected compromises when needed (e.g. reduction of taxes on 
cigarettes and alcohol, and liberating the prices of the dairy market). 
• Does not think that the bargain of joining the WTO and JUSFTA (open markets, 
increased FDI, and technology transfer) materialized. 
• During the JUSFTA negotiations phase, Jordan followed an approach to not raise 
an issue unless raised by the US side.  The purpose being to avoid unnecessary 
battles, but it also meant that IP section was not fully addressed. 
• The drive for the JUSFTA was driven by predominantly political (desire to strike 
an FTA with the US before other countries and to show Jordan’s ability to partner 
with the world’s largest market) and not economic reasons. 
• A Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for Conformity Assessment 
Procedures did not precede the JUSFTA, nor was such an agreement negotiated 
along with the JUSFTA.  When Jordan requested entering into such an agreement 
after the conclusion of the JUSFTA, its request was declined. 
• The absence of the MRA is a key impediment to the entry to US market for 
Jordanian goods, because conformity assessment certificates issued in Jordan are 
not recognized by federal and state US agencies.  Therefore, each Jordanian 
product desiring to enter the US market must apply individually in the US for 
approval of its specific product prior to exporting.  This is an expensive and time-
consuming process. 
• Jordan does not have an MRA with the EU, but is negotiating one at the moment.  
It will only cover one or two products and tested for a few years to see if the 
process goes without major problems before expanding it to more products.  The 
goal is for Jordan and the EU to sign an Acceptance of Conformity Assessment & 
Acceptance of Industrial Products Agreement (ACA). 
• Further, the EU market currently requires that any Jordanian product imported 
must have a Manufacturer’s Representative who will be held in the Jordanian 
manufacturer if any problems arise.  It is very difficult for Jordanian 
manufacturers to secure a European company that agrees to act in such a 
capacity. 
• Another key impediment to entry into US and EU market is the cost of Jordanian 
goods, which can be high because: 
• Jordan produces few raw materials (potash and phosphate), which means 
any raw materials must be imported. 
• Jordan is not a producer of any technologies, especially manufacturing 
ones, which must in turn be imported as well. 
• Jordanian labour is generally not trained and requires considerable time 
for training.  It is also more expensive than imported labour. 
• The cost of water, electricity, and fuel are higher in Jordan than any 
regional country.  Jordan is one of the poorest countries in water 
resources and imports 95% of its energy. 
• Jordanian laws are amended and changed with such frequency that the investors 
are not always sure of what the law is saying. 
• Governmental agencies have benefited from technical assistance and support 
from the West, but these benefits admittedly have yet to be felt by the general 
public and the industrial sector. 
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14. Mohammad Halaiqah – Member of lower chamber of parliament (Former minister of 
industry and Trade.  Former Deputy Prime Minister.  Head of the Jordanian delegation to 
WTO accession negotiations.  Head of the Jordanian delegation to the JUSFTA 
negotiations) (9/8/2011)  
• Joining the WTO was a condition precedent to the JUSFTA. 
• Jordan made a decision to join the WTO and sign the JUSFTA because it wanted 
to change its economic dynamic that was dependent on the Iraqi market and 
cross-regional trade, and to execute economic and legal reforms. 
• The WTO negotiating team had representatives from the private sector including 
the commerce and industry chambers, and the Jordan Association of 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers. 
• Jordan is a small country with limited negotiating room.  Had to go through 
bilateral negotiations with 17 countries prior to reaching the WTO secretariat. 
• Jordan had a good deal with its WTO accession.  There was a trade off on patents 
and IP laws as Jordan accepted them in return for concessions elsewhere in the 
WTO and the JUSFTA. 
• The industrial sector itself through its limited marketing and lack of innovation 
and spending on development, bears part of the responsibility for failing to 
penetrate EU and US markets. 
• The FDI flow and technology transfer promises made by western countries were 
exaggerated and did not materialize, but the private sector and not the 
government’s spearhead such things anyway. 
• Jordan benefitted from the legal and economic reforms and the overall benefits of 
the WTO and the JUSFTA outweigh the drawbacks. 
• Even if parliament were in place at the time of WTO and JUSFTA negotiations, it 
would not have strengthened the Jordanian position. 
• TRIPS is a universal standard and it should be followed not negotiated. 
• A good deal of the laws that were enacted as part of the legal reform process for 
the WTO and the JUSFTA were not properly thought-out and analysed.  Some 
like the plant patents, geographical indicators, and the electronic circuits were 
translated out right.  That is acceptable because these laws represent the 
acceptable universal standard.   
• A good deal of the weaknesses in the negotiating position of Jordan at the time 
being is a result of the draining of qualified people out of the government, with 
only mediocre talents remaining. 
15. Ahmed Hammad – Head of Trade Policy Division – Ministry of Industry & Trade 
(18/8/2011) 
• Jordan is not a member to the ACTA negotiations and has no intention to sign it 
once completed. 
• Jordan was invited to, and attended, the first ACTA plenary meeting in 2007 in 
Geneva, and indicated afterwards that it is not interested in joining the ACTA 
once completed. Nevertheless, Jordan received an invitation from the EU to re-
join the ACTA negotiations in late 2010.  The official Jordanian position against 
ACTA has not changed though. 
• The reasons for the official Jordanian position are: 
• ACTA require substantive legislative amendments. 
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• ACTA will result in increased administrative and enforcement costs. 
• ACTA will require significant changes to the nature and level of 
authorities among the various involved governmental agencies. 
• Why is Jordan invited to ACTA? 
• Jordan has strong relations with the EU and the US 
• There is a need to market ACTA and by having Jordan on board, the case 
of selling it to other countries in the region can be easier. 
• Jordan is already on board with TRIPS-plus IPRs standards, and ACTA 
represents a move in the same direction. 
• The Jordanian decision maker does not have any studies on the impact of IPRs on 
Jordanian economic sectors, and therefore, decisions in that regard are made with 
a political agenda and not an economic or development-based one. 
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9.8 Annex 8: Questionnaire Students’ attitudes towards Copyright and Trademarks 
 
Pirated products, are those products that have a trademark holder’s brand on them, but are 
produced by companies with no affiliations to the registered trademark. Pirated products 
can also come in the form of CD’s containing illegally copied software or even books 
that have been copied without the permission of the publishing company that holds the 
rights to those books.   
Part-One: Current views regarding the use of pirated products amongst students of 
the University of Jordan 
1.0.1 Please read the following and place a check 
beside the result that best applies to you.  
 Yes  No  
___ 1. Have you purchased pirated products 
at least once? 
1 2 
2. Is it likely that you will continue to 
purchase pirated products? 
1 2  
___ 
3. I would not buy pirated products if I 
could afford the price of the original 
products ?  
1 2  
___ 
 
1.0.2 What is the main source that supplies/sells you pirated products? 
 Pirated Products dealer  1   
 
___ 
Shops that amongst other things, 
also sells pirated products 
2 
Friends and Family 3 
 
1.0.3 Are there any original computer software programs on your computer 
? 
 1. None at all   
          ___ 2. 1 to 3 original programs 
3. 4 or more  original  programs 
Part two: Students opinion on pirated products from a religious perspective 
2.0.1 Please read the following and place a check beside the result that best 
applies to you. 
 Yes No  
1. Are pirated products prohibited by 
religion?  
1 2  
___ 
2. If religion was to forbid buying pirated 
products, would you  purchase them?  
1 2  
___ 
3. Even if buying pirated products is 
prohibited by law, I shall still purchase 
them 
1 2  
___ 
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2.0.2 Considering that pirated products are not mentioned in any of the 
religious books, therefore my main reference on them comes from: 
 “Al-Mofti” 1   
 
___ 
 Local Religious Leaders 2 
 My Father/Mother 3 
 Others 4 
 
2.0.3 If your main religious reference declared that pirated products are prohibited 
under your religion, would you follow this opinion ? 
 1. Always   
___ 
 
 2. On Occasion 
 3. I would not 
 
3.0.1 Student Opinion on pirated products from a moral 
perspective 
 Yes No  
 
___ 
 
 
___ 
 
 
___ 
 
 
___ 
1. Production of pirated products 
is morally sound as it benefits 
those of a lower income.  
1 2 
2. Pirated products infringe on 
the rights of companies 
1 2 
3. I feel uncomfortable when 
purchasing pirated products 
1 2 
4. I will continue to purchase 
pirated products, even if I 
possess the financial ability to 
purchase originals.  
1 2 
5. Pirated products do not harm 
Arab and Muslim populations 
1 2 
6. Personally, I do not care if a 
company loses some profit over 
pirated products 
1 2 
Personal Information: 
Age (Years):  Sex:             Male/Female   
Marital Status:               Single               Married                  Other 
Average monthly Family income (Dinar): Who pays your university fees? 
 
Which college do you attend ? 
Place of Birth: (Country)  The province: (Residence of Family) 
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9.9 Annex 9: Frequency Tables 
 
Frequency Table 
 
q1011 Q101.1 I have you engaged at least one time in buying Counterfeit products? 
 
 Frequency Per Cent Valid Per Cent Cumulative Per Cent 
Valid 1 Yes 342 89.8 89.8 89.8 
2 No 39 10.2 10.2 100.0 
Total 381 100.0 100.0  
 
q1012 Q101.2 Are you likely to continue buying Counterfeit products? 
 
 Frequency Per Cent Valid Per Cent Cumulative Per Cent 
Valid 1 Yes 202 53.0 53.0 53.0 
2 No 179 47.0 47.0 100.0 
Total 381 100.0 100.0  
 
q1013 Q101.3 I will not buy Counterfeit products if I can afford to buy the original. 
 
 Frequency Per Cent Valid Per Cent Cumulative Per Cent 
Valid 1 Yes 245 64.3 64.3 64.3 
2 No 135 35.4 35.4 99.7 
6 I dont know 1 .3 .3 100.0 
Total 381 100.0 100.0  
 
q102 Q102. Do you have any original software installed on your computer? 
 
 Frequency Per Cent Valid Per Cent Cumulative Per Cent 
Valid 1 None 101 26.5 26.5 26.5 
2 One to two  227 59.6 59.6 86.1 
3 Three or more 50 13.1 13.1 99.2 
6 I dont know 1 .3 .3 99.5 
9 Missing 2 .5 .5 100.0 
Total 381 100.0 100.0  
 
q103 Q103. What is your main source for buying Counterfeit products? 
 
 Frequency Per Cent Valid Per Cent 
Cumulative Per 
Cent 
Valid 1 Dedicated shops only 94 24.7 24.7 24.7 
2 Dedicated shops and other 
places 
213 55.9 55.9 80.6 
3 Relatives and friends 73 19.2 19.2 99.7 
9 Missing 1 .3 .3 100.0 
Total 381 100.0 100.0  
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q2011 Q201.1Do you think that Counterfeit products are prohibited by religion? 
 
 Frequency Per Cent Valid Per Cent Cumulative Per Cent 
Valid 1 Yes 109 28.6 28.6 28.6 
2 No 251 65.9 65.9 94.5 
6 I dont know 18 4.7 4.7 99.2 
7 Refused to answer 1 .3 .3 99.5 
9 Missing 2 .5 .5 100.0 
Total 381 100.0 100.0  
 
q2012 Q201.2 If you know that Counterfeit products are prohibited by religion will you continue to buy and use such 
products? 
 
 Frequency Per Cent Valid Per Cent 
Cumulative Per 
Cent 
Valid 1 Yes 66 17.3 17.3 17.3 
2 No 309 81.1 81.1 98.4 
6 I dont know 4 1.0 1.0 99.5 
9 Missing 2 .5 .5 100.0 
Total 381 100.0 100.0  
 
q2013 Q201.3 If you know that state law prohibits Counterfeit products will you continue to buy and use such 
products? 
 
 Frequency Per Cent Valid Per Cent 
Cumulative Per 
Cent 
Valid 1 Yes 132 34.6 34.6 34.6 
2 No 247 64.8 64.8 99.5 
6 I dont know 1 .3 .3 99.7 
9 Missing 1 .3 .3 100.0 
Total 381 100.0 100.0  
 
q202 Q202. Counterfeiting is not addressed directly by religion, what is the main source of your Islamic actions and 
decisions? 
 Frequency Per Cent Valid Per Cent 
Cumulative Per 
Cent 
Valid 1 The Mufti 157 41.2 41.2 41.2 
2 The Cleric in my 
neighborhood 
60 15.7 15.7 57.0 
3 Parents 65 17.1 17.1 74.0 
4 Other 96 25.2 25.2 99.2 
6 I dont know 2 .5 .5 99.7 
9 Missing 1 .3 .3 100.0 
Total 381 100.0 100.0  
 
q203 Q203. If the source of your religious guidance deemed Counterfeiting prohibited by religion, how much will you 
abide by such an edict? 
 
 Frequency Per Cent Valid Per Cent 
Cumulative Per 
Cent 
Valid 1 Always  201 52.8 52.8 52.8 
2 Sometimes 148 38.8 38.8 91.6 
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3 Never 30 7.9 7.9 99.5 
6 I dont know 1 .3 .3 99.7 
9 Missing 1 .3 .3 100.0 
Total 381 100.0 100.0  
 
q3011 Q301.1Counterfeit products are ethical because they allow people with limited income access to goods, 
software and books. 
 
 Frequency Per Cent Valid Per Cent 
Cumulative Per 
Cent 
Valid 1 Yes 274 71.9 71.9 71.9 
2 No 104 27.3 27.3 99.2 
6 I dont know 1 .3 .3 99.5 
9 Missing 2 .5 .5 100.0 
Total 381 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 
q3012 Q301.2 Counterfeit products intrude on the rights of companies. 
 Frequency Per Cent Valid Per Cent 
Cumulative Per 
Cent 
Valid 1 Yes 286 75.1 75.1 75.1 
2 No 91 23.9 23.9 99.0 
6 I dont know 2 .5 .5 99.5 
9 Missing 2 .5 .5 100.0 
Total 381 100.0 100.0  
 
q3013 Q301.3 I feel uncomfortable when buying Counterfeit products. 
 
 Frequency Per Cent Valid Per Cent 
Cumulative Per 
Cent 
Valid 1 Yes 188 49.3 49.3 49.3 
2 No 190 49.9 49.9 99.2 
6 I dont know 1 .3 .3 99.5 
9 Missing 2 .5 .5 100.0 
Total 381 100.0 100.0  
 
q3014 Q301.4 I will continue to buy Counterfeit products even if I afford to buy the original. 
 
 Frequency Per Cent Valid Per Cent 
Cumulative Per 
Cent 
Valid 1 Yes 103 27.0 27.0 27.0 
2 No 273 71.7 71.7 98.7 
6 I dont know 3 .8 .8 99.5 
9 Missing 2 .5 .5 100.0 
Total 381 100.0 100.0  
 
q3015 Q301.5 Counterfeit products do not harm Muslim or Arab people. 
 
 Frequency Per Cent Valid Per Cent 
Cumulative Per 
Cent 
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Valid 1 Yes 173 45.4 45.4 45.4 
2 No 204 53.5 53.5 99.0 
6 I dont know 2 .5 .5 99.5 
9 Missing 2 .5 .5 100.0 
Total 381 100.0 100.0  
 
q3016 Q301.6 I do not personally care about the companies’ losses because of Counterfeiting. 
 
 Frequency Per Cent Valid Per Cent 
Cumulative Per 
Cent 
Valid 1 Yes 242 63.5 63.5 63.5 
2 No 135 35.4 35.4 99.0 
6 I dont know 2 .5 .5 99.5 
9 Missing 2 .5 .5 100.0 
Total 381 100.0 100.0  
 
q700  Q700.age 
 
 Frequency Per Cent Valid Per Cent 
Cumulative Per 
Cent 
Valid 18 11 2.9 2.9 2.9 
19 56 14.7 14.7 17.6 
20 91 23.9 23.9 41.5 
21 105 27.6 27.6 69.0 
22 43 11.3 11.3 80.3 
23 13 3.4 3.4 83.7 
24 15 3.9 3.9 87.7 
25 3 .8 .8 88.5 
26 5 1.3 1.3 89.8 
27 3 .8 .8 90.6 
28 1 .3 .3 90.8 
29 2 .5 .5 91.3 
30 1 .3 .3 91.6 
36 1 .3 .3 91.9 
38 1 .3 .3 92.1 
40 2 .5 .5 92.7 
44 1 .3 .3 92.9 
99 Missing 27 7.1 7.1 100.0 
Total 381 100.0 100.0  
 
q701 Q701.Sex 
 
 Frequency Per Cent Valid Per Cent 
Cumulative Per 
Cent 
Valid 1 male 177 46.5 46.5 46.5 
2 famle 199 52.2 52.2 98.7 
9 Missing 5 1.3 1.3 100.0 
Total 381 100.0 100.0  
 
q703 Q703.Marital Status 
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 Frequency Per Cent Valid Per Cent 
Cumulative Per 
Cent 
Valid 1 single 351 92.1 92.1 92.1 
2 Married 16 4.2 4.2 96.3 
3 Other 10 2.6 2.6 99.0 
9 Missing 4 1.0 1.0 100.0 
Total 381 100.0 100.0  
 
q704 Q704.Family monthly income 
 
 Frequency Per Cent Valid Per Cent 
Cumulative Per 
Cent 
Valid 150 1 .3 .3 .3 
200 1 .3 .3 .5 
250 7 1.8 1.8 2.4 
300 14 3.7 3.7 6.0 
320 1 .3 .3 6.3 
350 9 2.4 2.4 8.7 
365 1 .3 .3 8.9 
370 1 .3 .3 9.2 
400 14 3.7 3.7 12.9 
450 5 1.3 1.3 14.2 
470 1 .3 .3 14.4 
500 42 11.0 11.0 25.5 
600 21 5.5 5.5 31.0 
700 18 4.7 4.7 35.7 
750 1 .3 .3 36.0 
800 14 3.7 3.7 39.6 
850 1 .3 .3 39.9 
900 2 .5 .5 40.4 
995 1 .3 .3 40.7 
1000 54 14.2 14.2 54.9 
1200 7 1.8 1.8 56.7 
1250 1 .3 .3 57.0 
1300 1 .3 .3 57.2 
1400 3 .8 .8 58.0 
1450 1 .3 .3 58.3 
1500 11 2.9 2.9 61.2 
1640 1 .3 .3 61.4 
1700 2 .5 .5 61.9 
1900 1 .3 .3 62.2 
2000 19 5.0 5.0 67.2 
2500 4 1.0 1.0 68.2 
3000 2 .5 .5 68.8 
4000 1 .3 .3 69.0 
5000 3 .8 .8 69.8 
6000 1 .3 .3 70.1 
7000 1 .3 .3 70.3 
7500 1 .3 .3 70.6 
30000 1 .3 .3 70.9 
9999996 I dont know 4 1.0 1.0 71.9 
9999997 Refused to answer 17 4.5 4.5 76.4 
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 1.08 7.3 7.3 41 nwonknU 8999999
 0.001 9.91 9.91 67 gnissiM 9999999
  0.001 0.001 183 latoT
 
 seef noitiut ruoy gniyap si ohW.507Q 507q
 
 tneC reP dilaV tneC reP ycneuqerF 
 reP evitalumuC
 tneC
 5. 5. 5. 2  ﻓﺎﻋﻝ ﺧﻳﺭ   ۱ dilaV
 8.01 2.01 2.01 93  ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻔﻘﺗﻲ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺻﻪ   ۲
 0.11 3. 3. 1  ﻋﻣﻲ    ۳
 4.27 4.16 4.16 432  ﺍﻻﻫﻝ    ٤
 0.37 5. 5. 2  ﺯﻭﺟﻲ   ٥
 2.37 3. 3. 1  ﺣﻛﻭﻣﻪ    ٦
 1.57 8.1 8.1 7  ﺟﻳﺵ    ۷
 3.08 2.5 2.5 02  ﺩﻳﻭﺍﻥ ﻣﻠﻛﻲ   ۸
 6.08 3. 3. 1  ﺍﺧﻲ    ۹
 2.28 6.1 6.1 6  ﻭﺯﺍﺭﻩ ﺍﻟﺗﺭﺑﻳﻪ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻌﻠﻳﻡ   ۰۱
 3.48 1.2 1.2 8  ﺍﺑﻧﺎء ﻋﺎﻣﻠﻳﻳﻥ    ۱۱
 5.48 3. 3. 1  ﺍﺑﻧﺎء ﻣﺧﻳﻣﺎﺕ   ۲۱
 8.48 3. 3. 1  ﺍﻟﺗﻌﻠﻳﻡ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻲ   ٤۱
 0.58 3. 3. 1  ﺍﻻﻡ   ٥۱
 2.39 1.8 1.8 13  ﻣﻛﺭﻭﻣﻪ   ٦۱
 4.39 3. 3. 1  ﻣﻧﻅﻣﻪ ﻓﺗﺢ    ۷۱
 0.001 6.6 6.6 52  gnissiM  999
  0.001 0.001 183 latoT
 
 ytlucaf s’tnednopseR.607Q 607q
 
 tneC reP dilaV tneC reP ycneuqerF 
 reP evitalumuC
 tneC
 0.22 0.22 0.22 48  ﻫﻧﺩﺳﻪ   ۱ dilaV
 3.22 3. 3. 1  ﻋﻠﻭﻡ ﺳﻳﺎﺳﻳﻪ    ۲
 0.13 7.8 7.8 33  ﻋﻠﻭﻡ ﺗﺭﺑﻭﻳﻪ    ۳
 2.13 3. 3. 1  ﻋﻠﻭﻡ ﻭﺭﺍﺛﻳﻪ    ٤
 0.24 8.01 8.01 14  ﻋﻠﻭﻡ   ٥
 5.64 5.4 5.4 71  ﺷﺭﻳﻌﻪ    ٦
 5.74 0.1 0.1 4  ﺯﺭﺍﻋﻪ    ۷
 8.74 3. 3. 1  ﻁﺏ   ۸
 0.84 3. 3. 1  ﺭﻳﺎﺿﻳﺎﺕ    ۹
 3.84 3. 3. 1   ﺩﻭﻟﻳﻪﺩﺭﺍﺳﺎﺕ   ۰۱
 0.75 7.8 7.8 33  ﺗﻛﻧﻭﻟﻭﺟﻳﺎ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻠﻭﻣﺎﺕ    ۱۱
 6.57 6.81 6.81 17  ﺍﻻﻋﻣﺎﻝ    ۲۱
 9.57 3. 3. 1  ﺍﻻﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﻳﻪ   ۳۱
 7.88 9.21 9.21 94  ﺍﻻﺩﺍﺏ   ٤۱
 0.98 3. 3. 1  ﺍﻟﻠﻐﺎﺕ   ٥۱
 5.98 5. 5. 2  ﻫﻧﺩﺳﻪ ﺻﻧﺎﻋﻳﻪ   ٦۱
 8.98 3. 3. 1  ﻫﻧﺩﺳﻪ ﻣﻳﻛﺎﻧﻳﻛﻳﻪ    ۷۱
 0.09 3. 3. 1  ﻫﻧﺩﺳﻪ ﻣﺩﻧﻳﻪ    ۸۱
 5.59 5.5 5.5 12  ﻫﻧﺩﺳﻪ ﻭﺗﻛﻧﻭﻟﻭﺟﻳﺎ   ۹۱
 0.001 5.4 5.4 71 gnissiM  999
  0.001 0.001 183 latoT
 
 htrib fo yrtnuoc s’tnednopseR.707Q 707q
 
 802 
 tneC reP dilaV tneC reP ycneuqerF 
 reP evitalumuC
 tneC
 4.2 4.2 4.2 9  ﻓﻠﺳﻁﻳﻥ   ۱ dilaV
 1.68 7.38 7.38 913  ﺍﻻﺭﺩﻥ   ۲
 4.68 3. 3. 1  ﺍﻛﻭﺭﺍﻧﻳﺎ  -ﻛﻳﻑ   ۳
 2.98 9.2 9.2 11  ﻛﻭﻳﺕ   ٤
 0.09 8. 8. 3  ﺳﻭﺭﻳﻪ    ٥
 9.19 8.1 8.1 7  ﺍﻻﻣﺎﺭﺍﺕ   ٦
 1.29 3. 3. 1  ﺑﺭﻳﻁﺎﻧﻳﺎ   ۷
 5.49 4.2 4.2 9  ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻳﺔ   ۸
 8.49 3. 3. 1  ﺍﻟﺻﻳﻥ    ۹
 3.59 5. 5. 2  ﺍﻣﺭﻳﻛﻳﺎ    ۰۱
 5.59 3. 3. 1  ﻣﺻﺭ    ۱۱
 8.59 3. 3. 1  ﻟﻳﺑﻳﺎ    ۲۱
 1.69 3. 3. 1  ﻟﺑﻧﺎﻥ    ۳۱
 0.001 9.3 9.3 51  gnissiM  999
  0.001 0.001 183 latoT
 
 )ecnivorp( gnivil fo ecalp s’tnednopseR.807Q 807q
 
 tneC reP dilaV tneC reP ycneuqerF 
 reP evitalumuC
 tneC
 3. 3. 3. 1  ﻓﻠﺳﻁﻳﻥ   ۱ dilaV
 8.37 5.37 5.37 082  ﻋﻣﺎﻥ   ۲
 3.08 6.6 6.6 52  ﺍﻟﺑﻠﻘﺎء    ۳
 6.08 3. 3. 1  ﷲ ﺭﺍﻡ   ٤
 7.28 1.2 1.2 8  ﺟﺭﺵ    ٥
 2.38 5. 5. 2  ﺍﺭﺑﺩ   ٦
 7.38 5. 5. 2  ﺍﻟﻌﻘﺑﺔ   ۷
 3.48 5. 5. 2  ﺍﻟﻛﺭﻙ    ۸
 5.48 3. 3. 1  ﺍﻟﻁﻔﻳﻠﻪ    ۹
 3.58 8. 8. 3  ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻳﻪ   ۰۱
 2.98 9.3 9.3 51  ﺍﻟﺯﺭﻗﺎء    ۱۱
 5.98 3. 3. 1  ﺍﻟﺷﻭﻧﻪ   ۲۱
 8.98 3. 3. 1  ﺍﻻﻣﺎﺭﺍﺕ   ۳۱
 0.09 3. 3. 1  ﺍﻟﻣﻔﺭﻕ   ٤۱
 3.09 3. 3. 1  ﺍﻟﻣﻭﻗﺭ   ٥۱
 8.09 5. 5. 2  ﻣﻌﺎﻥ   ٦۱
 5.59 7.4 7.4 81  ﻣﺎﺩﺑﺎ    ۷۱
 8.59 3. 3. 1  ﻧﺎﺑﻠﺱ    ۸۱
 0.001 2.4 2.4 61  gnissiM  999
  0.001 0.001 183 latoT
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